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INTRODUCTION

This report was developed .to provide the City of Portland with guidance
on implementing its proposed Downtown Plan. The study has two basic
objectives. One is to determine the extent to which the Plan is realistic
in terms of economic conditions in downtown and in the Portland metropolitan area. The second objective is to examine implementation
measures for those Plan elements that are achievable, and recommend
procedures that are most appropriate.
The report has four main sections or chapters. Section I provides a
brief discussion of the Plan, and describes its basic objectives and more
controversial or uncertain elements. As implementation of the Plan
depends upon economic conditions in the Portland area, an analysis is
made in Section II of those conditions as they apply to the downtown.
Trends in the use of downtown land vis-a-vis the metropolitan area as
a whole are examined to determine what is likely to happen in downtown
in the event the City continues on in its present direction, without
adoption of the Plan and related programs to guide use of downtown land.
In Section III the discussion turns to available implementation procedures
and techniques, and the prospects and implications of implementing the
various Plan elements. Section IV outlines those techniques and
implementation procedures that make the most sense for Portland,
indicates which of the Plan elements do not make sense in light of
economic realities, and discusses the implications on future downtown
land use if Plan elements are adopted.

MAJOR OBJECTIVES A'ND ELEMENTS
OF THE DOWNTOWN PORTLAND PLAN

The City of Portland's Downtown Plan, subject of this study, has been
the subject of considerable public and private technical work and discussion over the past four to five years. The plan itself, consisting of
a series of technical reports and supporting material, has been adopted
as a series of policy recommendations by the City (Planning Commission
and the City Council in 1972). Presently, the major elements of the
Downtown Plan are again being examined within the context of regional
growth trends, transportation requirements, design features, development regulations and requirements for public action.
Since this economic analysis of Downtown Plan proposals must speak to
the various elements of the plan as well as the overall thrust of the
planning approach, a concise review of the plan itself is provided.

SYNTHESIS OF PROPOSALS, DOWNTOWN
PORTLAND PLAN
The Downtown Plan considers a rather large area (termed "The Downtown", but really including both the Central Business District (CBD)
and adjacent residential and commercial districts). In total, some 740
acres or 483 city blocks (at 40,000 square feet each) are included
within the planning area. All of Portland's CBD is included, as well
as a large segment of the Willamette Riverfront (Marquam Bridge
north to the Broadway Bridge), the Portland Center concentration
(South Auditorium Redevelopment Project), the Portland State University
campus, and mixed residential, warehousing and other mixed commercial zones. Please refer to Plate I for a graphic illustration of the
Downtown Plan Area.
The plan and its related policy recommendations clearly attempt to
merge accommodation of the recent past and the present with an
expected future form and character of the central city. As a plan, it
is a rather different animal: it is not purely a design plan, nor is it
a "goals and objectives" effort alone; rather, it is a sometimes curious
mixture of physical planning and proposals for socioeconomic change
related to uses and functions of Downtown Portland.

Basic Concepts Reviewed
Overall, the Downtown Plan presents the following important concepts
o

A call for the strengthening of Downtown Portland
as the region's center of commerce, entertainment
and institutional activity.

o

Limitation of high-rise commercial building to a
reinforced, but controlled, "linear-centroid"
pattern of development.

o

Introduction of diversity in uses to various
districts within the planning area.

o

Reclamation of the Willamette waterfront zone
and conversion to "people-oriented" recreation
and open space use.

o

Limitations upon the amount and location of
automobile parking within the CBD; installation
of peripheral parking to replace parking within
the important CBD business and retail blocks.

o

Elimination of free vehicular circulation
throughout the planning area; redirection of
certain traffic flows.

o

Major upgrading of mass transit useage, with
selected corridors devoted to transit emphasis.

o

Increased ability for pedestrians to move freely
through the planning area without undue conflict
with auto traffic.

o

Strengthening of the CBD's retail core.

o

Introduction of additional residential use into
the planning area as a whole.

o

Selective redevelopment of transition areas,
"blighted areas" and other areas where reuse
of land appears possible or desirable for the
general public good.

This rather formidable list takes in the major Downtown Plan proposals,
There are supplementary or related proposals that call for numerous
changes Downtown that appear to be socially or environmentally beneficial. To name a few:
Supplementary Proposals
o

To enhance the "livability" of Downtown
(environmental improvements, increased
%
public services, etc.)

o

To improve student housing stock (serving
PSU student body)

o

To reduce air and noise pollution, auto
impacts, etc.

o

To promote Downtown as an "entertainment
and cultural center"

o

To identify and protect historical structures
and locations

o

To create an "urban setting" (design approach,
increased esthetic quality)

These and the overall major planning objectives expressed in the
Downtown Plan are backed up by very detailed, virtually block-by-block
"guidelines" for the various zones within the area.
Is The Plan Controversial?
While the plan's key recommendations appear at first glance very
sweeping, the overall plan actually presents bold recommendations
for significant change in but a few aspects of its coverage. In our
view, these are: (1) the limitation of automobile flow and storage in
the CBD; (2) proposed control of building heights and coverage;
(3) reliance upon and accommodations of mass transit service; and
(4) proposed conversion of the waterfront to new commercial, residential and public use. This is not to demean other plan elements or
an attempt to rank recommendations in importance, but many of the
other elements of the plan are rather salutary toward the existing
pattern of uses, or might seem relatively uncontroversial when viewed
by contemporary urban analysts and designers.

And, to reinforce our view, certain objections have been raised by others
regarding the four significant items above. It would be fair to say, we
believe, that the controls implied in the Downtown Plan might be termed
revolutionary by some Portland citizens, businessmen and public officials,
This is to be expected; planning has yet to be universally embraced, particularly when it appears to go beyond boostcrism or the absolute accommodation of laissez-faire politics and investment. In order to study the
Downtown Plan and evaluate its potential impacts upon pure market-based
behavior, however, one must look more closely at its components.

NOTABLE PLAN RECOMMENDATIONS AND
IMPLIED FUTURE CONDITIONS

The Downtown Plan neither rejects nor embraces apparent trends in use
and activity within the planning area. Rather, it conditionally provides
for continued location of regional and local commercial and institutional
uses in Downtown, and attempts to redistribute, to an extent, the anticipated volume of new uses expected through a twenty-year time horizon
(to 1990 in this case). P'or example, with respect to major uses appropriate, the plan recommends as follows:
Office Commercial Use
The growing importance of institutional and general office employment
in Portland is clearly recognized in the plan. Office space already
located in Downtown is designated to remain so; and various "zones"
of office space concentration are specifically discussed in plan documents and drawings. These are, primarily, (1) existing, older and
new CBD buildings; (2) the Portland Center concentration; and (3)
waterfront projects underway or being actively discussed.
For the office corridor (mainly new structures on 4th-5th-6th Avenues
between Portland State University and the CBD) major transit service
is recommended - the Transit Mall - and further automobile parking
capacity rejected.
Contemplated height and bulk regulations are designed to permit continuation of high-rise construction in this corridor. Elsewhere, the
suggested development regulations tend to drive heights down and
encourage lower-profile development. Office space of a less imposing
nature than that addressed in the "corridor" is encouraged throughout
significant emerging or possible reuse areas (in the waterfront zone,
CBD fringes, and so forth). Significant office redevelopment potential

is anticipated, or at least suggested, in the plan. High density office
development is restricted to the "corridor" (Broadway-Fourth, Market
to Burnside).
Retail Commercial Use
The historical concentration of department stores in the CBD (at Fifth
and Sixth Avenues surrounding the Meier & Frank store) is encouraged
and protected by a series of recommendations. Parking is restricted
to remove this pressure for land use conversion; a park is planned for
environmental improvement; reuse potential nearby is pointed out to
possibly increase retail floor area; pedestrian connections are improved
(at grade and with "skyways"). Finally, the 5th-6th Avenue corridor is
restricted to a transit emphasis (termed the "Transit Mall"), reducing
automobile flow. A corresponding transit mall on Alder and Morrison
Streets adds to this reduction in automobile dominance.
Throughout the remainder of the planning area, retail space of various
types is also encouraged, allowing almost unlimited expansion of this
major Downtown activity. No specific suggestions related to actually
regulating the scale or distribution are offered.
Hotel/Entertainment Use
The plan is less definitive in dealing with this category of Downtown use.
Existing hotels, restaurants, theaters, and related uses receive a brief
discussion and are "protected" in areas where they now exist. The principal hotel zone (surrounding the Benson, Hilton, Congress, Haviland,
etc.) is so retained. Other areas where new hotels might well locate
are, however, numerous enough to support dispersal and perhaps an
ultimate reduction in the "critical mass" of these uses. Some reuse
potential for hotels or entertainment in the Yamhill-Taylor "corridor"
(from Broadway to Third) is considered. Skyway connections between
major facilities are recommended. The Pioneer Square and Courthouse
blocks in this vicinity are treated as "open space. "
Public Institutional Use
Two major public space concentrations, both existing, are preserved
(but permitted expansion) in the plan. Portland State University receives
various recommendations related to supporting circulation and open
space. The "Government Center" (containing at present federal, state,
county and city offices) is designed to retain these activities and permit
additions as space requirements change. A strong pedestrian tie to the
waterfront zone is included in the plan. A system of pedestrian skyways
and grade crossings is linked to various buildings and parking facilities.

Public Recreational Use
A major and dramatic element of the Dow town Plan is the recommended
turnover of the Willamette River frontage within the planning area to
public use. This bold step (partially completed by the recent abandonment of the Harbor Way thoroughfare) creates a strong magnet for the
reuse of adjacent, generally underutilized blocks for a variety of uses.
This creation of a massive amount of new public space on the river is
one of the plan's key strategy items. The remainder of the Downtown
Area, not surprisingly, receives less attention in terms of park, open
space and recreation development (see, however, various proposals
mentioned in detailed district plans).
Residential Use
Considerable emphasis on accommodating new housing in Downtown
Portland is woven throughout the plan. Although some careful reading
is required to segregate implied residential policies, it is obvious that
housing is recommended to be conserved (as in existing concentrations
of apartments, apartment hotels and the like) as well as constructed
(there are a number of locations identified, including the waterfront
zone, PSU area, west of Tenth Avenue, etc.). Mixing housing into
other uses is discussed, and redevelopment for housing is implied in
various built-up, older areas of Downtown.
Specific public action to support housing is not really developed; but
the implied support to generate residential reuse is discussed.

SPECIFIC PLANNING DISTRICT GUIDELINES

The Downtown Plan addresses the future form of Downtown Portland
in a broad or generalized sense, but also deals with urban design and
specific planning guidelines on a subarea or "district" basis.
Plate II contains a reduced version of a composite of Planning District
sub-plans (18 Districts in all). These districts are treated on a
grouped basis in the final Downtown Plan reports, with specific recommendations for public improvements and land use varying from one to
the next. For readers wishing to relate major zones of interest in
Downtown Portland to the plan's "districts", we are providing this
summary:

Major Zone
Office Corridor
Retail Core

Covered By
Districts in Downtown Plan
Areas 1 and 16
Area 2

Waterfront
Retail/Exhibition Center

Area 3

West of Riverfront

Area 6

Downtown Waterfront

Area 4

South Waterfront

Area 10

Old Town

Area 5

Government Center

Area 7

Auditorium

Area 8

Portland Center

Area 9

Portland State University

Areas 11 and 12

West of Tenth

Area 14

Central Park Blocks

Area 15

South Park

Area 13

Hotel /Entertainment Core

Area 16

Union State /Railyard

Area 20

Industrial/Warehousing

Areas 17 and 18

ACTUAL AND IMPLIED REDEVELOPMENT
RECOMMENDATIONS

Two specifically identified redevelopment areas were developed by the
City Council and Portland Development Commission during the final
stages of Downtown Plan preparation; therefore these areas may be
viewed as an integral part of the plan. For planning purposes, redevelopment has been directed toward the Willamette Riverfront. (See Plate
III for delineation of the proposed waterfront renewal zone, an amalgamation of two areas identified in early drawings.)
Outside the designated Waterfront Redevelopment Area, there are no
specific action areas earmarked for publicly-supported reuse, although
the large number of "opportunity blocks" noted in Downtown Plan
drawings (well over forty blocks total) seems suitable for reuse at
least from a planning viewpoint (or the drafters of the Downtown Plan).
No specific rating of these blocks or assembled blocks has been made,
however, and consideration of reuse has remained suggestive only.
One "redevelopment opportunity" is noted for the Union Station/Railyards
site north of Steel Bridge.

SPECIFIC (NEAR-TERM) ACTION PROPOSALS

In addition to the recommended waterfront renewal program already
noted, the Downtown Plan (in its final report format) also recommends
a series of near-term actions (termed "First Phase Projects" in the
report) designed to begin implementation of various plan proposals.
Summarized, these action proposals are:
o

Close Ilarbor Drive, improve waterfront
zone, begin waterfront redevelopment program;

o

Begin 5th-6th Transit Mall Project; construct
phase one peripheral parking facilities; construct skyways from parking and Burnside area
to M&F Store; acquire M&F parking block and
develop as "Downtown Central Square";

o

Develop GSA Block (Federal Building) in coordination with Chapman and Lownsdaie Squares;
begin Government Center redevelopment project;

"•

o

Implement housing relocation programs for
Skid Road and Lownsdale area residents;

o

Continue Portland State and South Auditorium
renewal projects;

o

Accomplish various traffic improvements.

The plan emphasized 1975 as the target date for these proposals,
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DEMAND FOR DOWNTOWN LAND, 1975 TO 1990,
ASSUMING MINIMUM DIRECTION BY THE CITY

This section provides a review of land use trends in the Portland downtown
with projections to 1990. In this section it is assumed that the city will
follow a relatively passive rather than activist program to encourage and
direct central area reuse, and the land use projections reflect that assumption. Later in the report, in Section VI, this assumption is relaxed, and
projections reflecting a more aggressive set of policies on the part of the
city are provided.
Projections made in this section are essentially extrapolations of past
Portland area performance, but modified by changes in a variety of conditions that we expect to affect Portland area land use trends. These
conditions are exogenous, or largely outside of the control of the city,
such as growth in Portland area employment and population, growth in
real income in the United States, shifts in policies and programs of the
federal government, etc.
The report is developed to provide a view of what the Portland downtown
will look like in 15 years if present Portland area land use trends continue
in a more or less uninterrupted fashion. Obviously, no trends continue
uninterrupted through time but rather are modified as a result of new
economic conditions or public actions. The very act of forecasting frequently sets in motion pressure for change, particularly if the forecasts
are sufficiently gloomy. Nonetheless, the exercise is very useful, in
the sense that it provides a basis for knowing what the extent of the
problem is or is likely to be, and for providing insights into how the city
can formulate an effective response. The trends provide an order of
magnitude use of downtown land for six basic categories, which are:
.
.
.
.
.
.

Commercial office space
Public office space uses
Hotel/motel
Retail
Housing
Entertainment and cultural

OPERATING ASSUMPTIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE STUDY AREA

While the study area is the CBD, its future is to a great extent tied to
growth and change in the metropolitan area as a whole. While the
relationship is a complex one, the very rapid recent building boom in the
downtown paralleled in at least a rough fashion the rapid growth in population and employment in the SMSA since 1963, and it is probable that, if
the latter trend is interrupted in the future, the former one will be
similarly affected. In addition, the character of the Portland CBD has
been altered, in some cases dramatically, by policies of the federal
government. These, too, could change. Finally, both Portland area
population growth and federal policies could be altered by changes in real
income in the U.S. , as will be seen. There are other exogenous variables
that could affect the Portland CBD, but these are the principal ones, and
will be discussed briefly.
Population & Employment Growth
Table 1 provides population estimates for the four-county Portland SMSA
over the years 1960 to 1973, and projections to 1990 at the 2.1 percent
average annual compound rate of increase which prevailed during the
years 1962 to 1973, when the Portland area experienced considerable
population inmigration. As can be seen, there have been surges of
population growth in the area, followed by slowdowns which correspond
to the decline in home building activity in the U.S., such as in 1962, 1966-67
and 1973. The Portland area is a service center for a vast hinterland
which accounts for much of the nation's output of wood products; hence
it is obviously still sensitive to changes in income flows in the wood products industry, even though this industry now directly accounts for only
10 percent of total manufacturing employment in Portland itself.
Portland has, on the other hand, been the focus of significant recent
growth of new, dynamic manufacturing firms producing high value consumer goods, instruments, electronic equipment, private aircraft, and
highly specialized custom products (trucks, rail cars, and machinery)
designed for non-Pacific Northwest markets. Manufacturing employment
increased in the area from 64,400 to 86,300 between 1960 and 1968, a 3. 7
percent average annual increase. Employment in four categories-machinery, electronic equipment, transportation equipment, and instruments—doubled, reaching 29, 500 by 1968, and accounted for most of the
net manufacturing employment increase. Growth in those industries
apparently explains the surge of population growth after 1963. Prior to
that time, the Portland area growth rate was roughly one percent per

i •:

TABLE 1

POPULATION OF THE PORTLAND SMSA
1960-1973 & PROJECTIONS TO 1990
AVERAGE ANNUAL

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1975
1980
1985
1990

SOURCE:

PERCENT CHANGE

TOTAL

YEAR

__

821,897
838,951
844,215
857,989
880,628
919,627
934,754
941,438
968,645
1,009,129
1,034,360
1,049,500
1,059,300
1,101,700
1,218,200
1,355,900
1,504,200

2. 1
.6
1.6
2.6
4.4
1.6

.7
2.9

2. 1
2.4
1.5
.9

2.
2.
2.
2.

1
1
1
1

1960-1968 ESTIMATES BY CENTER FOR POPULATION RESEARCH AND
CENSUS,

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY.

ESTIMATES BY U . S .

LoRD/LeBlanc.

1970

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS.

PRELIMINARY
PROJECTIONS BY

year, slightly below the national average. Since 1968, growth in manufacturing employment has levelled off, but employment has continued to
grow, mainly in the trade, services and government sections (up 18. 3
percent).
As can be seen in Table 1, Portland population growth has again slowed
in the past two years, principally because of a decline in employment.
Whether the 2. 1 percent growth rate can be sustained in future years is
not clear; but in the absence of any compelling reasons to conclude it
will change, we conclude that the experience of the past ten years is a
valid basis for projecting future growth in the area.
Growth in Real Income
The importance of continued growth in real income is frequently overlooked and underestimated, but in light of recent trends in the U. S. , this
crucial variable should not be overlooked. Growth in Portland population
in the past decade, although rapid, accounted for only roughly 33 percent
of the net increase in retail space constructed over this period, while
growth in real income accounted for most of the remainder. Looked at
another way, a decline of real per capita income growth from 4 to 3
percent would result in 16 percent less additional retail space required
on an annual basis in the Portland area.
Even more significant for the downtown is what effect a slowdown in real
income growth may have on living patterns and habits in the U. S. Such
a slowdown could have a substantial long term impact on residential,
entertainment, commuting and other patterns and preferences of residents
of urban areas. These can only be touched on here.
There are at least two problems in the recent past which have caused a
marked slowdown in growth in per capita income and which may be short
term in duration or a harbinger of things to come. The two are changes
in the availability of raw materials, principally oil, and in food supplies.
While the oil crisis was mainly politically derived (i. e. , the Arab Nations'
gambit of pressing for more political leverage through reduction of oil
supplies), the energy problem will remain, as the nation's energy resource
deficiency is really quite complex.
A more significant cause of the recent very rapid growth in consumer
prices has been the increases in food prices. Despite the energy crisis,
the year 1973 would have closed with a substantial gain in real per capita
income in the United States had it not been for a very sharp increase in
food prices. This increase more than offset the increased productivity

of the nation's manufacturing sector and caused overall real incomes
to increase only marginally (less than 1 percent) during the past year.
The causes of food shortages are very complex; but from our reading
of recent developments, there may be some strong reasons to be concerned about the future. A one percent decline worldwide in food
production in 1973 was enough to create worldwide shortages. There is
also evidence that weather patterns are changing, with the apparent
long-term trend towards colder and more erratic weather and with a
very definite decline in monsoon rains in the world's Equatorial area,
which will most probably continue to create significant food deficiencies
in these areas.
This has forced the U.S. to become a major exporter
of food supplies.
The outlook at this time is for worldwide food supplies to continue to be
erratic. If this is the case, this means, more than likely, continuation
of relatively rapid inflation in the United States, further eroding whatever
gains might result from increased productivity. Real per capita income
has grown at varying rates in the U.S. at various intervals in the past.
During the past 13 years, the rate has been more on the order of 4 percent.
We have used a compound growth rate of 3 percent over the forecast period.
In view of the many uncertainties evident at the present time, this estimate
could turn out to be high.
An analysis of the nature and magnitude of the impact of this situation
is outside of the scope of this investigation, but one probable result will
be a continued shift in living habits and preferences of urban residents
from "superior" goods to "inferior" ones (houses to apartments and
perhaps private autos to public transit, for example).
The continued acceptance of apartment living has been reinforced by
trends in the costs of housing construction. The shifting age composition
in the state towards more persons in their 30's and fewer in their 20's
should have brought with it a corresponding increase in the demand for
single family dwellings. Such a shift has in fact been in evidence during
the past three years; but continued rapid increases in housing costs,
including high interest rates, has modified the extent to which demand for
one-family dwelling units has grown in the Portland area. A s a result,
there has been a greater growth in the number of apartments than might
have been anticipated, and we see no reason for this trend to abate. In
other words, both income and price effects have been at work encouraging
this alteration in Portland area residential patterns.

1

A variety of recent news articles have described the problem. See, for
example, "We Can't Take Food for Granted Anymore" and "Ominous
Changes in the World's Weather", Fortune, February, 1974.
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Greater reliance on apartments would mean that a greater share of the
city's work force could be more conveniently served for commuting purposes by public transportation. This in turn may have a bearing on
commercial activity, particularly offices, encouraging centrality rather
than dispersion. How pronounced these shifts will be, however, is not
clear at this point.
Policies of the Federal Government
Federal programs will obviously have a bearing not only on how rapidly
the Portland region will expand but also on the future character of the
downtown. A slowdown in real income will have a bearing on the availability of federal monies for subsidizing housing, in the urban core or
picking up public transit deficits, which are likely to be high in the next
decade.
The outlook for continued rapid growth in federal expenditures in cities,
on the order of the past decade, is not promising. In 1971 federal
government expenditures were $211 billion. The projection made by the
Brookings Institute for the 1977 budget was for an approximate 45 percent .
increase over the 1973 budget to $370 billion. As it turns out, the 1974
budget is already far above earlier projections. Part of the increase can
be explained by inflation, but the principal cause has been in the increases
in Health, Education and Welfare programs.
It is hard to see how this trend can continue. This growth has taken place
without any corresponding increase in taxation2 and has resulted in a
series of continuous budgetary deficits during periods of high employment
and inflation. No one is certain how this problem is going to be resolved,
but the effort to channel federal monies to the communities through the
lump-sum route of revenue sharing, both general and special, rather
than the more customary grant process, has been somewhat disappointing,
as the total level of federal monies reaching the cities has not increased
particularly in real terms. Given the many problems faced by the nation
in the years ahead, it is doubtful that we will continue to see the acceleration in federal programs favoring communities that we have in the past
ten years (although there will probably be a restructuring of programs).
We must assume, then, that the City of Portland's efforts with respect
to its downtown must rely largely on local, rather than federal, support.

1 Brookings Institute, Setting National Priorities: The 1974 Budget
(Washington, D.C. , July 1973).
2 Taxes have actually been cut substantially as a result of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 and the Revenue Act of 1971.
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DEMAND FOR OFFTCE SPACE
IN THE DOWNTOWN, 1975 to 1990

The amount of future office space demand in the Portland central area
will depend upon the growth in such space in the metropolitan area as a
whole over the next 15 years and how successfully the central area is
able to compete for a continuing share of this growth.
Projected SMSA Office Space Requirements
Total employment in office-using categories in the total Portland metropolitan area in 1962 was on the order of 30, 800 persons. By 1971, this
level had grown to 51, 200, a net increase of nearly 22,400, or 66. 2
percent. The greatest absolute growth took place in finance, insurance
and real estate employment, but all categories showed rather strong
rates of growth. Miscellaneous business services, for example, increased
by nearly 5, 600 persons over this period.
Translating this growth in employment into space, and using West Coast
space coefficients, the four-county Portland SMSA would have required
some 5. 2 million square feet of office space in 1962 and nearly 8. 6 million
by 1971, a net increase of some 3. 4 million square feet. Looked at on an
average annual basis, the area would have absorbed on the order of
375,000 square feet per year. These data are seen in Table 2.
This total does not include space for office functions of manufacturing,
construction, retail and wholesale entities, either proprietary or leased.
This amount is impossible to estimate precisely, but based on work the
consultants have done in other areas, this component will add 10 to 15
percent to the general office space requirement. Assuming the latter
estimate, the entire four-county Portland metropolitan area had an annual
requirement of roughly 430,000 square feet of net additional office space
over this nine-year interval.
In addition, a portion of the total office space inventory is removed each
year, as a result of conversions or demolitions resulting from age or
other uses of the land. The amount of space removed each year varies.
On the average, probably 2 to 3 percent of the total stock is removed.
This seldom results in a requirement for a comparable amount of space,
however, as these buildings tend to have relatively low occupancy levels
by the time they are ready for removal.

TABLE

2

EMPLOYMENT IN OFFICE-ORIENTED ACTIVITIES
PORTLAND S . M . S . A 8c OFFICE SPACE REQUIREMENTS, 1962 8c 1971
PER EMPLOYEE

SPACE

SPACE

REQUIRED

REQUIRED

CHANGE

EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT

CHANGE

PERCENT

SPACE

1962

1971

1962-1971

CHANGE

COEFFICIENT

14,794

22,864

8,070

54.6

150

2,219,100

3,429,600

1,210,500

3,927

9,494

5,567

141.8

150

589,050

1 ,424,100

835,050

874

1,458

584

66.8

225

196,650

328,050

131,400

4,867

6,614

1 ,747

35.9

200

973,400

1 ,322,800

349,400

1,871

3,338

1 ,467

78.4

175

327,425

584,150

256,725

4.477

7.441

2.964

66.2

200

895,400

1.488.200

592.800

30,810

51,209

20,399

66.2

5,201,025

8,576,900

3,375,875

1962

(SQ.FT.)

1971

(SQ.FT.)

1962-1971
(SQ.FT.)

F I N A N C E , INSURANCE AND
R E A L ESTATE
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS
SERVICES

A

L E G A L SERVICES
NON-PROFIT MEMBERSHIP

B

ORGANIZATIONS
MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES
SELF-EMPLOYED

MANAGERS

AND PROFESSIONALS

TOTAL

A

C

ADVERTISING, DUPLICATING SERVICES,
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, TEMPORARY
HELP SERVICES, CREDIT REPORTING AND
COLLECTIONS, EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES, ETC.

B

LABOR, PROFESSIONAL, BUSINESS, C I V I C ,
RELIGIOUS, CHARITABLE AND NON-PROFIT.

c

ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, ACCOUNTANTS

SOURCE:

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS.

BASED ON SAN FRANCISCO SURVEY BY M I L T O N MEYER &

Co.

SPACE COEFFICIENTS

Future SMS A & Portland
Requirements for Office Space
The SMSA requirement for office space grew on a relatively constant
basis over the past decade. Table 3 shows the growth in employment
in office-using categories. As can be seen, employment moved upward
continuously until 1960. During the next two years, employment gains
in office categories were small. Between 1971 and 1972 these categories
again increased. Using this curve for projecting future employment levels
and space requirements, there will be a need for roughly 13. 3 million
square feet by 1980 and 17. 9 million by 1990, a net average annual gain
of approximately 460, 000 to 470, 000 square feet during the years 197 5 to
1990, or a need for 360, 000 square feet annually.
Growth in office space within the Portland city limits was slightly lower,
from roughly 4. 9 million square feet in 1962 to 7. 9 million by 1972, a 4. 9
percent compound rate of growth. By 1980 the city will, if present trends
continue, have a requirement for a net additional 2. 5 million square feet
over the 1972 level, and by 1990 this requirement will have grown to 5. 6
million square feet to accommodate finance, insurance, real estate and
a variety of business and professional services. Adding an additional
15 percent for office space connected with manufacturing, distributive,
utility, construction and other such businesses, the total requirement
in the Portland city limits would have increased between 1962 and 1972
to 3. 5 million square feet, or 350,000 annually. There will be a total
additional requirement of 2. 9 million square feet by 1980 and 6. 5 million
by 1990.
This space will be concentrated principally in two areas, the Portland
downtown and the Lloyd Genter. The trend in new medical office space
locations is toward hospital environs. There continues to be a demand
for other professional and services-oriented office space in the various
neighborhoods within the Portland city limits, but the magnitude of such
space is small in terms of the city's total. Allocating space between the
downtown and the Lloyd Center environs is somewhat difficult, as the
area's potential depends to a great extent on supply conditions (the
availability of suitable sites, for example, as the Lloyd Corporation
plans only one additional building in the area). However, the Lloyd
Corporation has been able to construct and lease close to 480, 000
square feet of space in two towers in the past five years, and while some
of this space is spillover from federal agencies in the area, it is obvious
that the Lloyd Center is attractive to tenants. A requirement of 60, 000
to 70, 000 square feet would appear to us to be attainable annually in the
Lloyd Center area, with the remaining 290,000 to 300,000 in downtown.

TABLE

3

GROWTH IN OFFICE EMPLOYMENT,
PORTLAND S . M . S . A . , CITY OF PORTLAND
& SUBURBAN, 1962 TO 1972, & PROJECTED
1980, 1985 & 1990

PORTLAND

C I T Y OF

OUTSIDE

PERCENT

SMSA

PORTLAND

PORTLAND

SUBURBAN

1962

30,810

27,947

3,653

11.6

1964

33,917

29,662

4,255

12.6

1965

36,570

32,123

4,447

12.2

1966

40,336

35,024

5,332

13.2

1967

41,836

36,024

5,812

13.9

1968

46,363

39,215

7,148

15.4

1969

50,064

41,520

8,544

17.1

1970

51,444

42,220

9,224

17.9

1971

51,209

41,348

9,861

18.8

1972

56,581

45,217

11,364

20.1

1980

76,100

59,500

16,600

21.8

1985

89,000

68,500

20,500

23.0

1990

102,000

77,200

24,800

24.3

SOURCE:

Lord/LeBlanc.

Supply, on the other hand, increased in a rather erratic fashion during
the past decade. As can be seen in Table 4, the supply of new office
space coming on stream in the downtown and the Lloyd Center varied
from zero in 1966 to 884,000 in 1970, with the annual average at 312,000
square feet. The differential between annual supply and the 350,000
square feet of annual demand noted above is explained mainly by growth
outside of the downtown and Lloyd Center (such as in space for administrative personnel next to plants and warehouses in the case of manufacturers
and distributors, and professional, business and personal services in
neighborhood areas).
The annual rate of growth in SMSA office employment between 1962 and
1972 was on the order of 6. 2 percent compounded, which was nearly
three times the rate of growth in population and roughly 1. 8 times the
rate of growth in employment in general. The 6. 2 percent growth rate
will not be sustained in the future.
The principal reason for the expected decline in the rate of growth in
Portland area office employment is a projected decline in the rate of
growth in the area's labor force. The labor force has been growing very
rapidly in the Portland area over the last decade, on the order of 3. 4
percent compounded, in contrast with the much slower 2.1 percent growth
in population. However, this performance will not continue. The principal reason for the rapid growth in the labor force, which increased from
a level of 40 percent of total population to about 44 percent between the
period 1960 to 1972, was the rapid growth in numbers of post-World War II
youngsters moving into their employable ages during this ten-year interval.
This phenomenon will not take place in the period 1970 to 1980, however.
The birth rate began to slow during the post-War era, and the net increase
in the number of Portland area residents in the age group 25 to 29 will
decline from 16, 586 between 1970 and 1975, to 6, 752 between 1975 and
1980, to 1,638 during the next five-year interval.!
We would have to expect a slowdown in the office employment growth
rate. If office employment continued to increase by 6. 2 percent compounded as it had during the past decade, while the labor force growth
rate was dropping to a level roughly comparable to the rate of growth
in population, office employment in the Portland area would double within
12 years, while the total labor force increased by 26 percent. This
suggests that, while the total labor force grew by 139,000,. in the next
12 years office employment would grow by 58, 500, or 41 percent.

1 Projections by Lord/LeBlanc. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projected
Oregon's labor force to grow at a rate of 20. 7 percent in 1960 to
1970 and 14. 7 percent between 1970 and 1980. "Labor Force Projections
by State, 1970 and 1980", Monthly Labor Review (U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, October, 1966).

TABLE 4

NEW OFFICE BUILDINGS

CONSTRUCTION

PORTLAND DOWNTOWN & LLOYD CENTER,
1962 TO 1973
(NET

LEASABLE SQUARE FEET)

NEW
YEAR

1962
1963
1 964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

CONSTRUCTION,

NET RENTABLE SQUARE FEET

75,000
346,600

•

TOTAL, 1962-1973

265,000
75,000
105,000
132,400
120,000
884,000
200,000
720,000
500.000
3,433,000

ANNUAL AVERAGE

1962-1973
1964-1968
1969-1973

SOURCE:

286,033
301,140
484,800

MARLETT & ASSOCIATES, SELECTED IMPACTS OF THE
PACIFIC R I M CENTER PROJECT, PORTLAND. OREGON
(PREPARED FOR THE DAVIDSON COMPANY, J U L Y ,

PP. 3 & 11.

1973),

Changing Locational Patterns
•of SMSA Office Space
The Portland downtown continues to be the major center for office
activity in the Portland area, although a growing share of such space is
locating in suburban areas. In 1962, approximately 88 percent of the
Portland SMSA's total office employment and space was found within the
city limits of Portland, with most of this in the downtown. By 1972, this
total had dropped to 80 percent. By 1980 the city's share is projected to
drop to 78 percent, and by 1990 it will have only 75 percent of the SMSA
total. This distribution of total office space throughout the SMSA, with
the growing percentage of the total going to suburban areas, is based
upon least squares projection of past performance in the Portland SMSA.
It seems to us that, in light of past performance, there may be an undue
concern about the suburbanization movement of office space. While
there has been a continuous trend towards more office space in suburban
areas, it has in reality been relatively slow. It seems to us that the
growth of such space in suburban Portland is not due to a flight from the
central area, but rather that the entire Portland office space market is
growing very rapidly and that suburban areas are picking up their share
of this total market.
The basic cause of growth of suburban office space is accessibility to
markets and is functionally related to growth in population. Population
in the Portland area has been growing, as noted, at the rate of over 2
percent compounded annually and with the majority of this growth locating
in outlying areas. We expect the continued suburbanization of population
in Portland, even if an alteration in past land use densities takes place
(to higher density use of land). Density in the Portland area at the present
time is some 6, 000 persons per square mile. Given population growth
expected to 1980, there would be a net requirement for an additional 26. 5
square miles for urban land uses in the Portland area is present densities
prevail. By 1990, this requirement would increase to 74 square miles.
Assuming that a rather substantial increase in density was achieved, on
the order of one-half again that of present requirements or approximately
9,000 people per square mile, there would be a requirement by 1980 in
the Portland area for an additional 17. 7 square miles of outlying urbanizable
land and 49. 4 by 1990. The likelihood of increasing densities beyond this
point are very remote. San Francisco, for example, has a present density
on the order of 13, 000 people per square mile (which is declining). The
likelihood of reaching San Francisco densities in the Portland area over
the next 15 years are very low indeed, given the ample amount of land
available in suburban areas and the relatively limited constraints imposed

by such things as difficult terrain or other kinds of political or natural
boundaries. There is a significant potential for filling in in land passed
over.
The office-using categories that over the past decade have shown the
greatest tendency for dispersal to non-central areas have been real
estate, non-profit membership organizations and some business services
(advertising, credit collecting and reporting, duplicating, etc. ). As can
be seen in Table 5, between 1964 and 1972, the percentage of SMSA real
estate agents located outside of the city limits increased from 13 to 31
percent. The suburban share of miscellaneous business services increased
from 6 to 14 percent. However, the majority of finance, insurance and
professional services continued to concentrate in the central area. The
share of these services provided in outlying areas increased only marginally
over this 8-year period (banking, for example) or not at all (attorneys,
architects, engineers, accountants).
The principal reason for the concentration of office functions in the
downtown is to take advantage of external economies. Corporations and
banks, for example, rely on a large number of satellite professional and
business services. These, on the other hand, must rely upon a relatively
large number of potential customers or clients to survive. The CBD provides the greatest opportunity for such exposure. Because of its central
location, the CBD minimizes aggregate driving distances, and also allows
for convenient service by public transit, vitally needed by banks and
insurance companies with large clerical staffs, many of whom use public
transit (60 percent of U.S. National Bank employees use public transit,
for example). As was noted earlier, we expect an increase in use of
public transit, reinforcing the central location of office buildings in
Portland. 1

GOVERNMENT USE OF DOWNTOWN LAND

Past growth in government office employment in the Portland SMSA has
not been overly dramatic. Federal employment rose from 13, 000 in 1962
to 14, 300 in 1972. State and local public administration employees rose

It is useful to look at the experience in other areas, to see the extent
to which suburban office construction has actually occurred. One way
is to take a cross-sectional look at a variety of cities of different sizes
and characteristics, to determine if there is uniformity or variability with
respect to the number of white collar workers working outside of central
areas. In the much larger San Francisco-Oakland SMSA, with approximately 3. 5 times as many people spread out over a considerably larger
area, the City of San Francisco still accounted for 60 percent of office
employment in 1972.
^ 3

TABLE 5

SUBURBANIZATION OF F . I . R . E .
& SERVICES CATEGORIES, 1964 TO 1972,
& PROJECTED GROWTH, PORTLAND
SMSA, 1972 TO 1982
SMSA

%

%

PROJECTED

SUBURBAN

SUBURBAN

GROWTH

1972

1964

1972

1972-1982

7273

\4%

CREDIT AGENCIES

2463

14

16%
17

59%
38

INSURANCE BROKERS

2189

9

12

23

REAL ESTATE

4930

13

31

18

INSURANCE CARRIERS

6256

4

21

MISC.

14

68

15

32

27
20

EMPLOYMENT

BANKING

9666

2
6

LEGAL

1596

16

NON-PROFIT MEMBERSHIP ORG.

7107

9

18

MISCELLANEOUS SERVICES

3756

13

13

BUSINESS SERVICES

SOURCE:

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS.

BY Lord/LeBlanc.

PROJECTED

from 14, 300 in 1962 to 20, 700 in 1972. Projecting ahead on the basis of
past growth performance, future government employment should increase
in the Portland area as summarized below.

1962
1972
1980
1990

Federal
Employment

State and Local
Public Administration

13,000
14,300
15,600
17,400

14,300
20,700
25,000
31,000

However, the State Department of Employment does not break such
employment down by office employees versus non-office workers. In
an effort to determine how much actual square footage is used for each
of these uses in the downtown and to develop projections for each of the
governmental entities, we held a series of interviews with relevant
public officials.
Table 6 below outlines existing net square footage occupied by government
employees in both the Portland SMSA as a whole and in downtown Portland,
The space occupied is broken down into "Government owned and Leased"
categories.
We found that federal space needs increased in the 19 50's, by 2. 1 percent.
In 1958, the federal government owned or operated 970,000 square feet
in Portland. In 1974, this total had increased to 1,350,000. However,
there is presently considerable crowding, and the new 350, 000 square
foot federal building should relieve much of this as well as reduce the
amount of space leased. We expect continued growth in federal office
space needs at about 2 percent. We were told that probably between 1980
and 1985 another federal office building will be constructed in Portland.
As its primary function would be to house the overflow of the Interior
Department's functions now in leased buildings nearby, it would likely
be located in the Lloyd Center.
On the other hand, state and local government employment is expected
to increase at a higher rate than that shown over the last decade. While
state government will continue to grow, our projections of office space
needs in Portland have taken into account the State's current feeling that
it leases too much space in Portland. Rather than build more office
buildings there, the State's plans currently call for a conversion into
offices opened up by declining populations in the State's institutions in
Salem, and by transferring some activities now using leased space in
Portland to other state-owned buildings in Salem.
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Table 6

FEDERAL, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICE SPACE OSE IN PORTLAND, WITH
COMPLETION OF NEW FEDERAL BUILDING,
JANUARY, 1975
(Net Square Feet)
Total in
Portland

Downtown
Portland

Gov't. owned
Downtown
650,000
180,000
185,000
110,000

Federal GovernmentState of Oregon
Multnomah County
City of Portland
School District No. 1
Port of Portland
Tri-Met

1,700,000
530, 000
445,000
190,000
35,000
31,000
24, 000

870,000
300,000
235,000
170,000

Totals

2,955,000

1,579,000

4,000

-1,125,000

Leased
Downtown
220,000
120,000
50,000
60,000

4, 000
454,000

• Excluding Postal Service

SOURCE: Lord/LeBlanc Survey.

The City and County plan to construct a 270,000 square foot City/County
building between the Courthouse and City Hall. The building would include
150,000 square feet for jail and police facilities (this assumes selling
the police station at Second and Oak), with the remaining 120,000 square
feet for general City/County offices.
Other local government groups that may locate downtown are the Port of
Portland and Tri-Met. The Port needs 35,000 square feet for its
activities, including a 20,000 square foot conference and exhibition
center. It would like to have 25,000 square feet for adjacent traderelated leasable office space. Tri-Met is locating downtown rather
than remodel their Southeast 17th Avenue headquarters. The two new
federal and City/County buildings should, then, meet the needs of these
entities in the downtown over the next 15 years. A small amount of
lease space may be required for the Port of Portland and Tri-Met.

DEMAND FOR HOUSING
IN THE DOWNTOWN

Population residing in downtown declined from a total of 31, 987 in 1940
to some 13,811 by 1970, a decline of some 18,176, or 56 percent over
this 30-year interval. This includes persons living in Census Tracts
50 through 57, which constitutes nearly all of the land area in the downtown within the freeway loop and includes some areas partly outside of
this loop. 1
Central Area Population 1
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990

31,987
28,099
19,807
13,811
10,000
8,000

Projecting population to 1980 and 1990 on the basis of this trend, we would
expect population in the downtown area to virtually be nonexistent by 1990.
However, there have been at least some modest improvements of late,
which must take those into consideration. There are seven downtown
areas with relatively distinct groupings of persons. These include low
income pensioners living in residential hotels west of the retail core,
residential hotels east of the retail core, the South Park blocks white
collar workers, upper middle income residents in the South Auditorium
Urban Renewal area, students living on the periphery of Portland State
University, the Skid Road population, and other (non-Skid Road) residents
in the area north of Burnside. The outlook for each of these areas tends
to vary.
Probably the most significant change in population in the downtown area
has been the relative decline in the numbers of the city's large transient
labor population. The numbers have declined in the last few years,
largely due to three factors: (1) welfare payments have now been
extended to allow many of the alcoholics in the area to go to nursing
homes; (2) the restriction of entry of Mexican labor into the United States
has raised wages and reduced the need for many of the Mexicans as well
as other workers to migrate to Oregon from California; and (3) mechanization of agriculture has caused the market for transient labor to decline

1940 to 1970 estimates from Portland City Planning Commission,
Cornell, Howland, Hayes, Merryfield, and DeLeuw, Cather & Company,
Portland Downtown Plan Inventory and Analysis (Portland, Oregon,
September 1971), p. 11. 1980 and 1990 projections by Lord/LeBlanc.
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in the Willamette Valley. As a consequence, the number of migratory
workers drawn to the Burnside area has dropped substantially in the last
decade, to the point where the numbers are very small and are expected
to continue to decline, assuming no programs are developed to encourage
them to remain in the central area.
The numbers of persons living in the residential hotels east of the central
core are also expected to decline sharply in number over the next decade,
principally because of the deteriorated and unsound condition of the
dwelling units in that area and probable reuse or upgrading of much of
that land. The majority of housing units in that area at the present time
are unsafe; and unsanitary, and the outlook for renovation of most of these
structures for residential reuse is not promising.
On the other hand, there have been several instances of successful conversions of older hotels in the area to the West of the downtown core into
residential units for elderly, retired persons; and there appear to us to
be no reasons why more such conversions could not take place in the
future. The principal problem will be limited availability of convertible
buildings rather than limited demand, and without a fairly comprehensive
survey of such buildings it is impossible to say what the overall potential
is. But we would expect that at least a portion of the dwelling units lost
in the east of the core of hotels would be provided in the area to the west
of the downtown through the conversion process.
The north of Burnside area (excluding Skid Road) is also undergoing upgrading in recent years; and this can be expected to continue, given a
non-activist policy, with the total population in this area in older
residential hotels continuing to decline. We would expect by the year 1990
for the numbers of persons living in this area on a full-time basis to be
virtually non-existent.
The student population living around Portland State is concentrated in
basically two kinds of structures. One, there are a relatively large
number of students living in the Ondine, an off-campus privately-run
dormitory. There are also a number of students living in older, run-down
apartment houses near the campus. (There are two other concentrations,
on in highrise structures in Goose Hollow and the other in Northwest
Portland, but both of those are outside the study area. )
The outlook at the present time for more housing near the campus does
not appear to be promising, but there may at least be a potential for
saving much of what is presently there. The owners of the Ondine have
been trying for some time to sell the tower to a hotel chain for a conversion

to a hotel. They are presently in negotiations with Holiday Inn, and the
outlook is not known; but it would appear that sooner or later a sale
will be consummated. There is declining interest on the part of students
for dormitory living at Portland State; and, unless this pattern turns
around at that school (as it seems to be at others), the outlook for
retaining the Ondine or constructing new dormitories is not promising.
On the other hand, there are several older apartment houses holding
from 300 to 400 students located within the campus that were acquired
by the school to accommodate future classroom expansion. However,
enrollment has stopped its forward advance, and it now appears that
the land on which these buildings sit will not be needed. With upgrading
or replacement of these structures, this area could continue to provide
housing for PSU students.
The only housing market for downtown with much promise is in middle
to upper income apartments and condominiums such as found in the South
Auditorium Urban Renewal area. Even here the outlook is not overly
promising for at least the next decade. Three towers were constructed
in the area by the Fluor Corporation around the middle part of the past
decade. These all leased up relatively rapidly, principally because of
the tight money conditions and limited availability of dwelling units in
the 1966-67 period in this area. They have continued to experience
relatively high occupancy but, because of their high cost of construction
relative to rents that the buildings are able to command, the return on
investment has been low. The fact that no additional such buildings have
emerged in recent years is at least one index that the Portland Center
Project was not overly successful and is not likely to soon be repeated.
Three condominium towers have been erected in the downtown in the past
four years. While initial sales were brisk, the overall performance has
been disappointing. To date, only 145 of a total of 364 units in these
three towers have been sold, or approximately 50 per year. The problem
is again one of very high construction costs, forcing very high prices
which, in turn, has limited the market to a very small segment of
Portland's population. The developers would probably have had greater
success if they had provided greater numbers of smaller, low-priced
units. Also, interest rates have been high in recent months and have
probably adversely affected sales. Hence, an absorption of 50 units per
year may possibly be improved upon. 1

1 Another constraint is the number of persons who would wish to live in
highrise towers. Without a long tradition in the Portland area, the
time that it takes for adjustment of the population to such living conditions tends to be great. Highrise buildings have generally not been
successful in all but very large cities in the U. S.

The outlook for more such buildings in downtown Portland with an
absorption rate of even 75 per year (and with no assurance that the
market will continue to grow even at that rate, as the three existing
projects may have largely met Portland's potential for such housing) is
not promising, except at infrequent intervals. A developer building a
tower with 100 units would have to assume that he was going to attract
66 percent of the entire market before moving ahead with his project,
in hopes that he would be able to sell all dwelling units within an approximately two-year interval. At bestwe would expect an average of approximately one tower every four years over the next 15 years in the Portland
area, and with the number of units added greater near the end of this
interval, as the Portland area population continues to grow and the
periphery of the city expands outward. The need is for smaller condominium buildings, with consequent lower risks. Developers have not
used this approach in the Portland area at the present time, arguing that
high land prices preclude this approach (we note, however, that the
American Plaza built its two towers on very low priced urban renewal
land). One new project on the drawing boards for the South Auditorium
area with several small buildings may be a realistic prototype for more
such housing in the future.
Our guess is that most of the north of Burnside and Lownsdale area
housing will have been replaced by 1990, with part of this need met in
the area west of the CBD. The number of students living near Portland
State University should decline somewhat, but the middle to upper income
population should increase over the next 15 years. An estimate of 10,000
persons residing in the central area by 1980 and 8, 000 by 1990 should be
realistic.
Converting this decline into land area is quite complex, as much of the
downtown population lives in buildings with ground floor commercial uses.
It would appear, however, that at least 30 to 35 blocks containing residential buildings for low income persons in the area east of Broadway
will undergo reuse within the next 15 years. The area west of Tenth
should pick up a portion of the housing demand.

THE OUTLOOK FOR HOTELS &
MOTOR INNS IN THE DOWNTOWN
The number of additional hotel and motel rooms needed in downtown over
the next 15 years is a function of (1) net increase in room demand, (2) the
occupancy rate, (3) the rate at which demolition or conversions of
existing older units take place, and (4) the locational attributes of the
central area relative to other areas.

Demand for Transient Housing
in the Portland SMSA, 1956 to"
1973 and Projections to 1990
Portland's Chamber of Commerce*estimates that there are 5, 303 rooms
concentrated in the city's major hotels and motor hotels. Figure 1 shows
the additions to the city's stock of major transient housing facilities over
the years 1956 to 1972, and the number of units added annually over this
interval. As can be seen, the total stock of hotel and motor hotel rooms
increased from 1,650 to 5, 500, or by roughly 220 annually, between 1956
and 1972, an annual increase of 5.4 percent compounded. A simple
extrapolation of this performance gives a total requirement of roughly
8,200 rooms by 1980 and 12,000 by 1990, or 320 annually between 1972
and 1980, and over 420 during the next decade. At least 40 to 50 of the
rooms added each year represent replacements of older hotel facilities
which are demolished or converted to other uses, generally housing for
the elderly. Hence, 280 to 360 rooms will be required annually over the
next 15 years in the Portland area to meet net increases in room demand.
An additional 40 to 60 will be required as replacements of existing
facilities.
Projects Planned for the Portland Area
The city's hotel/motel room stock increased significantly following 1960
with the introduction of the Hilton Hotel, but there was a sharp decline in
motor hotel construction between 1964 and 1969, when only 175 rooms,
or 35 per year, were added (see Figure 1). The city's occupancy rate
has been high in recent years, perhaps because the industry was slow to
perceive additional opportunities following 1963, and this failure has
persisted until recently.
Table 7 summarizes hotel and motor hotel units being considered for
construction in Portland in the next two years. As can be seen, some
1, 500 additional rooms in six installations are presently being considered.
Only three of these installations, however, involving 600 rooms, are
presently moving ahead. One is a 200-unit Sheraton Inns motel near the
airport, and the other two belong to the Thunderbird chain and will be
constructed in the Vancouver/Jantzen Beach area.
The Hyatt Corporation is presently negotiating with Portland Commons'
investors for the site at Southwest Front and Jefferson Streets in the
South Auditorium Urban Renewal extension and will construct a roughly
300-room hotel if they decide to move ahead. Marriott is considering the
OIC project for a 400-room installation. These six additions, if built,
will meet the incremental growth requirements in the city for the next
five years.
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Table 7
PLANNED ADDITIONS OR
EXPANSIONS TO THE PORTLAND
HOTEL & MOTEL INVENTORY
Location

Approx. No.
of Rooms

Planned
Opening

200
200
200
400
N.A.
300

1974
1974
1974
N.A.
N.A.
1975

Airport
Sheraton
Jantzen Beach
Red Lion
Quay (expansion) Vancouver
Marriott
OIC Project
Portland State 1U.
Holiday Inn
South Auditorium
Hyatt

Moving ahead
it

ti

I?

ii

Rumored
II

Decisions per

1500

Total

SOURCE:

Status

Lord/LeBlanc Survey.

The Changing Location of
Portland Hotels & hotels
Prior to World War II, transient housing construction in Portland consisted
mainly of hotels in the downtown area. In the early post-War years, the
majority of new construction was in relatively small motel units along
principal arterial highways. These were generally independent, owned
and operated by older, retired or semi-retired persons. In the late
1950's and 1960's, most major Portland area transient housing construction took place in clusters (1) around the Lloyd Center-Coliseum area,
(2) near major freeway interchanges, or (3) adjacent to the Portland airport.
These were mainly relatively large motor hotels, run by the major motel
chains.
While most of the post-War motel construction took place on sites outside
of the CBD, there have been exceptions. The 500-unit Hilton Hotel
opened in downtown Portland in 1961, and the 180-unit Portland Motor
Hotel was constructed in the central area in 1962. The 140-unit Riverside
West and the 257-room Ramada were added on the periphery of the downtown in 1964 and 1970 respectively. As of 1973, the CBD accounted for
39 percent of all hotel and motel rooms. However, the CBD's share of

the total has been declining rapidly since 1962, when it accounted for
64. 6 percent of the total. Locations of existing and 1962 units in the
Portland area are summarized in Table 8. As can be seen, the principal
motor hotels recently constructed in Portland are located at the Airport,
Jantzen Beach, peripheral to the CBD, and the 1-5 Freeway south of
Portland.

Table 8

LOCATIONAL CONCENTRATIONS
OF PORTLAND AREA TRANSIENT
HOUSING FACILITIES
No. of
establishments-1972
CBD
Coliseum/Lloyd Cen.
Airport
Periph. to CBD
East Burnside/Sandy
1-5 Freeway South
Jantzen Beach-Vane.
Total

SOURCE:

No. of
Rooms

No. of
Est. 1962

No. of
Rooms
1962

10
7
3
3
3
3
_2

2,070
1,311
438
577
224
221
462

10
3
-1
3
-_--_

2,070
731
-180
224
---

39.0
24.7
8.3
10.9
4.2
4.1
8. 8

64.6
22.8

26

5,303

17

3,205

100.0

100.0

Percent of
Total-1972

Percent of
Total-196 2

5.6
7.0

Lord/LeBlanc Survey.

Together with change in locations after World War II came change in the
type of establishments constructed. Major building prior to World War II
consisted of hotels. Since 19 50, only two hotels (the downtown Hilton and
the 300-unit Lloyd Center Sheraton, which opened in 19 59) have been constructed. Since then construction has shifted to motor hotels. In size
these have ranged from 60 to 300 units. Of the four Portland establishments
with over 250 units, three (the Ramada Inn at the periphery of the CBD,
the Travelodge at the Coliseum, and the Jantzen Beach Thunderbird)
have been completed since 1970. The size by number of units of motor
hotels built since 1950 is given below. Nonetheless, as was seen, there
has been a resurgence of late in interest in the central area on the part
of the large hotel chains.

Room Size Category
30-99
100 - 199
150 - 199
200 - 249
250 & over

Number of Motor
Hotels Constructed
7
4
3
3
3

Projected Additions to Downtown
There is a swing back to downtown locations on the part of the lodging
industry today, and the interest shown by Hyatt and Marriott in the
Portland area is no isolated phenomenon. It is being duplicated throughout the U. S. The reversal of the outward movement of lodging facilities
cannot be explained simply by occupancy levels. In Portland the Benson
continues to attract exceptional patronage (90 percent occupancy), but
the Hilton is less successful.
Our guess is that there are several reasons for the recent interest.
Among these are: (1) the trend toward ever larger and more expensive
motor hotels has finally reached the point at which the hotels are competitive; (2) the surge in new downtown office building construction has
brought with it a concomitant shift in demand by guests to be near
destinations; (3) upgrading of the downtown in general through urban
renewal is making them more attractive and providing sites at relatively
low cost; and (4) the increasing attractiveness of new hotels with their
many bars, restaurants and other features, is making them exciting
places at which to stay (and making others drab by comparison). These
installations, because of their great size, need central locations to
survive.
Running counter to the above is rapidly escalating room rates relative
to growth in real income. The real question, then, is whether the
resurgence of the major downtown hotels will continue. We suspect they
will at least hold their share of the market over the next 15 years.
Some 897 of the 2, 598 rooms constructed in the Portland SMSA over the
past 11 years (including the Hilton) were located in the central area. The
interest on the part of Hyatt and Marriott must be considered something
of a bellweather, and the very large increase in the supply of office
space projected for the central area should trigger greater future
interest in the area on the part of the hotel industry. A projection of
some 2,000 new hotel rooms in the central area over the period 1975 to
1990, or about 33 percent of total SMSA additions, would seem to us to

be achievable, with increments added at approximately three- to five-year
•intervals.
Roughly 13 percent of these rooms will represent
hotels (several of which will in turn be converted
added will be both hotels and motor inns, and, in
mance, will be distributed throughout the central
as well as in more central locations.

replacements of existing
to housing). New units
line with past perforarea, on its periphery

DEMAND FOR LAND FOR CULTURAL
& ENTERTAINMENT FACILITIES

Cultural and entertainment facilities use downtown land; more importantly,
they help set the character of the downtown. With lively activity in those
two spheres, downtowns are relatively alive in the evening hours, with
restaurants, bars and other retail facilities benefitting. When these
activities dry up or leave the downtown, it becomes a dead area in the
evening hours. What, then, is their present status and future outlook,
if present trends continue?
Principal Facilities for Performing
Arts, Athletic Events & Conventions
Portland has three major downtown public assembly buildings. These
are the Civic Auditorium in the downtown and the Civic Stadium and the
Memorial Coliseum, both on the periphery of the downtown.
The Auditorium is now used nearly to capacity (over 500,000 admissions
per year, 25 events scheduled for the 31 days of March, 1974). Five
major groups--the Oregon Symphony, Portland Opera Association,
Northwest Releasing Corp. , Celebrity Attractions and Jack Roberts
Productions--use or book shows in the Auditorium. As the Paramount
Theater closes for conversion to a convention-banquet facility, the
Auditorium will also absorb the weekly rock star concerts presently
staged at the Paramount.
The Auditorium's Manager largely credits the development of the South
Auditorium Urban Renewal area since 1968, when the Auditorium was
renovated, to the growth in use of the facility. There are numerous
new office buildings in the area (with office employees staying downtown
after work to catch performances), plus the condominiums and Portland
Center apartments, whose residents are attuned to Auditorium cultural

and entertainment offerings. The two adjacent parking structures
provide ample evening parking for events.
Civic Stadium is greatly underused, with only high school and Portland
State University football, which does not draw the principal users.
Oregon State University plays one game a year there, while the University
of Oregon plays no games in Portland since completion of Autzen Stadium.
Low level minor league baseball is the only summer athletic attraction.
A World Football League franchise for Portland has been awarded. Civic
Stadium has inadequate parking and access, and capacity for only 32, 000
spectators.
Memorial Coliseum continues to be booked near capacity, and events
are well attended, with hockey, major league basketball, large-scale
conventions and assemblies, some rock groups, and trade and consumer
shows, as principal users. Hockey is presently declining after many
years of excellent attendance.
No alternative facilities are under serious consideration at the present
time. The city has considered spending $10 million to cover the Civic
Stadium, but is not likely to do so, since parking, limited seating and
access problems would remain as large impediments. There are also
apparently no plans to erect auditoriums, theaters or arenas to complement
the Civic Auditorium or the Memorial Coliseum, although, as noted,
these are presently operating at or near capacity. The manager of the
Civic Auditorium feels that development of the block directly north of
the Auditorium should be encouraged as an expansion of the civic
cultural/entertainment complex. He suggests two main theaters on the
adjacent block, one a 6, 000-seat arena on the main floor for rock concerts
and other large events, the other a 1, 500-seat repertory theater on the
second floor, with entrance facing the opposite direction. The present
Civic Auditorium has 3, 000 seats, and with Evans Products and the
Hyatt Hotel coming in nearby, a realistic usage capacity will be exceeded
in his view.
While at this point additional new public assembly buildings in the
Portland downtown seems to be relatively low on the list of priorities
facing the City's present administration, it would appear to us most
probable, given the rapid growth in usage and the apparent limitations
of supply, that an additional performing arts facility will be added to the
Portland downtown over the next 15 years. The outlook for more than
one such facility is somewhat more problematical in light of the need for
obtaining voter approval, the prevailing attitude of Portland voters in
recent years towards bond issues, and a probable climate of economic
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uncertainty in the years ahead. What form the installation takes on
(repertory theater, arena, etc. ) is anyone's guess, but at least one full
block in downtown may be required.
Cultural Facilities
The main downtown cultural facilities are the Art Museum, Historical
Society, and the Library. The Historical Society would like to expand
into the burned-out apartment house adjacent to it on the Park Blocks,
but it is doubtful they will find funding. The Multnomah County Library
is cramped for space in a 1912 building, but is most likely to solve that
problem by transferring some non-public functions to branches outside
downtown. The only possibilities are acquiring the block directly north,
building there and tying it to the present site with a skyway; but no money
is evident for such a program.
Movie Theaters
In the early 19 50fs the downtown lost five theaters in rapid succession
(the Liberty*, Playhouse, United Artists, Newsreel and Circle) as a resultof the emergence of television. Three others were added recently through
conversion of the Broadway to a multi-theater installation and through
opening of two theaters near Portland State, but the Paramount shifted
to live concerts.
The severe pounding the movie theater industry took after television
appears to have run its course. There are now more theater seats in
Portland than a decade ago, although the increases have all been outside
downtown, in multi-cinema theaters in shopping centers served with
ample parking. Another problem is high property taxes on downtown
theaters (because properties are valued at their highest alternative use).
Movie theaters operate on thin margins. The film distributors do not
look for any increase in downtown theaters over the next decade, but do
expect downtown to hold its own (or, in other words, more theaters will
not be lost). We concur.
The fate of downtown theaters largely depends on the future course of
downtown, and re-emphasizes how each downtown land use depends upon
all the others. If the Broadway area loses its critical mass of people
strolling about in the evening hours (tourists, residents, etc. ) it could
suffer the same fate as Market Street in San Francisco or downtown
Seattle, both of which have been subjected to rowdyism and muggings.
Both have become places where respectable residents seldom go in the
evening.

One project worth noting is the remodeling of the Paramount Theater by
John Haviland to make it part of a hotel /convention center complex to
rival the Hilton. He is removing the theater seats from the main floor
of the Paramount, replacing them with tables and chairs for banquets
and meetings, and connecting it with his two adjacent hotels, the Heathman
and Haviland. There are several amateur theater groups performing in
or near downtown, but they are of no major consequence either in terms
of levels of attendance or land use.

OUTLOOK FOR RETAILING
As in the case of the other land uses, the prospects for the central area
attracting increased retail activity over the study period depends upon
growth in total retail sales in the Portland metropolitan area as a whole
and the competitive attributes of the CBD relative to the SMSA.
Projected Retail Sales in
the Portland SMSA
Well over 90 percent of the CBD retail sales are in the four comparison
goods categories of general merchandise, apparel, home furnishings,
and miscellaneous or specialty retail sales (sporting goods, jewelers,
gift shops, etc. ), and in eating and drinking establishments. Hence, we
have concentrated our discussion exclusively on these five categories.
As can be seen in Table 9, expenditures in the entire Portland metropolitan
area for the five comparison goods categories are expected to increase
between 1972 and 1990 by between 100 and 155 percent, depending upon
the category. Expenditures are functionally related to growth in population and real income but adjusted to reflect the manner in which expenditure s
in the various categories vary with income (to reflect their elasticity with
respect to income, in other words). These vary depending upon the extent
to which they represent necessities or luxuries. Incremental percent
increases in outlays for food are quite small, given an increase in family
real income; incremental outlays for recreational equipment are quite
high. Projections are made on the basis of real income only or, in other
words, ignore inflation, to provide realistic estimates of future space
requirements for retailing in the Portland area.
Productivity (sales per square foot) of retail outlets was held constant
(although the trend is towards more self-service stores which may indeed
be necessary in the future if projected growth volumes are to be met, in
light of declining labor force participation rates.

The amount of space required to accommodate this expansion in sales
volume would increase from 17. 8 million square feet in 1975 to 35. 9
million square feet by 1990, or 5. 1 percent on an average annual, compound basis, in the five categories.
CBD Potential
The central area retail market is made up of two distinct groups:
(1) people coming to the CBD to shop, either* because they live in or near
the downtown or because they prefer to shop there rather than in neighborhood or suburban shopping centers, and (2) the downtown work force and
those coming into the CBD on business. The level of CBD retail activity
in any one year, then, varies both with the size of the CBD work force
and with the amount of retail trade the CBD attracts from its own trade
area and from a much wider geographic area. Unfortunately, there is
no reliable estimate of the relative magnitudes or rates of change of
these two components. Hence, we are forced to rely on past overall
sales trends as a guide to future performance.
One thing that is obvious is that the amount of the total future metropolitan
area retail space requirements that the CBD can expect to attract is
related, to a great extent, to the number of major regional shopping
centers likely to emerge over the study period. Table 10 provides an
index of the impact on the CBD of growth in sales of Lloyd Center and
the emergence of a number of smaller centers in east Portland. As can
be seen, while total sales increased in the CBD, in real terms they were
declining. All CBD comparison goods categories declined relative to
the SMSA; declines in general merchandise and home furnishings were
pronounced (43 percent), while apparel and miscellaneous retail sales
declining share of the total was considerably less (16 percent).
The 1972 Census data are not available until August of this year, and,
since there are no recorded statistics on Portland area retail sales by
area, it is impossible to say at this point how well the Portland downtown
retailers performed since 1967 relative to the CBD. Downtown retailers
seem to feel that the CBD was able to maintain in real terms its volume
of five years earlier, although it undoubtedly continued to lose ground in
terms of its share of the total metropolitan market.
Washington Square Shopping Center, which opened in 1973, can be
expected to make significant inroads into downtown retail volumes, as
it will cater to a West Side market that up to the present probably
favored downtown relative to Lloyd Center. Obviously, if additional
centers emerge during the next 15 years, these too would make inroads
into CBD sales. Consumer preference for conventional shopping centers

appears to us to be quite strong and related to (1) one-stop shopping;
(2) covered malls; (3) accessibility; and (4) convenient parking. Socioeconomic changes have played a major role. For example, over 50
percent of all women between the ages of 20 and 65 now work, and
shopping activity is greatest in evening hours. The CBD has lost the
competitive edge in nearly all departments. One notable exception is
breadth of merchandise offerings.
On the other hand, the importance of a growing downtown work force
and hotel guests should not be minimized in the future of the CBD. One
survey conducted in Denver showed that a typical employee working
downtown spends $700, or about 35 percent of all his family's household
expenditures for comparison goods. Business meetings, conventions,
attendees at sporting and performing arts events, vacationers and
visitors on personal business, make expenditures in the downtown aside
from those at their hotels, if they end up staying in the downtown area.
The majority of this money is spend for food, clothing and specialty
shoppers' goods. With the projected growth in office expenditures and
hotels in the central area, it can be expected that downtown retailers
will benefit. Furthermore, while shoppers make fewer trips to the
CBD, when they do so, per trip expenditures tend to be higher than in
suburban centers.
We have assumed that past trends in downtown retail activity relative
to the SMSA are reasonable bases for projecting future market shares.
We would expect the ratios to continue to fall rather sharply until about
1980, as a consequence of Washington Square, but that continued growth
in downtown of other uses will assist in mitigating the competitive impact
of future centers. The CBD will, in other words, become more reliant
on its own market. Because of rapid growth in total retail expenditures
in the metropolitan area, CBD sales should remain relatively strong even
if their share of the total continues to decline. Hence, by 1990 the amount
of space devoted to retail sales in downtown should increase by some
956,000 square feet, or 1.8 percent on a compound annual basis, over the
2. 5 million square feet found there in 1972. As seen in Table 11, the
greatest increases will be in apparel, eating and drinking establishments,
and miscellaneous retail or specialty items. General merchandise sales
should increase slowly, and home furnishings sales should decline on a
non-inflated basis.
The growth in specialty sales in downtown relative to general merchandise
stores should not be unexpected. The increasing shift to specialty stores
has resulted from growth in real income, which has allowed expenditures
to reach a point where economies of scale are achievable in more and more
small but highly specialized stores. In reality, the general merchandise
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store is a cluster of specialty stores with efficient administrative
services. The future of the major retail chains probably hinges on how
effectively they are able to duplicate the unique products characteristic
of small specialty retailers. The extent to which specialty retailers
are encouraged to locate in the central area also provides one clue to
future retailing potentials of the CBD.

Table 11

CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
RETAIL SPACE REQUIREMENTS,
1972, 1980 & 1990
(000 S. F. )

General Merchandise
Apparel
Home Furnishings
Eating & Drinking
Miscellaneous Retail
Total

SOURCE:

1972

1980

1990

Change
1972/90

Annual %
Change
1972/90

1322
444
128
253
353

1431
508
106
265
436

1655
660
114
375
657

333
216
-14
122
299

1.3%
2.3
-.5
2. 2
3.4

2505

2746

3461

956

1.8

Lord/LeBlanc, based on Table 9 volume estimates
divided by prevailing West Coast per square foot
space/sales volume coefficients.

The principal results should be the following:
1.

More retail activity will be in evidence in the central area than in
1974, and the commercial core will be a little larger.-

2.

Its character will have continued to change, towards more restaurants
and shops oriented to the downtown work force and commercial visitors,
and more highly specialized retailers whose market is statewide.

3.

Retailers will be more spread out in the central area and less concentrated in the core. They will be less tied to the major department
stores and more to office and hotel concentrations.

4.

The expected volume of general merchandise sales means that
another department store should emerge in the area by 1990, to take
the place of Rhodes. (Rhodes itself may come back, in a smaller,
more efficient store with more up-to-date merchandise and merchandising techniques).
•

Land Requirements in the
Downtown, 1975 - 1990
The demand for land from each of the six categories discussed above is
summarized below:
. A maximum of some 5. 5 million square feet of office space would
appear to be attainable in downtown. This represents, assuming an
average building floor area to land ratio of 8:1, a net requirement
for approximately 17 blocks, excluding parking, over the study
period.
. As was seen, the magnitude of space devoted to housing is more
difficult to come to terms with because of multiple uses of blocks
containing housing units. Present blocks earmarked as opportunity
blocks in the Downtown Plan already contain much of the substandard
dwelling units likely to be razed. Future highrise residential towers
should absorb no more than four full blocks of downtown land; we
assume the equivalent of eight full blocks with housing will be cleared,
or a net addition of four to the stock of vacant (by definition "opportunity" ) blocks.
. One additional block will be required for government offices, for a
City/County office building.
. One additional block should be required for a public assembly building
and possibly two others for miscellaneous private sector entertainment
facilities.
. Much of the additional 900,000 square feet of retail space projected
for the central area will be absorbed in office and hotel buildings.
Another department store should emerge, but the existing Rhodes
store will either be razed or serve as a replacement. A maximum
of two additional blocks would appear likely.
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. The amount of land required for hotel/motel use will depend upon
how many and how large the new facilities are. We assume a distribution ranging from smaller motels of 150 rooms to hotels containing
up to 500 rooms will emerge. Some existing hotel space will be lost
to residential use. A net requirement of seven blocks appears
probable.
There will be, then, an additional requirement in the downtown for
approximately 26 full blocks to meet future downtown land use demand,
excluding parking. Against this total is a current potentially available
supply significantly exceeding that requirement. The number of opportunity
blocks by area is broken down below:
Area
Broadway to the River, South of Burnside
Broadway to Stadium Freeway, South of Burnside
Broadway, Burnside, Glisen
Total

Blocks
45
29
j^8
92

CONCLUSIONS

What, then, are the implications of this probable land use requirement
in the downtown in terms of the appearance and character of downtown
to 1990?
1.

On the whole, downtown should fare relatively well for nearly all
land uses on a competitive basis with respect to the metropolitan
area as a whole. Suburbanization of office space will continue,
but the greatest magnitude of future SMSA office demand can be
expected to locate in downtown. The future retail activity will hold
up in downtown, although its character will change. Hotel/motel,
cultural, entertainment, and governmental uses of the downtown
should continue to grow or at least hold their own with respect to
the region. The only area of land use where it can be expected that
there will be a significant absolute and relative decline is in housing,
with the numbers of middle and upper income residents moving into
the downtown failing to keep pace with the decline in numbers of
moderate to low income persons.

2.

Despite this outlook, supply of potentially developable land will
continue to exceed demand. One of the principal problems facing
downtown over the next 15 years will be underutilization of land,
with all or a portion of the majority of underutilized blocks used
for surface parking, in the absence of an aggressive program on
the part of the City to control how its central area land is used.

3.

Land coverage in the downtown depends heavily upon the interaction
of three critical variables. These are height and density of office
buildings; use of land for parking, particularly for surface parking;
and use of downtown land for housing.

4.

There is obviously an inverse relationship between the height and
density of buildings and downtown land coverage. The lower the
FAR, the greater the land coverage from office buildings. Assuming
all office buildings were constructed at a 4-to-l height and density
ratio in the downtown, 34 blocks would be required over the next 15
years. At a 12-to-l ratio, 11 blocks would be required.

5.

If the City intends to follow a strong policy of discouraging any
significant future buildup in parking in the downtown, then there will
be a considerable amount of vacant land available at existing FAR.

6.

Presumably much of this land could be used for housing. There
are, however, some significant rigidities that would create some
problems in allowing such an event to materialize. These have
been alluded to earlier and will be discussed at greater length below,
but essentially boil down to problems of high construction and land
costs, and problems of developing housing on a sufficient scale to
generate a sense of neighborhood within the downtown.

The Plan calls for a lowering of office densities or FAR's in a portion
of the downtown, construction of additional housing in the downtown, and
a slowdown in parking usage of downtown land. The extent to which these
and other proposals are feasible is the subject of the following section.
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TECHNIQUES & PROSPECTS FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE DOWNTOWN PLAN

As was seen in the previous sections, the uncertain or controversial
elements in the Downtown Plan involve (1) height and density proposals,
(2) housing, and (3) the future of downtown retailing. The capability of
the downtown to compete for all land uses vis-a-vis the Portland region
as a whole is also somewhat at issue, since this capability is so essential to effective implementation of the Plan. Techniques and prospects
associated with implementing these proposals is the subject of this section,

HEIGHT & DENSITY PROPOSALS

The Plan specifies height and density of buildings in specific zones in
downtown with the intent of regulating development in these areas. This
section explores the economic implications of the height and density
proposals, to (1) attempt to predict probable future downtown development
patterns as a consequence of these proposals and (2) assess their practicability. No value judgments regarding the desirability of these controls is
made. Our assessment of the proposals is made only to determine whether
they will bring about the results desired and will not adversely affect the
remaining elements in the Plan. The emphasis here is on office buildings,
since they are the principal building type most generally affected by
height and density regulations.
The analysis begins with a discussion of what the development pattern
would have been in downtown Portland in the past if the land market had
been operating as an effective instrument governing the decisions of land
owners, developers and other interested parties. This review is made
to determine whether there have been some deviations from the performance that should have emerged, what the reasons for the deviations
were, and to tender some solutions. Finally, we discuss the probable
ramifications of the proposed height and density proposals on probable
future Portland downtown land prices and development activity and
indicate some of the conditions needed to make them work.

Past Development Patterns &
the Downtown Land Market
Under normal competitive conditions in the land market there is a consistent relationship between (1) land price and land availability and (2)
land price and building density (in the form of square feet of leasable
building space). The greater the availability of land relative to demand,
the lower the offering price and hence the lower the density. Building
height and bulk is a tradeoff for high land prices; land developers tend to
increase building sizes significantly as a result of high land costs because
of the necessity to spread these costs over larger numbers of floors or
larger amounts of floor area. When land prices are relatively low, this
necessity lessens considerably. The reason suburban office buildings
typically have low profiles is because land prices are relatively low.
In a sense, demand for downtown land has riot been particularly high.
There are many blocks used all or principally for surface parking. The
downtown presently has some 93 relatively underutilized blocks which
have been designated as opportunity blocks in the Plan. Forty-five of
these are in the area of maximum potential future development. On the
other hand, only roughly 28 full blocks will be required over the next 15
years, ignoring parking for the moment, and ignoring any effective plan
or city policies to change downtown land demand. At the same time,
downtown land prices are by no means low.
Given the relatively low demand relative to the supply of downtown land,
there should have been a more extensive use of land, with a greater number
of smaller office buildings, and with relatively little underutilized land.
Instead, relatively few but large highrise buildings were constructed, while
the supply of vacant land in the downtown actually increased. The question
is why?
It is important to know what conditions would have had to have been met
for the above process to have materialized. A model providing a first
approximation to the development pattern that should have emerged would
have had the following conditions:
1.

A highly competitive market composed of knowledgeable developers
and willing sellers of land. There would need to be an ample supply
of profit-maximizing office building developers (entrepreneurs)
competing for downtown land, all cognizant of development potentials
in the downtown.

2.

There would need to exist ample numbers of land owners willing to
sell at the prevailing market price, without timing of sale complicated
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unduly by interim uses, expectations of higher future returns, etc.
3.

No advantages connected with building size and no problems connected
with assembly of land. Technology would not enter into the picture
by allowing developers to reduce unit costs by building larger or
smaller buildings. In other words, there would be constant costs
over a large range of building size.

4.

Developers would not be influenced positively or negatively by the
general and immediate environs to prospective building sites.
Opportunities and constraints created by externalities were non-existent.

5.

Finally, no other controls and incentives existed to encourage or
discourage certain types of office buildings.

If these conditions were extant, competition would force a relatively
low scale of building size, as each developer would take into consideration
all other buildings coming on stream and would not attempt to overbuild.
Specific land prices would reflect only the productivity of individual sites,
determined by rents tenants were willing to pay and proximity or accessi-.
bility to the center of activity in the downtown.
Causes of Past Development Patterns
Explanation, then, for the development pattern that did emerge over the
past two decades in Portland's downtown seems to rest with the failure
of the above conditions to have been met:
1.

Apparently, the profit-maximizing objective has not necessarily been
the sole influence at work in the construction of Portland downtown
office space during the last decade. Profit maximization obviously
was one influence, but apparently more critical in many instances
were operating influences, such as the need for sufficient space in
buildings to handle existing or future company operations; the desire
to convey a certain image by size and character of buildings; etc.
In other words, other influences played a role in building height and
density decisions.

2.

There seems to have been a limited supply of entrepreneurs. Principal
suppliers of office space in downtown Portland in the last decade were
large institutions, such as banks, major corporations, utility companies, etc. , who constructed buildings partly for operational
requirements but also for corporate identification. In light of the
rather rapid increase in the growth of office space in down, it is
apparent that either prospective developers did not perceive
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opportunities or decided not to compete with institutional developers
providing space because of a presumed competitive disadvantage.
There were a number of exceptions (Boise Cascade, 200 Market
Street), but nearly all of these buildings were smaller in scale and
concentrated in the urban renewal area. Part of the explanation
may also be in slowness to perceive opportunities. Portland's population growth prior to 1963 was relatively slow. During the next decade,
the rate doubled and office space demand tripled, probably taking
many of the area's developers by surprise.
3.

Downtown land supply is apparently not highly elastic with respect
to price. Land prices have remained high or increased in much of
downtown, despite the considerable vacant or underutilized land in
the area. This phenomenon can probably be explained by a number
of influences, but the main one is that there have been alternative
uses available which have tended to encourage retention of downtown
land. Although considerably less visible in the sense that office
buildings are, use of land for ground level parking provides certain
rewards. A hypothetical parking lot using one block of downtown
land could yield net income to its owner after payment of operating
costs but before debt service, between $25,000 and $65,000 per year,
depending upon parking fees, lot turnover and operating costs. Assume
the following conditions:
40,000
400
100-200
$2. 00
250
1
$50,000
25, 000
$25, 000
48,000
-$23,000

S. F. /block
S. F . / c a r
cars per day (depending upon turnover)
Parking fee per day per car
days of operation per year
2
$100,000
35, 000
$ 65, 000
48, 000
$ 17,000

Turnover
Gross Income
Operating costs (mainly property taxes, labor)
Net income before debt service
Debt service
Net yield

Debt service is mainly the opportunity cost of using the money tied
in land in some alternative investment. There may be minor costs
associated with the lot, such as asphalt, a shed, some landscaping,
etc. , but the principal "cost" to the landowner is the opportunities
foregone. Assuming $20 per square foot land is sold with the proceeds
invested conservatively at 6 percent, the land owner foregoes an
income of $48, 000 per year. Hence, the landowner's decision on
whether to hold or sell depends upon how successful he is in generating

income relative to his opportunity costs (or how successful an
operator is relative to a lease income roughly equivalent to the
landowner's opportunity cost).
Other variables enter the picture, however. One is expectations
regarding the future value of downtown land. Retention may be
related to speculation on anticipated future escalation of downtown
land prices, and parking is an interim measure to cover opportunity
and holding costs. The land may be undervalued by tax assessors.
This is the case in the above example where property taxes are based
on an assumed value lower than $20 per square foot. Hence, the
public may in a sense be subsidizing the holding of land in less than
optimum usage, and is probably widespread, as many parking lots
could not operate profitably if this were not the case. There may be
structures on the land with remaining depreciable life, thus discouraging immediate sale; or the land may be held by absentee or
otherwise indifferent landowners, unaware or indifferent to development opportunities.
4.

Technology obviously plays a role. It costs nearly the same per
floor to construct a building 30 and 40 stories as it does to build
buildings half that high. Hence, unit costs decline by spreading out
the cost of land (a fixed cost). As Portland area developers were
building to the extent of the market during the past decade, and since
relatively few buildings were coming on stream during this period,
many of the developers chose to build as much space as they thought
they could lease, and these buildings tended to attract a large share
of the incremental space market growth during these years. Hence,
the office building development pattern that emerged in the downtown
was abetted by the influence of technology in building construction.

5.

Finally, the buildings that did emerge were influenced by extraneous
conditions, such as the size of Portland blocks (which encourage
plaza buildings to minimize interior space with no direct access to
outside light); by public policies (the technique of "borrowing" and
the bonus of providing parking garages on borrowed land); etc.

Some Solutions
The competitive model was not useful in predicting performance of Portland's
downtown office building market in the recent past, principally because
competitive conditions were far from perfect. The solution to the problem,
on the other hand, would appear to rest with changing these conditions, by
inducing more competition. The following programs would seem to us to
make some sense.

ED

There is a need for more competition. There would appear to be a
need to attract more office building developers to downtown Portland.
The key seems to be in the availability of a greater supply of building
sites, and it seems to us that this is the main reason why the institutions have provided most of the office space in recent years. They
have had the financial capability necessary to weather problems
associated with assembling land. The smaller speculative office
building developers do not. They have, on the other hand, been
relatively quick to capitalize on development opportunities when sites
have been made available, such as in the South Auditorium Urban
Renewal area (where several small buildings have surfaced during
the past decade), or in the case of the proposed Northwest Natural
Gas Company project.
There is a need for a more vigorous renewal effort. Merely making
sites available will itself be no panacea. The interest shown in the
South Auditorium area over the past decade, despite its location considerably removed from the City's CBD, was no accident. It was
precipitated by the environmental conditions being built into the
project. The area was able to overcome accessibility disadvantages
by offering environmental advantages, while much better located sites
along the waterfront to the north went underutilized despite roughly
comparable prices. There is a need, then, for the City of Portland
to take a more active role in the downtown development process by
making sites available through urban renewal.
There is a need for disincentives for holding downtown land. Without
using write-downs, there would be the problem of acquiring sites at
prices developers could afford to pay. As will be seen, there should
be no need for a write-down for office buildings, but this would be
for other land uses (housing, for example), unless some means of
discouraging land holding (disincentives) are employed.
The use of land for parking for interim income to meet holding and
opportunity costs could be discouraged by constructing several new
major parking garages in the downtown; by imposing a prohibition
on using vacant land for parking automobiles; by a review of property
tax assessments on vacant downtown land (to bring them up to the
value of their next highest alternative use); by code enforcement of
older buildings with limited remaining useful life; by imposing heavy
taxes on autos parked downtown (through parking fees) in lots other
than authorized garages; by differential fees favoring city-sponsored
garages; and the like. All of these reduce parking operators' incomes
by either reducing revenues or increasing operating costs. Publishing
results of the downtown land use survey would help by removing much
of the speculative incentive for holding land in anticipation of higher

future land prices. Endorsement of a policy to construct downtown
parking garages, even without some of the above disincentives, would
help, as it would mean introduction of a sizeable increase in parking
spaces and hence competition for potential parked autos. Finally,
discouraging driving by downtown office building tenants, with a
switch to public transit, more car pools, park-and-ride systems,
etc. , would tend to free downtown sites for development.
Design alternatives are needed to free downtown office building sites.
It seems to us that most of the problems that have been created by
the design of downtown office buildings (i. e. , the tall, slender plaza
building, for example) could be overcome by changes in public policy
that would permit some changes in design. The Northwest Natural
Gas Company model, with its emphasis on smaller scale buildings
built on the periphery of a four-block area and surrounding a plaza,
with perhaps one lone tower considerably smaller in scale than is
customary at present, is one model that would provide some relief
from the monotony of the plaza or pedestal building in the downtown,
and would create some interesting new spaces for prospective tenants.
The main public policy change that permitted this design alternative
was closure of two streets. This policy allowed development of much
smaller scale (three- to four-story) office buildings and still allows
adequate return on investment for its developers. Some variants on
this approach would seem to be quite possible, perhaps with emphasis
on more intensive utilization of land but with buildings surrounding
courtyards or interior plazas. Horseshoe patterns such as the
Harrison Square Building, is another model.
Another possibility is to encourage construction of more buildings
on partial blocks in downtown. There is a minimum size that all
buildings must achieve, so that elevators and other common areas
do not represent too great a proportion of total building area for
these buildings to be efficient. Aside from that problem, these
buildings are typically discouraged because windows are not allowed
on sides where buildings may be constructed on an adjoining parcel.
It seems to us that this problem could be mitigated by a transfer of
development rights between the smaller and the taller building, so
that a series of buildings with different heights could be tied together
within a single block, providing interest and diversity in the skyline
and yet eliminating the need for potentially dead areas- associated
within plazas. This practice would also make considerably more
potential building sites available.
There is a need to reassess appraisal practices. The whole tax
assessment, land acquisition and reuse appraisal practice is probably

way overdue for review and reform. Present practice tends to
create many problems. For example, tax assessments of downtown
land tend to be low, and assessments of existing older buildings tend
to be higher than warranted. Acquisition appraisals for purposes
of urban renewal tend to be too high, generally based on prices paid
by large, well-heeled institutional investors such as banks, who are
capable of paying above market prices for key sites. Use of transactions such as P.G.E. 's purchase of waterfront land at $25 per
square foot may or may not be a valid indicator of land price for
the remainder of the area. There are so many rigidities, institutional complications and extraneous influences at work in the real
estate market that excessive reliance on comparable sales may have
some unfortunate consequences. Prices paid for any given site
depend all too frequently on how badly a given buyer needs the site
and the extent to which its sellers can afford to hold out. These
conditions may or may not be relevant to adjacent or nearby sites.
Probable Consequences of the
Height & Density Regulations
From our discussions with Portland downtown businessmen and community
leaders, two questions were of principal concern with respect to the
proposed height and density proposal. One was whether construction of
low profile office buildings in the downtown would be feasible given downtown land price, and density regulations would discourage new future
downtown office space. The other was whether sufficient building sites
would be available in the downtown (particularly the office core) as a consequence of the height and density regulations. The question, then, is
what can be said about future development activity in the downtown as a
consequence of imposition of height and density regulations?
Relationship between Land Cost,
Density & Return on Investment
In order to come to grips with the relationship between land prices, floor
area ratios in buildings (FAR's), and building sizes, we conducted a series
of cash flow and return on investment analyses. We calculated the return
on investment from fifteen alternative building assumptions. We assumed
buildings would be constructed on downtown Portland parcels with five
different land prices, $10, $20, $30, $40 and $50 per square foot, and
with three separate FAR's, 4-to-l, 8-to-l and 12-to-l. We assumed
all other conditions to be constant, including construction costs at $32
per square foot, which included tenant improvements and common areas.
No parking was assumed, as these improvements should be met by parking
fees. Rents were all constant, at $8. 70 per square foot (including

amortization of tenant improvements). Building efficiency was assumed
'at 80 percent. We assumed 10 percent interim financing and 8. 5 percent
mortgages, 25-year terms at 80 percent of total project value. Fees
and contingencies represented 15 percent of total construction costs,
and it was assumed that the project would take two years to be constructed.
These conditions are not in all cases precisely representative today but
reflected those of a year ago. The important point is that they are consistent for all cases. The results of this exercise can be seen in Table 12.
As can be seen, yields vary relatively little between the 4-to-l, 8-to-l
and 12-to-l height ratios where land prices are $20 or under. Return
on investment is 14. 2 percent on an after tax basis on $10 per square
foot land and increases slightly to 16.7 percent with the 12-to-l ratio.
With land prices increasing to $20 a square foot, return on investment
drops slightly. The 12-to-l FAR yields 15.4 percent, while the 4-to-l
FAR's yield drops slightly to 11.3 percent. Overall cash flow is obviously
considerably greater for structures with a 12-to-l height ratio, but
investment required is proportionately greater.
For land prices of $20 to $30 a square foot (representative of most of
the blocks peripheral to the CBD), return on invested capital was not
enhanced significantly by increasing the height of buildings. (One complication is that, if sites are relatively hard to come by, developers will
tend to try to maximize income on sites obtained, and maximization is
achieved principally by building higher buildings. It is important to
simultaneously attack the site supply problem, then. )
When land prices increase to $40 and $50 per square foot, then height
and density regulations begin to play a relatively important role. As can
be seen, with $50 a square foot land, an FAR much under 12-to-l is no
longer a particularly attractive investment. An FAR of 4-to-l is not
feasible in blocks with prices much over $30 per square foot.
The above exercise more or less confirms what could be concluded from
observation of actual development practices in the downtown. If the
arguments of those who contend that it is impossible to build lower profile
buildings in the downtown because of high land prices actually did make
any sense, then building sizes would have a very direct relationship to
land price, with relatively little variability. As it turns out, there has
been considerable variability in building heights and densities with respect
to land prices. The 42-story First National Bank Building was constructed
on land with average per square foot prices roughly comparable to the
22-story Evans Products Building. On the other hand, the 18-story P. G. E.
Building had a much lower FAR (of 4-to-l) and yet was constructed on
land reportedly selling for $25 per square foot. The very low profile
Northwest Natural Gas project will similarly have a land price on the

order of $8 to $10 per square foot average, while a small seven-story
office building proposed by one of the savings and loans for the downtown
core will be constructed on land valued roughly at $40 to $50 per square
foot. The point is that, as was noted earlier, a number of considerations
besides profit maximization enter into the decisions of developers with
respect to the size of their buildings. Secondly, land costs represent a
relatively small proportion of total project costs. These costs can be
spread out over a fairly wide range of size of buildings without causing
any significant reduction in the per-floor cost of the building. The
upshot, then, is that it would be feasible to construct relatively small
office buildings (with FAR's of 4- or 5-to-l) throughout much of the downtown. There have been few reasons to do so in the recent past, as
conditions noted above encouraged maximum land coverage.
Future Downtown Land Price Structure
Since the value of land is a function of the use to which it can be put,
one consequence of the proposed height and density configuration in the
downtown is that it would tend to fix the ratio of land values in each of
the three zones (4-to-l, 8-to-l and 12-to-l FAR's) with respect to each
other. Assuming that all developers construct buildings to the maximum
height and density allowable in their zone, it would be almost twice as
advantageous to be an owner of property with an 8-to-l FAR as it would
in an area with a 4-to-l, and slightly over twice as advantageous to be an
owner with a 12-to-l FAR as with an 8-to-l. A developer could buy land
in any of these zones, construct a building to its maximum FAR, and
receive an equivalent return on investment, although his investment would
obviously be greater the higher the FAR. We would expect, then, as a
first approximation, a tendency towards such an equilibrium. There
would, of course, be some complicating elements. One would be achievable
rents; rents may not be comparable in these three zones. It is also not
clear that building developers would build to their maximum allowable
floor area. This decision would be a function of the extent to which there
was a market or the other needs of the building owners. Individual sites
would have locational and environmental advantages over some of the
others, resulting in a value differential. Nonetheless, for the most part,
the equilibrium condition noted above would take effect. The new structure
of downtown land prices would be similar to that prevailing today, but
with some modifications.
The Initial Impact
San Francisco recently developed a 16-to-l FAR along Market Street, and
the immediate impact was the emergence of several new office towers.

Table 12
RETURN ON INVESTMENT AFTER TAX-,
HYPOTHETICAL DOWNTOWN OFFICE
BUILDINGS UNDER A VARIETY OF
ASSUMED LAND PRICES & FLOOR
AREA RATIOS
Floor Area Ratio
Per Square Foot
Land Cost

4 - 1

$10

- 1

12-1

14. 2 %

16.1%

16.7%

$20

11.3

14.2

15.4

$30

8.9

12.6

14.2

$40

7.0

11.3

13.2

$50

5.1

10.0

12.2

Return on investment calculated by discounting the after tax cash
flow shown on the third from the bottom line of the computer
printouts, reproduced in the Appendix. The minus sign represents
cash out each year, or investment. For example, $477, 000 is
required in Year 1 in Alternative 1. A positive sign indicates cash
in or return on investment in each given year. (For example,
$198, 000 in Year 4, Alternative 1. ) When each year's cash flow is
discounted by the rate shown, the sum of each individual year's
positive cash flow is equal to the discounted value of the cash out
(investment). This is compounding in reverse, and the best
available method for comparing projects with non-uniform timing
of investment and cash flows.
SOURCE:

Lord/LeBlanc.

However, Portland has considerably more potential office sites available
in its downtown as compared to San Francisco, so we doubt that experience
will be duplicated in Portland.
One result of the regulations may well be the near term construction of
several smaller buildings, assuming procedures are followed to encourage
availability of more building sites on the periphery of the downtown. The
new equilibrium land value structure should make developers more or
less indifferent as to whether they construct buildings with a 4-to-l,
8-to-l or 12-to-l FAR. Return on investment is the same. Hence, it is
possible that risk aversion would play an important role. In other words,
since a sufficient supply of sites was available, and since return on
investment was the same for smaller as well as larger buildings,
developers would tend to concentrate on sites with lower FAR since
investment would be lower and the risks associated with leasing considerable
space would be lessened.
One key would be preferences of building tenants, and it is not clear
whether there is a preference for tall buildings, and whether they would
be willing to pay a higher lease rate differential to be near transit or for
the views provided. Tenants may be equally attracted to the river,
plazas , and more intimate character of buildings and environs in smaller
structures east of Fourth Avenue. Obviously, there would be an interest
in and a need for both. Similarly, higher rents in the taller buildings
may be more than offset by potentially lower construction costs on
buildings with 4-to-l FAR's. It is, in any event, very important that
the city play a direct role in making sites available for smaller structures
and for upgrading general environs (through urban renewal). The actions
recommended above, of encouraging a greater supply of potential office
building sites to come onto the market, would definitely make more sites
available. The City should not expect a flood of such sites at any one
time, however. Owners will have a time preference; some may prefer
holding downtown sites for future sale despite declining income or price
escalation expectations. It may be disadvantageous for some owners to
sell sites at the present because of the necessity to pay high capital gains
taxes. Others may prefer to wait simply because sales proceeds are not
needed now. There are many non-economic considerations facing
landowners.
Moreover, the impact of the 4-to-l ratio on the area with the greatest
potential for near-term development of small office buildings (the area
between Fourth and the River, Morrison and Jefferson) is significantly
complicated by the $25 per square foot land price reportedly paid recently
by P. G. E. , significantly over existing assessed values. The probable
impact of these prices is not clear. The P. G. E. action could have two

effects. One, the $25 per square foot transaction may become the model
for other land owners, with these holding out for the high price. On the
other hand, the upgrading caused by the P. G. E. project may be the
stimulus needed to trigger new investment in the area, in effect justifying
the high price. One advantage from having institutions as pioneers is
that they can more readily afford to buck the negative environmental
influences such as presently found in the waterfront area noted above
than can developers building for the general space lease market.
Impact on the Core
First National Bank, Evans Products, P. G.E. , Standard Insurance,
and Georgia Pacific, all constructed buildings outside the core to take
advantage of relatively low land prices. A review of Table 12 shows
that return on investment drops at $50 per square foot. Prices in the
core will probably either have to soften or prices on land peripheral to
the core will have to increase somewhat before there is much incentive
for developers to construct major office buildings in that area (aside
from possibly institutional investors, such as the U. S. National Bank).
Twenty to thirty years ago there was a need on the part of banks and
other service firms to cluster near retail customers, and this clustering
was reinforced by heavy reliance on public transit for both shopping and
trips to work. Today these conditions are less apparent and dispersion
of office space over a much wider geographic area in the downtown is
possible. On the other hand, the regulations will at least provide an
incentive that was not available before, since the core land, as was seen,
will once again become competitive with peripheral land. The transit
mall and views from highrise office space may be the factors that
offset risk aversion. It is really impossible to say what the likely
effects of height and density regulations will be on the transit mall
corridor as well as Area 2, since they depend so much on the character
of individual projects that may eventually surface in these areas. The
corridor, for example, may attract one or more additional large institutional or corporate symbol office buildings. The fate of these areas rests
in part, then, with random and hence unpredictable events. The city can
provide the conditions and incentives that will induce investment, but it
cannot be assured that investment will indeed take place.
The Equity Issue
One concern of the downtown business community with the proposed
building regulations relates to questions of equity. There is a concern,
for example, that values would be lost. The height and density regulations

would not by themselves force a downward shift in land values, providing
the FAR's imposed are consistent with present values. Other public
policies might (parking, promotion of housing without some means of
subsidization). One basic intent of the Guidelines Plan is to encourage
a shift in land uses from, for example, automobiles to buildings, and a
shift to office buildings should not cause a decline in land prices. In any
event, public policy changes are always favorable to some groups and
damaging to others, and it is impossible for policies to be neutral in all
respects. There are, it seems to us, ways of handling the problem to
make the burden less severe, such as by phasing parking improvements
or by transferring development rights, but there may not be a way of
resolving all of the problem of downtown building height and density
without at least some minor casualties.

IMPROVEMENT IN DOWNTOWN
RETAIL OUTLOOK

As was seen in Section III, the outlook for downtown retailing is far from
pessimistic. Near term sales volumes are likely to dip in a relative
(regional) sense and perhaps in an absolute sense as a consequence of
Washington Square, but the anticipated continued rapid growth in total
SMSA retail sales and emergence of new markets for downtown should,
over the 15-year study term, cause total downtown space devoted to
retailing to expand. There will, however, be some important changes
in the character and location of these activities.
There are three principal ways in which the city can assure that the
projected sales are realized and augmented. One of these is through
some rather dramatic structural changes in the retail core, by encouraging
development of retail facilities similar in character to those found in
remaining areas of the SMSA. Another is through some less dramatic
techniques aimed at bandaging and repairing downtown retailing problems
and deficiencies. The third method is through development of cooperation
and controls at the regional level, aimed at enhancing the relative position
of downtown. The third of these methods is discussed in a later section.

U.S. Retail & Department Store Location Trends
& Implications for Downtown Portland
During the last 25 years nearly every downtown has had to make drastic
adjustments or lose economic viability. Only in the larger headquarters
cities that have experienced an office boom and in a few quaint villages
has new investment been attracted without vigorous and highly organized
local effort, usually accompanied by large federal grants. The reasons
have been so frequently described as to need no more than listing:
. Near total reliance on automobile travel, particularly in smaller
metropolitan areas, makes congestion and high cost of automobile
storage a downtown handicap.
. Growth inevitably increases the proportion of the urban population
living farther from downtown, and these are households most crucial
to retail success because they are affluent enough to afford new
housing and have growing families and incomes.
. Obsolete buildings, small parcels, and multiple ownerships in
downtown make quick change impossible and development costs
high.
. Major department stores with heavy advertising programs can draw
customers to any convenient location, which in a small metropolitan
area means any location with good freeway access.
. Department stores anchor regional shopping centers, attracting
customers who also patronize smaller stores. Thus they are in a
position to demand a subsidy downtown cannot offer in the form of
lower rent, lower land cost, or profit from participation in
development of the center.
. Regional shopping centers offer the customer more convenient
parking, weather protection, longer store hours, and unified sales
promotion. . . all as a result of centralized management that never
can be fully duplicated downtown.
Each generation of shopping centers is larger than the last in the quest
to attain retail dominance through attraction of trade area customers
seeking convenient shopping, large selections of comparison goods,
and presumably competitive merchandising practices. Prior to the late
'fifties, the regional shopping centers (at that time, 250,000-300,000
square feet of space) often included one major department store and
supporting shops. Community centers of that area rarely exceeded

200,000 square feet of supermarket-drug-junior department store space.
Today, regional (and the "super regional" centers) commonly exceed
500, 000 feet of selling area, with two to four major stores as anchor
tenants, and the community centers have expanded, in some areas to
include large discount drug chain operations, and even solitary department
stores, where land area is at a premium but retailers perceive a market
for full-line merchandising. The community center has, however, lost
its prominence as larger regional centers have expanded operations to
include convenience goods (food and drug items), and are to a certain
extent being replaced by neighborhood centers (under 100, 000 feet) and
free-standing stores (discount operations, the 7-11 "stop 'n shop" market,
and the like).
Around the U. S. , downtown's share of retailing has been on a decline for
some 15 to 20 years, although in many areas the absolute volume of
sales in downtown stores has not suffered, and in some cases actually
has risen. Without extraordinary conditions, the downtown retail profile
has not been enjoying the benefits of rapid demographic and economic
growth in expanding metropolitan areas. However, what might appear
to be a gloomy picture overall is showing signs of changing. New department stores and supporting retail space are, in fact, being developed in
a number of cities of all sizes and character. In almost all cases, the
major stores are located within or immediately adjacent to urban redevelop
ment projects, many financed with the formerly plentiful federal loans
and grants for renewal in central cities. Such disparate locations as
San Francisco, Baltimore, Hartford, Fresno, California; San Diego,
Los Angeles, Pasadena, Cleveland, Kansas City, Oklahoma City, Boise;
Wausau, Wisconsin, Detroit, Dallas, New Orleans, Saint Paul, Tampa
and Boston fall into this category.
Within the past three to four years, additional major store planning and
construction has occurred outside federally funded renewal projects. Use
of "tax increment" financing (bonds secured by future tax revenues) has
become popular, and use of this technique is most sound with respect to
high-value retail and office projects. For this reason, throughout the
West Coast and in certain Midwest and Eastern seaboard cities, new
central area retail-office-hotel projects are emerging.
The reasons for the shift in interest back to the central cities is because
of a recognition of new markets in downtowns. The retail department
store has, in the past 100 years or more, gone through a series of changes
in locational and operational characteristics. An overly simplified
chronology of department store operations in this country would include
these milestones:

. Prior to 1918: All major "flagship" (key stores) in downtown
districts, usually tied into locations with competitors and served
by interurban transit.
• 1918-1930: Additional expansion of downtown stores into smaller
cities; initial expansion out of major city central business districts
(particularly in California, Illinois, New York).
. 1930-1945: Depression and wartime curtailment of expansion except
in aircraft or shipbuilding centers (California, Great Lakes, Eastern
Seaboard).
. 1945-1955: Major impetus to locate new department stores near
rapidly growing close-in suburbs. Flagship stores still maintained.
Declines begin in central city sales volume.
. 1955-1970: Proliferation of the regional shopping center; major
racial and other changes in central cities prompt closings or
cutbacks in quality of CBD flagship stores.
. 1970-Present: Continuation of exurban regional center trend; early
indications of new interest by chains in downtown or other urban
office employment concentration zones. Some new construction
(urban renewal programs mainly); some renovation. CBD stores
begin distinct shift to soft goods and specialty offerings.
Growth in offices, hotels and housing in the downtowns provide new
markets. Many of the new stores are "replacement flagship" stores
(as in Los Angeles, San Francisco and many cities in the East). In
these examples, locations and characteristics are changed to fit the
market.
Suburban expansion remains the key to increased sales - and all major
chains continue to hedge their central city bets by locating new suburban
outlets wherever possible. Remaining in the CBD without suburban
representation forces these stores to change the mix of goods offered,
and dual representation shifts CBD outlets more to dry goods. Leaving
the CBD would, of course, create a void in merchandise that could later
attract a new department store operator, and this is another incentive
that keeps many stores in the central area despite shrinking profit margins.
The In-Town Shopping Center Alternative
Realization of retail development potential within downtown above levels
noted in Section II will require full recognition of market forces and

investor preferences by public officials. New retail space potential in
downtown Portland will be keyed to (1) rising employment levels,
(2) available sites, and (3) access and parking questions. The outlook
for the first element is excellent, as was seen. The second is a problem,
at least for sites suitable for larger retail complexes or retail/hotel/office
multi-use projects - a growing trend in central cities today. Presently,
there are limited opportunities for major redevelopment projects adjacent
to the existing retail core. The third item (access and parking) is a
major element of the present Downtown Plan evaluation program, and a
firm policy has yet to be adopted.
Retail developers (other than small operators working with small sites
or multi-use possibilities) tend more and more to seek the "shopping
center in town" possibility as an investment, for reasons noted above.
Hence, the full realization of a stronger retail concentration in downtown
will in all likelihood require direct public action (redevelopment authority
and possible joint financing of parking and off-site improvements). The
magnitude of current (one million plus feet of floor area) and potential
1990 retail use in downtown (an additional one million feet or more)
indicates that:
. Considerable land area would be required, in assembled chunks,
to accommodate large retail project proposals (large projects of
400, 000 square feet or more).
. Contemporary practice for in-town centers will accept some
reduction, but not elimination, of parking for patrons - thus
requiring nearby garage facilities.
. Expensive land (especially at the contemporary low floor area
ratios of 2- or 3-to-l) and construction costs will drive developers
to seek partial (if not total) public underwriting of parking and
extraordinary improvements).
Thus, for full implementation of the Downtown Plan retail objectives,
the City should consider public action to accommodate at least one
future retail (or multi-use with retail emphasis) project of a magnitude
of 500, 000 square feet, using urban renewal as a basis for implementation.

Support of Existing Downtown Retailing
The other type of public action recommended is directed towards the
existing concentration of regional retailing uses (department stores and
support outlets in the CBD), and consists of a series of programs, many
already under consideration, such as (1) maintenance of adequate access
and parking for the store operators, short of a critical congestion level;
(2) improvement of the regional transportation system, with service
provided during the commute hours and on weekends and holidays;
(3) adequate public services, including sanitation and street maintenance,
in the vicinity of the retail core, and (4) maintenance of an adequate level
of public protection to ensure that the retail district is free of crime
against persons and their property.
The second series of recommended programs is directed toward the
maintenance of Downtown as a major regional retail center as years
pass. This set of programs is really tied heavily into regional planning
and service policies, but also includes a series of actions that could be
taken by Portland City, such as: (1) completion of an adequate specific
"retail district" comprehensive or precise plan, designed to accommodate
the apparent retail development potential in Downtown on at least a tenyear horizon; (2) consideration of the use of public powers (including
redevelopment) to provide adequate sites and facilities for new stores
and support activities that might wish to locate in Downtown over time;
(3) limiting the sheer amount of commercial strip proliferation that
could occur citywide and weaken to a degree Downtown potential.
At this point, it is appropriate to consider the implications of the Downtown Plan related to the distribution and scale of the retailing function.
The plan suggests both the maintenance of the existing core are functions
(department stores and supporting area), and the introduction of retailing
(for diversity) in numerous other Planning Districts, including the
Waterfront, Union Station Area, etc. Recognizing the goals of the plan
in this respect, we must nonetheless point out that this "dispersal" concept is one that could weaken, rather than strengthen, the Downtown
retail function over the years - - a t least as
related to retailing above
the impulse buying or specialty goods category. One possible direction
retailing might take, if dispersal is encouraged to a large degree, is to
fragment into a series of "centers" located within large buildings, or
within multi-use projects: none of the functional centers would be large
enough to offer comparison goods or other household shopping categories,
and the household-oriented functions of Downtown retailing could continue
to be usurped by outlying shopping centers, each in its own right a smaller,
competing CBD.
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Our general recommendation at this point is to caution future planners
working with Downtown Plan guidelines to carefully consider the levels
of retailing encouraged in non-CBD zones, such as the waterfront
redevelopment areas, while recognizing that some convenience and
specialty shopping will logically fit into new larger office or hotel projects. One of the first and most significant steps in such planning is the
completion of an accurate inventory of existing space in Downtown retail
outlets - - broken down into fine categories - - and the updating of this
inventory on a regular (as opposed to a crisis) basis. Reflection upon
the size and composition of this inventory when considering plan approvals
for new Downtown projects should provide planners with the necessary
guidance relative to the desirability and scale of retailing to be permitted.
Under all considerations, maintenance of as strong a base of comparison
shopping as is possible is crucial. The alternative, that of further loss
of the major backbone of retailing to suburban centers, is one not designed
to support Downtown Plan implementation, and it must be regarded with
a high degree of concern.

HOUSING PROGRAMS & PROSPECTS

The Downtown Plan calls for a broad range of housing opportunities, to
meet the needs of persons from a wide range of income groupings. In
this section an examination is made of some possible programs that
would assist the city in implementing this objective; and some conclusions
are drawn regarding the city's prospects of meeting its downtown housing
objectives. The discussion differentiates between housing prospects in
the middle and lower price and rent ranges, as these prospects do differ.
Middle Income Housing in the Downtown
The outlook, as seen in Section II, was not overly optimistic for middle
income housing in the downtown without some incentive program on the
part of the city.
The future of downtown housing is tied to effective development costs
(and thus rental and sales prices) relative to more conventional urban and
suburban residential areas. There is latent demand for housing near
office employment concentrations, irrespective of suburban housing
opportunities, because of accessibility to jobs and reduced time, cost
and convenience of commuting. However, the cost/price relationship
is crucial. Typical central city land is apparently simply too expensive
(in excess of $10. 00 per square foot) and construction costs too high
(over $25. 00 per square foot) for rentals and sales prices to be held to
market levels(under $300 monthly for rentals, or $50,000 sales prices).

At these prices, the locational advantages of downtown cease to provide
an adequate tradeoff for commute costs for all but a very small segment
of the city's population. Adding the costs of parking in multilevel
structures is an additional inflator of housing unit price. Although
downtown Portland land values are rapidly reaching the threshold level
for housing projects even at high densities (100 DU/acre or more), the
escalation in Class 1 construction (fireproof) costs is more detrimental.
Thus, without combined public and private action, housing in downtown
Portland does not have a bright future - alternative use pressures are
simply too strong.
Another problem regards questions of scale. Scale is important in an
investment sense, since, as was seen in Section. IT, the slow rate of sale
(or lease-up) of downtown dwelling units means that developers constructing
units with typical downtown densities (100 or more units per acre) are
forced into carrying considerable unsold inventories for relatively long
periods of time. Buildings with 50 dwelling units, then, would be a more
realistic scale. This means smaller structures on smaller sites, which
generally implies relatively low land costs.
The low absorption effects scale in another way, however. There is a
critical mass that is important to housing in downtown areas. There
needs to be enough housing units (and hence population) around for residents to feel a sense of community or neighborhood, to reduce the potential
for crime or the fear of crime, to provide essential convenience goods
and services, etc. Residential building needs,in other words, to be a
clustering together in downtowns, and several are needed in each relevant
area. Without this level of scale, housing in the downtown ceases to be
attractive to prospective buyers and tenants.
In terms of action to support housing programs, all choices effectively
come down to subsidies or bonuses, even for middle income units. Subsidies were possible at one time through the use of federal urban renewal
programs, with the cost of residential land written down to levels
compatible with the rent-paying capabilities of prospective residential
tenants, and with the write-down subsidized in part by federal grants.
Even with the low land costs associated with housing projects in urban
renewal areas, the rate at which dwelling units were added was hardly
spectacular. The problem in Portland's principal designated downtown
renewal areas (extending between Madison and Glisan, Fourth and the
Waterfront) is that the Guidelines Plan rejects the use of condemnation
and clearance as a means of implementing land use objectives in this
area. Even if the Plan permitted use of this tool, federal renewal programs
have for the most part been discontinued and State programs (largely
funded through issuance of tax increment bonds) are considerably more

expansive for use by the local areas (although they provide some compensating features).
It would seem to us to be unthinkable that the City would ask its taxpayers
to subsidize middle income housing in downtown on a direct basis. The
City, we would suspect, has too many alternative pressing uses of its
resources for subsidies for the middle income segment of its population,
no matter what the secondary benefits that may derive from the program
(i. e. , effect on downtown as a whole). One sensible alternative, then, is
to relax the prohibition against use of more conventional renewal tactics,
with use of condemnation, and housing, land and construction write-downs
paid for out of tax increment revenues. Since this procedure is potentially
the most effective device in its kit of implementation tools, we would hope
that the City would at least review the matter once again before shutting
the door once and for all on this device.
The other potentially workable technique involves use of the bonus system,
similar to that used in the past for parking garages. If buildings in a
portion of the waterfront area (say between Madison and Oak) were allowed
to be constructed with variable heights, but with maintenance of the 4-to-l
height ratio, a housing bonus system could be used. The bonus could be •
provided by allowing the developer to (1) build housing on the adjoining
unused block; (2) do a twin use building (office and housing) with somewhat
higher FAR's; (3) construct a housing project with a density roughly twice
that of the office building; and/or (4) allow additional office FAR to
developers who also provide housing.
There are two problems with the bonus approach. The first is that in
the case of increasing the density of housing in order to reduce effective
overall land cost, developers are still confronted with the problem of
high cost of highrise construction, which is the principal disincentive for
such housing. The problem with providing the office building developer
with a bonus is that if the practice does catch on, the landowner most
assuredly will increase his asking price for the land, since the yield
from the land will now be greater. The value of the land is a function
of the use to which it is put. If, by adding a bonus, potential yields from
the land increase and the land is now worth more, landowners will push
the price up or prospective developers will bid it up to the point where
the incentive provided by the bonus will begin to disappear. The answer
to this problem may be through administrative action (flexible policies
and review procedure).

The Cost of Providing Moderate Income
Housing Downtown: The Relevant Variables
The principal problem connected with moderate income housing in the
downtown is one of cost. The relative cost of building such units free of
subsidies is discussed here, and is followed by the subsidy alternatives
available to the City.
We have not attempted here an exhaustive analysis of the cost of all the
various types of housing now being constructed. This discussion is
included to give a better picture of why housing is so expensive to construct, and more importantly, what conditions need to be met, or which
of the critical cost variables the City of Portland might be able to reduce
to provide incentives for developers to build or rehabilitate low and
moderate cost housing in the downtown area.
Although everyone is aware that housing costs are rising, the cost of
housing to a renter or prospective buyer combines many individual cost
items, some of which have risen at a rate twice and three times the
cost of living index. The composite breakdown of the major cost components
in twelve apartment complexes in the Portland area is shown below.
Although each apartment project varied in rent per square foot, as well
as all other items on a per square foot basis, the percentage of the gross
rent going to pay for each cost item did not vary appreciably. That is,
it did not matter whether the renter was paying $100 or $300 a month;
roughly 40 to 50 percent of that rent was being applied to the interest on
the building mortgage. The figures were obtained by adding the projected
expenditures for each item over a thirty-year operating life and dividing
by the net rents received over that same period after operating costs.
Operating costs, such as property taxes, utilities, maintenance and
administration, were deducted so that the amount going towards the
capital improvement could more easily be identified. In most cases,
these operating costs consumed approximately 35 to 40 percent of the
gross rents received. The percentage figures,, below, therefore, show
where the remaining 65 percent of the tenant's rent goes.
. Land (8. 5% of net rent rising 8-9% annually)
. Construction (22. 3% of net rent, rising 7% annually)
. Interest (47. 4% of net rent; 1/2% increase results in 5. 1 %
increase in rent)
. Taxes (10. 8% of net rent)
. Profits (11. 0% of net rent)
It is apparent that rents within the means of low and many moderate income
residents in the downtown section of Portland will not be achieved at

current price and cost, levels without subsidies. These may take the
form of direct subsidies to the tenant or owner; interest rate subsidies
to lending institutions; or tax subsidies to reduce land or construction
costs.
In order to determine the extent to which any of these subsidy forms
affect the cost of housing to the tenant, we have constructed two hypothetical housing models similar to several housing opportunities now
existing in the downtown area. The first is a rather extensive rehabilitation
of an existing 200-unit hotel, converted to efficiency units for the elderly.
Each unit will contain a new small bath/kitchenette unit designed to meet
the requirements of Section 23 leasing program of the Public Housing Act.
The second prototype development tested is an "in-fill11 apartment complex
to be built on a city block. Various densities shall be considered to test
the sensitivity of rental rates to land prices.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate how reductions in interest
rates, land costs, sponsors' profit and increasing densities affect the
rental rate which a tenant would have to pay. We have used a typical
financial analysis of the return to a developer over a 25 -year life of the
project as a means of testing both the economic feasibility of the project,
as well as the sensitivity of rent to different cost bases.
Elderly Housing - Rehab Prototype
Land Area - 20,000 S. F.
Existing Building - 50,000 S. F.
Existing Units - 200

Cost - $4/S. F.
Value - $8/S. F.

Price - $ 80,000
$400,000

Remodel Units - 150 @ 250 S. F. /unit

The existing hotel occupies one-half a city block. Its purchase price by
a non-profit housing corporation is $480,000. Of this, $400,000 is
assigned to the value of the existing structure and refinanced at the time
of rehabilitation. The rehabilitation costs could run from $8 to $20 per
square foot to bring the building up to minimum public housing standards.
Three separate financing methods were tested. The first is a 3% low
interest housing loan which banks and local corporations might be able
to supply to very low levels of funding. The second is a 6%, 3 5-year loan
which should prove to be quite comparable to housing monies available
from the State of Oregon. The third is the current rate of interest
available from private lending institutions at 8-1/2% for 25 years.
As can be seen from the table shown below, if elderly units are to be
made available in the $50 or less price category without further assistance,

rehabilitation costs must remain below $10 per square foot on the 6%
loan but can rise to over $19 per square foot on the 3% loan. Under
current private financing conditions of 8-1/2%, such housing is probably
unattainable.
Each dollar added to the per square foot rehabilitation cost adds 5 percent
to the rents of these units under the 3% and 6% loans, and more than 6%
to the rents under a market rate loan. Each additional half percent of
interest added to a 35-year loan adds 8% to each tenant's monthly rent.
Here again, we witness the cost of money (financing) compounding the
increase in the cost of construction.
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Moderate Income Housing - In-fill Prototype
Land Area - 40, 000 S. F .
Building - 100 units: 40 eff.
40 1BR
Average 620 s.f. 2 Q 2 R R

Cost - $4/s.f.
P r i c e - $160,000
Gross Building Area - 80,000 s.f.
Net Rentable 62,000 s.f.

Operating expense - 35% of gross rents
Developer's rate of return - 12%

This apartment project is to be built on a city block. It will contain 100
relatively small units aimed at secretarial and white collar workers.
Financing shall be either through available State monies at 6% or current
market rate of either 8-1/2-25 year loan, or 9%-20 year loan. The
developer expects a 12 percent, rate of return on a discounted basis. Mis
equity will be either 10% of the project cost under the 6% and 8-1/2%
financing, or 20 percent under the more stringent condition of 9%.
If two working girls, each earning about $4/000 a year, combined 2 5% of
their monthly incomes each, they could afford $16 5 per month rent.
As we see in the tables below, if the project is financed with a 6% mortgage
and construction costs do not exceed $21 per square foot, moderate priced
housing is achieved with no further subsidies. However, as the interest
rate jumps to 8-1/2 percent, construction costs would have to be below
$16 per square foot to be considered moderate income housing. While
this construction cost is still attainable, minimum cost of wood frame
construction in urban areas has risen to the $18 to $20 per square foot
level, and Class 1 construction costs are still higher. If interest rates
should rise to 9%, rental rates on a small unit such as these would have
to bring nearly $24 5 per unit, a very unlikely prospect.
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R e n t s / L a n d P r i c e and Density
To test the sensitivity of rents to land prices and density, we kept the
mortgage at 6% and assumed construction costs to be $22 per square

foot of whatever size building was required to produce the densities of
• the units per a c r e . Again, remember that something less than 28-1/2
cents per square foot in rent produces moderate income housing. A
600 square foot one bedroom unit would rent for $170; a 750 square foot
two bedroom unit would be less than $215.
As can be seen in the table-below, if a density of 60 units to the acre is
to be achieved, land prices will have to be below $4 per square foot.
Doubling the density, to 120 units per acre,*would permit $6 per square
foot land prices. This density would require at least three to four floors
of apartments above the required levels of parking.
Each dollar added to the cost of land at densities of l e s s than 100 units
per acre adds about 3. 5 percent to the rent of the units which a r e built
on it.

RENT PER SQ. FT. AT VARIOUS
LAND COST & UNIT DENSITIES
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Rents/Profit
A final test was made to see the relationship between rents and the
percent of profit which is made by the sponsor/developer. By reducing
the expected rate of return on the equity which an owner receives from
12 percent to 3 percent, rents were reduced by l e s s than four percent.
However, a non-profit housing corporation could expect to reduce rents
by even a greater percentage in light of their tax status and even lower
margin of required operating capital.

Implementation Procedures: The
Sources of Support & Direction
While the private money market of banks, savings and loan associations,
insurance and other such companies will undoubtedly provide some of the
funds for the rehabilitation of downtown housing units, most will come
from government sources or through governmental subsidies or guarantees.
What programs, then, are currently available or anticipated in the near
future which will supply desperately needed financial support to this
housing effort?
The situation today as far as an effective housing subsidy program is
far less encouraging than that of the 1960's. Federal support for "great
Society" housing programs is rapidly disappearing - through program
cutbacks, impoundment of appropriations, and realignment of categorical
grants (special purpose funds) into a proposed "block grant" (general
purpose) federal grant policy. Of the "two hundred series" of federal
housing subsidy programs enacted prior to 1970, only the 202 (elderly)
remains funded; 235-236-237 and the older 220 programs are, in effect,
dead. Presently, the administration and HUD officials are permitting a
continuation of contract authority for Section 23 (public housing leasing)
projects (provisions contained in MR 14490). The national emphasis is,
in summary, away from housing program subsidies on a large scale.
This situation, coupled with the phasing out of categorical urban renewal
grants (HUD requests for fiscal year 197 5 less than 1*5 percent of
national requests) effectively places the burden of housing programs upon
states and local agencies.
As heavy a burden as this appears, there are relatively untested approaches
to house production in central cities that should rapidly gain in popularity
as federal props disappear. Many states are rushing to approve state
financing of housing funds (California is considering at least six bills,
Oregon likewise; in North Carolina, Missouri, Oklahome, Georgia,
Illinois - various debt proposals are under consideration). Most of these
proposals are to float large general obligation bond issues, and to use
funds for (1) direct subsidies, mainly for lower-income units, and (2) mortgage funds to supplement scarce and costly private money. Similar
proposals to support conservation and maintenance of existing housing may
be found in numerous states.
Some housing experts feel that massive statewide funding of loans funds
plus "community development" federal block grants may well do a better
job of pump-priming housing in general than was experienced under federal
subsidies. Others disagree. What is more significant, perhaps, is the

emerging view of housing professionals that "production subsidies"
should revert to moderate-income and middle-income needs (closing a
smaller gap), while other approaches to lower-income housing are tried-primarily direct income subsidies, or "rent certificates" (housing stamps,
if you will).
Actually, the bulk of housing assistance programs now emerging from
state houses are really designed to replace formerly available federal
programs. Thus, major changes in the relationships between housing
plans and actual supplies of dwelling units are not yet worked into the
equation. This phenomenon is likely to occur, however, as other states
fund housing and study more closely production assistance models similar
to the New York State provisions (for statewide intervention by the quasipublic Urban Development Corporation and its subsidiaries) and other
examples.
Descriptions of some of the relevant programs, some of which may
serve as models for Portland lobbying efforts, are provided below:
New Oregon State Legislation
Affecting Housing
Low Income Loans - HB 2398. This act will be a loan program where
blocks of money will be made available to local governmental bodies
through the sale of revenue bonds by the State Housing Division. Although
the rate of interest which will be charged borrowers is not determined at
this time, it is likely to be about 2 to 3 percent below the current commercial market rate, or somewhere on the order of 5-3/4 to 6-1/2 percent.
Terms could be up to 40 years. Multnomah County will probably receive
20 percent of the allocation, with the total allocation on the order of $200
million. This amount will probably not be released in any one bond
issuance, but, over the next few years, Multnomah County should be in
line for roughly $40 million for low income housing units.
Rehabilitation of units is stressed by the wording of the bill. It remains
to be seen if this will be the case or whether funds will be doled out on a
first-come basis. Residents of projects financed by this program will
be required to have incomes below the median level for the area. In
addition, they must be spending at least 25 percent of their income on
housing. Using 1970 Census figures of family income and outdated figures
of income to rent ratios from the 1960 Census, we would estimate that
about 38, 000 of the County's 70,000 families who are below the median
limit would fall within the 25 percent restriction.
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Using Department of HUD figures on loan to value ratios, unit construction
costs, and the like within their 236 program, we would estimate that the
full $40 million could produce about 2,700 new low to moderate housing
units in the County, or about half again that many rehabilitated units.
Student Housing Loans - HB 5097. Approximately $10 million has been
allocated for student housing in the Portland area, including Portland State
and the University of Oregon's Medical, Dental and Nursing Schools. The
Columbian Research Institute is currently developing a feasibility study
of student housing in the area. It will show the alternate methods for best
utilizing this loan money. We estimate on a very preliminary basis only
that the amount of the full issuance could create between 600 and 750 new
student units, based on an inflated per unit cost of similar student dormitory
housing. However, their recommendations might favor apartment units.
Programs in Other States
The newly-enacted Georgia law specifies that at least one-third of the
housing units financed by the state agency must be in standard metropolitan
statistical areas; another one-third must be financed in areas located
outside an SMSA. Two later sections of the act require the finance agency
to establish one or more special "capital reserve funds" - which may not
fall below a level at least equal to the amount necessary to cover the
principal and interest due on the authority's bonds for a calendar year and a special "general reserve fund. "
Vermont's new UFA is empowered to borrow money and issue up to $74
million in tax-exempt bonds (which will not be backed by the full faith and
credit of the state); to make loans to mortgage lenders; to buy and sell
federally- and state-insured mortgage loans for housing construction or
rehabilitation; to create special "debt service reserve funds"; to provide
technical assistance; and to acquire property.
The two-part act also calls for the creation of a home mortgage guaranty
program, which will expand the activities of the six-year-old home
mortgage credit agency. The new body is authorized to offer up to $20
million worth of loan guaranties - all backed by the state's full faith and
credit.
Senate Bill 1633 would create a California Housing Finance Corporation
and designate it as the only state agency empowered to receive and allocate
federal housing assistance funds. The bill also authorizes the state's new
HFC to issue its own tax-exempt bonds and to make loans for the creation
of housing for low- and moderate-income persons and families. An
interest-free start-up loan of $750,000, repayable within 10 years, is
appropriated to the HFC from the state's general fund.

SB1634 is conditional upon the creation of a state housing finance corporation as proposed in SB1633. It provides for the sale of up to $500 million
in state bonds to create a fund for use by the HFC. The full faith and
credit of the state would be pledged for payment of the bonds and their
proposed sales would be submitted to the people for their approval at a
special election to be consolidated with the general election in November
1974.
In February of this year, a bill was introduced in the general assembly
of North Carolina to expand the powers of the North Carolina Housing
Corporation. The new agency would be empowered to issue bonds of up to
$50 million "to provide financing for residential housing construction,
new or rehabilitated, for sale or rental to persons and families of lower
income. " It would also have the authority to issue mortgage loans to
housing sponsors to purchase loans from mortgage lenders when "mortgage
loans are not otherwise available wholly or in part from private lenders
upon reasonably equivalent terms" and to provide management and counselling services to lower-income persons when no other satisfactory
counselling service is available.
In Missouri, House Bill 1190--to double to $200 million the bonding
capacity of the Missouri Housing Development Commission—was under
final consideration by the legislature in early April. Passage of the bill
by both houses is likely. To date, the Housing Development Commission
has utilized $95 million of its first $100 million authority. Missouri also
has a tax abatement law, which serves as a surrogate for the more usual
tax allocation procedure. This measure is discussed more fully in a
subsequent section.
In New Jersey, following the federal government's announcement last
year that rehabilitation financing under the Section 312 program would no
longer be available after June 30, the State Department of Community
Affairs came up with a rehabilitation financing arrangement of its own.
Initiated in the fall of 1973, the new state-aided rehabilitation program,
like its federally-funded counterpart, aims to bring homes in deteriorating
neighborhoods up to local code standards. It also has another goal; to
encourage private lending institutions, by offering to balance their loan
commitments with the guarantee of a state grant of up to 30 percent of
home repair costs, to invest once again in "high-risk" urban areas.
Columbus appears to be the first city in Ohio to take advantage of state
legislation, first enacted in December 1969 (and amended in 1971 and in
1972), that allows a city or county to exempt persons who rehabilitate
deteriorating homes from paying higher property taxes. Passed over
four years ago as an incentive to inner-city rehabilitators and builders

to invest in the improvement of deteriorating urban neighborhoods, the
state law has become increasingly important in recent months as
federal financial assistance for rehabilitation activity has diminished.
The Texas Home Rehabilitation Loan Fund Act would have established
two loan programs intended to strengthen the capacity of local governments
to deal with neighborhood decline "by providing access to home improvement loans for persons and families of low income; by conducting research
on the most efficient and economical methods of accomplishing home
rehabilitation; by educating low-income homeowners and potential homeowners in methods of maintaining their homes; and by promoting vocational
training programs in all fields related to housing rehabilitation.
In addition to a bill that authorizes an increase in bonding capacity for its
state housing finance agency, the 1974 session of the Minnesota legislature
also empowered the HFA to initiate a statewide housing rehabilitation loan
program, supported by a $100 million bonding authority and a $1 million
reserve fund appropriation. The bill enables the state agency to make
residential rehabilitation loans to low- and moderate-income homeowners
and to sponsors of housing for low- and moderate-income persons and
families, when private financing on reasonable terms is not available.
The UFA's loans are to be limited to the market value of the property,
when existing indebtedness is computed.
Who Will Do What? A Look
at Portland's Agencies
Three public and semi-public agencies in Portland each have a part to
play in bringing about an improved supply of low and moderate income
housing downtown and city-wide. These are (1) the Portland Planning
Commission and its staff, which is charged with developing a general
plan for the city and the downtown, and overseeing its implementation;
(2) Portland Development Commission (PDC) and staff, which plans
within the redevelopment areas, assembles land and creates development
opportunities; and (3) the Housing Authority of Portland (HAP) which, in
the future, will be more involved in leasing new and rehabilitated housing
units from owners and developers.
Desperately needed in this team is a non-profit sponsor/developer which
would work closely with the three agencies above to actually construct
the housing units. Until then, housing opportunities with limited or no
profits will go begging. This, and increasing the scope of the office of
Housing Coordinator (expediter) are discussed more fully below. However,
first a look at some specific steps which each of the existing agencies must
do to help bring about more low and moderate income units downtown.
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Planning Commission & Staff. The Planning Commission and staff must
develop a strong plan and direction for housing downtown and citywide.
It should be in a form and contain the information required by the new
Federal Housing bill so that the City will lose no time in applying for
Federal Housing Assistance when it becomes available. But, furthermore,
it must set priorities for low and moderate income housing as to which
segment or segments of this below market group needs housing the most.
Part of its determination should be where these persons are located;
whether any relocation would result in a better environment for those
residents; where and how much rehabilitation will be required to stem
the deterioration in various areas; how much will this cost; and what is
the relative expenditure of monies going to rehabilitation versus new
construction. Each of these elements should be. determined for various
levels of funding.
The participants in this planning process must keep in mind that these
decisions are outside the marketplace which generally decides who shall
be housed, where and for how much. More or less continuous contact and
coordination with citizen groups which truly represent the various segments
which will be the recipients of this housing aid and who will pay the bill
should be maintained.
Portland Development Commission & Staff. PDC has done an outstanding
job in creating an esthetically pleasing and economically viable redevelopment project in the Portland Center. As it moves out into second and third
phases, it should more carefully consider the social effects of its actions.
Two thousand low and moderate housing units have disappeared in the
south end of Portland. If housing is to have a place downtown, the process
of clearing and constructing must be replaced or supplemented with
rehabilitation and the filling-in process. The Lownsdale and Skidmore
Fountain areas create unique opportunities for PDC to employ their
innovative talents, to assemble key parcels and existing sound buildings
for a variety of uses, including low income housing as a major component.
As we will show in later examples, tax increment money from the added
value of a new hotel or office building in an area can be used to write down
the cost of land and buildings assembled for housing purposes in that same
area. The former analysis of how land cost affects rental rates shows
clearly that PDC must be able to offer low and moderate housing sponsor/
developers cleared land for about $4 per square foot. The feasibility of
rehabilitating any residential structure should be considered before the
purchase of any major buildings. Non-profit housing sponsors should
be encouraged to purchase rehabilitation opportunities directly from
current owners wherever possible to save PDC administrative and
holding costs. -.

The Development Commission could offer incentives to corporate and
commercial developers to also act as housing sponsors. Donation of
land or services (architectural fees, building supervision, etc. ) to a
non-profit corporation can become tax-deductible expenses to a profit
corporation. They, in turn, could be given a reduction in land cost
commensurate with the savings to the City resulting from the donation or
service.
Housing Authority of Portland. HAP manages over 4, 000 low and moderate
income units in the Portland area. About 2, 000 units are leased under
Section 23 contracts; the remaining units were built under conventional
or turn-key programs and are owned by the Authority. The future of the
conventional and turn-key programs are in doubt, as the present Administration is strongly opposed to this approach to public housing. The
prospects are likely that the Section 23 leasing program will be expanded.
Currently, HAP has less than 100 units of their allotted monies available
for leasing additional dwelling units in the Portland area. Even some of
this money is being used to further reduce the rent in other units under
construction. HAP is currently applying for 650 additional allotment
units.
The Housing Authority has shown strong interest in contracting with downtown apartment owners for a number of their units. Hopefully, in the
future, as greater appropriations to this leasing program become available,
a number of units can be specifically committed to the downtown area,
which would then allow an owner or developer to have a firm commitment
of future income as a basis for determining what costs could be borne in
the rehabilitation process.
The Section 23 leasing program operates in this way: The Housing Authority
negotiates with the apartment owner as to the fair market price of his
units. They sign a contract of from one to five years (occasionally with
additional option, periods). The Authority finds the tenants and charges
them 25 percent of their income and makes up the difference between this
and the market rent paid to the apartment owner with the federal subsidy.
Anticipated changes are that maintenance and administration problems
now handled by the Housing Authority will be shifted to the owner in the
new Federal housing bill. This would increase the participating owners'
reluctance to take part in the program due to high maintenance cost and
social problems which many feel are associated with low income residents.
Non-Profit Housing Corporation. Often utilized in California and the East
Coast, but seldom seen in Oregon, the non-profit housing corporation
plays a vital part in producing low and moderate income housing. Their
concern is for social need rather than profit; therefore they can take on
many more development opportunities. They act as a sponsor and can
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also function as the developer, although often they hire such expertise.
The seed money that is required for operation and minimum equity investment (for land purchase, etc. ) is generally raised from foundations,
charitable organizations, churches, local banks and corporations, and
the like. A board of directors operates it like any other business, except
operating costs and profit are kept to a minimum. Such non-profit corporations can continue to operate the low income units after their construction, lease them to a management firm or housing authority, or sell the
project for no profit.
It is our strongest recommendation that such a non-profit corporation
be formed. It would be well if a broad spectrum of the community with
knowledge of housing needs and development skills were involved, such
as churches, downtown business and labor leaders, and city commissioners.
If this is not feasible, an agency such as the Housing Authority itself could
sit as this private organization. This, however, would bring up the
duality of constructing the units as one entity and leasing the units to
themselves. Such a non-profit housing corporation would fill the gap in
the process of producing low cost units now missing due to the lack of
profit motivation.
Office of Housing Coordinator (Expediter). The City has made a positive
and necessary step in the creation of a housing expediter. This office
is critical in coordinating the four agencies described above so that a
comprehensive attack on the downtown housing problem can begin in
earnest. The office must also be an informational source to the communityat-large as to housing programs and opportunities that are available to
them, as well as soliciting their opinion at various stages of the City's
plans. Such an information bank must include the various development
opportunities of sites, rehabable buildings and sources of funding so
would-be developers can be guided to existing or future opportunities.
This office will play an ever-increasing role in the coordination and
allocation of funds which are going to be disbursed to local bodies in
blocks by new Federal and State housing programs. Priorities established
at the City Council level will demand close supervision by this office.
Some Concluding Thoughts on
the Downtown Housing Issue
While it is important that the City promote housing in the downtown as a
vehicle for supporting other Plan objectives, it is not altogether certain
that subsidized housing on any major scale makes any sense in downtown,
at least substantial numbers of low income housing units. The City Plan
calls for it, and at least some such housing is feasible, providing the City

is willing to provide low cost sites and state rehabilitation funds do become
available. However, there are some problems.
In the first place, the City may be wishing to use housing to bolster the
Plan rather than meet the needs of the poor. An incredible number of
problems have surfaced around the country with respect to subsidized
housing, and the moratorium on the program by the Nixon Administration
was not done simply because of differences in philosophy, but rather
because of necessity. The problem with subsidy programs in the past is
that they have been very expensive, the administrative costs have been
excessively high, and the impact on existing neighborhoods has, in many
cases, invited resistance.
If future federal programs are in the form of housing allowances, then the
downtown, rather than having a captive market, must compete with other
areas for tenants. The question is whether it can. There is no clear-cut
indication that low and medium income residents would like to live in the
downtown, given a choice. Our experience in Fresno, for example, was
that they would not. We interviewed residents in several of the pensioner
hotels in the area and found that they were living in the downtown area
simply because no alternatives were available to them. In Portland, the
Lutheran Church sponsored conversion of the old Multnomah Hotel into a
residence hotel for the elderly. It had very limited success in leasing its
units and, as a consequence, abandoned the project. The hotel was
eventually taken over by the federal government and converted to offices.
It is not clear why the project failed; perhaps its close proximity to the
Burnside area was a factor. The point still remains that the reason why
most low income people live in Portland's downtown at the present time
is because it is one of the few places left in the City of Portland where
housing can be found at rents of less than $75 per month. The reason for
that is that the units are unsafe and unsanitary.
In addition, it is important to think through what the externalities are
with respect to housing in the downtown. Are the overall net impacts of
providing more housing downtown positive or negative with respect to the
area? Retail sales would increase, but the magnitude would not be overly
great because of the low incomes of such residents. Sales would be largely
for convenience items. There would presumably be a slight reduction in
aggregate Portland transit costs, although even this is not clear. Many
of the residents, for example, would not be working and hence would have
limited need for rapid transit. If they did wish to shop, it is quite possible
that they would be located relatively distant from the commercial core
anyway and would have to rely on some form of transit. It could well be
that the transit form would have to be a more personal and hence expensive

one. In addition, the crime rate may go up if the composition of the
downtown residents changes to one of many low income residents under
the age of 30. This would intensify the fear on the part of the majority
of residents in Portland to come into downtown.
In short, it is not clear that (1) given an alternative, Portland's downtown
can compete effectively with other portions of the city to attract low
income residents and (2) that it is a good idea to spend substantial amounts
of local revenue to subsidize such housing. A yardstick is needed to know
whether there are better, more productive uses of City of Portland
revenues.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS:
REGIONAL & LOCAL
Our approach to an evaluation of the Portland Downtown Guidelines Plan
is based on the conviction that no major city plan, be it the central area
or other key component, can be implemented within a vacuum, particularly
without recognition of the interaction of a number of related area-wide
planning efforts. Plans and policies that would directly or indirectly
affect the performance of the Downtown Plan are (1) regional and (2) local.
The implications of identifiable policies on the downtown planning effort
are discussed below.
Policies Deserving Review
Since the gist of the Downtown Plan is continued centralization of
"regional-serving" activities in Central Portland west of the Willamette
River, we are concentrating upon public policy sets that involve the
following:
.

Actions that encourage or discourage public and private
investment supporting new activities, including the location
of residential, commercial and industrial development.

.

Actions that regulate the location and characteristics of
such development.

.

Actions that tend to shift, over time, the balance of power
between historical and emerging activity centers.

Examples of the first set would be the provision of roads, water and
related infrastructure to fringe lands under measurable development
pressure. The administration of land use regulations, and related
police powers, would be valid examples of the second set. Extensive
reorganization of public agencies, consolidation of powers (or separation
of powers) and related actions are examples of the third set of policies
that have a bearing here.
Policies of Primary Importance
A further division of public policies may be made from the three sets
enumerated above. We would group policy sets into two major categories:
mandatory and discretionary. The first category, mandatory policies,
will receive little attention here, since these required actions (such as
the maintenance of an assessment roll for taxation, taxation at fair
market value, provision of a basic potable water supply, etc.) are
changed only at state and higher levels of public authority, and after
much debate and consideration of all general welfare concerns.
Certain discretionary policies having a bearing on this discussion, however, can be isolated and reviewed within the context of the Downtown
Plan implementation effort. These policies, consisting in the main of
variations in the thrust and timing of public actions, include:
o

Regional and subregional land use planning and
land use controls

o

Transportation system service levels, service
areas, routes, and extent of coverage

o

Regional and subregional infrastructure plans
and service policies

It is our intent here to provide a concise review of the breadth and
characteristics of such policies in the Portland Metropolitan Area as
they relate to the Downtown Plan and the outlook for implementation of
its major proposals.
Essence of The Downtown Plan
Highly simplified, the Downtown Plan developed in the past three years
calls for a continued centralization of certain regional activities in
Central Portland: it is based upon reinforcement of the area as the
primary regional employment center; it calls for strengthening of the
retail and service functions in the CBD; it clearly calls for redevelop-

ment of underutilized areas to increase residential inventory; it proposes
that Downtown Portland be the focal point of the regional mass transit
system, in addition to its central position as the hub of the regional
highway network.
Implementation of this plan would thus require, over the years, a combination of public policies that in fact support the directions called out
in the planning framework-.
A quick look at some public policies in effett or emerging in the region
should thus cast some light upon problems and potentials:

Regional Policy Makers and Their
Spheres of Influence
Within the Columbia Region are literally hundreds of public authorities,
each with varying levels of power and influence. Our focus upon the
policies associated with regional land use, transportation and policy
administration does, however, reduce this formidable list to a manageable number.
Of this group, we would rate the City of Portland as the clear municipal
power. In conjunction, as a major influence on the region, we have the
Port of Portland's major employers. Utilities, including major federal
agencies, the Bonneville Power Administration and local public utilities,
are important. The counties that have jurisdiction over unincorporated
lands (Multnomah, Washington, Clackamas, and Clark County, Washington)
are quite significant. The special service districts providing water, sewers
and other necessities rate mention. The transportation policy makers
(Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District, Oregon Highway Division, others) have a very large role to play.
In addition to these policy makers with chartered powers to regulate or
direct urbanization, there is a host of newer agencies that are rapidly
gaining powers, where previously existed only advisory or similar
functions. Of these, we would rate the Columbia Region Association of
Governments (CRAG) as an agency of note, and Oregon's Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) as one major power in environmental
matters.

Regional Land Use Planning and Control
There is at present no truly effective regional land use policy group in
the Columbia Region. There is, however, a regional planning agency,
CRAG; and recent legislation has provided CRAG with new powers that
may well become quite important to any concept of regional planning.
Now, however, CRAG simply acts in an advisory and coordination
capacity. It functions as the local agency for review and approval of
grants from higher government levels to local jurisdictions, and thus
exerts considerable influence on their plans and programs.
CRAG also maintains a regional "plan" (currently termed "an interim
land use plan") which is basically a series of proposals for balanced
land use throughout the region: three concepts are considered, consisting
of concentration, dispersion, and a combination of the two. CRAG, not
surprisingly, favors the third (or combination plan) since this tends to
favor "balanced" or incremental growth in regional communities already
established. Planning proposals notwithstanding, however, much of the
current "interim land use plan" is derived, by necessity, from the plans
of local jurisdictions. Recently enacted or pending legislation related
to regional land use planning (see below) is almost certain to increase
CRAG's influence in the future. Such an increase in regulatory powers
will undoubtedly result in a more direct role for CRAG in regional land
use planning and control. If this occurs, and if a policy of "controlled
balanced growth" is carried forward, policies established and administered by this regional agency could tend to move regional growth away
from centralization in Portland and toward incremental growth in
existing settlements. If Portland policy makers fully accept the premises supporting implementation of the Downtown Plan, an aggressive,
advocate role within the Columbia Region Association of Governments
will be quite important indeed.
Another agency operating in a regional sense is Oregon's Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ). Like other statewide or regional environmental agencies, DEQ has been primarily concerned with pollution control; and in this vein, mainly with air and water quality. The very
magnitude and complexity of pollution control today gives this agency
(and its counterparts at other levels) rather healthy powers to regulate,
or at least materially influence, land use in the region. Presently,
DEQ is struggling with at least two issues directly affecting Downtown
Portland's future. These are (1) control of vehicular travel and concentration, to control air quality, and (2) control of wastes, mainly
liquid, to maintain water quality. In the Portland Metropolitan Area,
as in others, the enormous dilemma of our dependence on the automobile
has complicated the manner in which we distribute our urban activities.

At this point, an equal dilemma is how to continue growth without an
immense effort to simultaneously create sufficient treatment of human
and industrial wastes. With respect to the Downtown Portland planning
proposals, we see two areas of policy on the part of DEQ that will be of
considerable significance: (1) control of travel to and from Portland's
central zones, with related parking regulations, and (2) control of new
suburban development of all types, with respect to loads on water and
sewer facilities. Much of DEQ's effort in the travel area is so intertwined with transportation policy administered by others that it is quite
difficult to clearly note a posture by such an agency that could be
independently held. If, however, no realistic solutions to travel and
parking problems are forthcoming, in a collaborative sense, from a
number of agencies, Downtown Portland could well find itself by mandate restrained from further intensification. Policies in this area of
environmental control are in their infancy. How they really begin to
emerge in the next few years will be of considerable significance.
Subregional Planning - Four
Counties Examined

Moving directly from the regional scale of public policy sets, we turn
to the next largest jurisdictional bodies: that of the counties making up
the Columbia Region. These are the Oregon counties of Multnomah,
Washington, Clackamas and Columbia, and Clark County, Washington.
Columbia County is largely rural and outside the foreseeable urban
pattern, so we will look only at the four remaining in any detail.
Multnomah County
This county, heart of the region and containing all of Portland City, is
largely built up - with the exception of the hill mass following the
Willamette River northwest from Portland, and the eastern fringes
(Sandy River zone). Outside Portland itself, Multnomah County is
generally residential in character; heavy port and other employment
centers run the length of the urbanized area along the Willamette and
Columbia Rivers.
In terms of a future land use policy, Multnomah County is now updating
and revising its General Plan. County officials note that growth is
anticipated in the eastern segments of the county; the rapidly urbanizing
communities are Gresham, Troutdale, Fairview and Wood Village. The
availability of sanitary sewer connections has strengthened eastern county
attraction for new development, as has the rather extensive grid pattern
of local streets and highways.

Construction of the Mt. Hood Freeway through Multnomah County is
considered to be a remote possibility. Construction of 1-205 is considered more likely to occur, but its character has now been reduced
from its original concept of 10 lanes with interchanges every 3/4 mile
to a 6-lane road with interchanges farther apart. (The Multnomah Board
of County Commissioners has also asked for a restudy of 1-205, but it
has already approved an extension to Foster Road.)
The emerging General Plan shows one new regional commercial center,
at Banfield Freeway/1 82nd Street.
Some revitalization of commercial activity in the Parkrose Area (southeast of Portland International Airport near Bypass 30) can be expected.
A new sewage treatment plant will be built nearby. There are good
industrial sites along State Bypass Route 30 east of the airport (on the
Union Pacific Railroad Line) and a number of firms have recently
located there. To accommodate additional growth, Multnomah County's
policy will be to strengthen existing centers.
Multnomah County was just recently reorganized by charter amendment
and reduced from 7 to 4 departments or Councils (Human Resources,
Environmental Services, Judicial Services and Administrative Services),
each with a department head. The county and operations will be altered
again if the proposed charter amendment for city/county consolidation
is passed. The present effort to consolidate the City of Portland and
the County (mostly along county organization lines) could create considerable changes, which are difficult to estimate now.
Again, while probably not intended to do so, policies of Multnomah
County appear to conflict with the intent to maintain a strong Portland
CBD, if only because this county, like CRAG, has other constituents
and interests to consider. The proposed city/county consolidation could
direct influence toward Portland, but this is not a certainty.
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Washington County
Washington County has increased its public planning efforts in the last
two years to cope with the rapid development that has been occurring.
This county experienced the sharpest population growth rate in Oregon
over the 1960-70 decade, jumping from 92, 000 to 154,000 persons, or
increasing 67.4 percent. By the end of 1973, population was approaching
180,000 persons. Washington County planners attribute this growth to:
o

Improved highway access to Portland itself

o

Large amounts of developable land within reach of
Portland jobs

o

Construction of sewer and water lines, schools,
parks and other services

o

Movement of certain employment generators from
Portland or other locations to the county (Tektronix
in Beaverton, for example)

The cities within the county grew faster than the unincorporated areas
(including annexation), but comprise just over a third of the county's
population, so that the county still controls about 2/3 of its total area.
Beaverton and Hillsboro were the fastest growing cities through the
past decade.
Washington County is still very dependent on the remainder of the region
for its employment base. Roughly 46 percent of all employed persons
in the county work outside the county. Washington County also depends
heavily on Portland's CBD for goods and services. The ratio of nonmanufacturing jobs to manufacturing employment is 1.4 to 1 in the
county but 3. 4 to 1 in the SMSA. Total employment increased 100 percent in the county during the 1960-70 period; manufacturing increased
170 percent while non-manufacturing increased 135 percent. (Tektronix,
Inc. is the county's major employer; its 7,000 employees represent
43 percent of all manufacturing employees and 14 percent of total
employment in the county.)
But other developments are capable of altering the county's competitive
strength in the region. The new Washington Square retail center near
Progress is a prime example. This regional shopping center employs
some 3, 000 persons and contains roughly one-third the retail floor area
of Downtown Portland. A new Community College is now being planned
adjacent to the proposed Rock Creek Reservoir, which (with the proposed

McKay Reservoir and the Scoggin project now under construction) will
add three regional parks to the county.
The Washington County, Oregon Comprehensive Framework Plan
(October 1973) has presented its land use requirements to the year
2000 based on a low population projection. The report relates eleven
factors which can be expected to impact future growth in Washington
County, including:
o

Increased highway congestion into Portland

o

No new highways from Washington County into
Portland

o

Increased development controls

o

Development of 1-205 improving access in Multnomah,
Clark and Clackamas counties
Due to these and related factors, they do not see population reaching a
high of 484, 800 but rather remaining near 412, 200. Based on this lower,
population, they foresee some 404 acres of new commercial uses by
2000 - 41 neighborhood centers, 10 community centers and two regional
centers.
One official feels that CRAG's criteria for population or growth control
is inadequate because CRAG uses only water and sewer capacity as the
limiting factors. He would rather award design/density bonuses for
getting the "right" development in the "right" place. He favors design
"bonus" criteria rather than utility capacity because too much damage
is done by the way developments get built and not just due to the type and
size of development - - whether commercial, residential or industrial.
Once the County Planning Commission and developers become more
familiar with the design bonus concepts, there are plans to implement
development ceilings based on standards for types and number of
development. The county might goto a priority rating schedule in 1975.
Every two years, the county plan will be reappraised as to its design
concepts rather than just zoning. They have already rezoned 70% of
the county into four broad land use classifications - - Urban Growth Area,
Intermediate Urban Growth Area, Rural Intermediate Growth Area, and
Natural Resource Area.
Development will take place in a manner to create or reinforce existing
communities. The Intermediate Urban Growth Area will accommodate
urban use as planned over a 20-40 year time frame consistent with the
natural resource base.

It is felt that there should be a balance between employment and residential uses in the county. Concentration in Portland should stop, or
at least not exceed certain levels, so that the regional centers concept
can be implemented. Washington Square is viewed as a good example
of such a desirable center. A connection by public transit of some form
is favored between Washington Square and State Route 217, with perhaps
medium density residential and/or industrial parks along the corridor.
State Route 8 would be another area for this type of linear/cluster
development, with medium density units - - 8 to 14 dwelling units per
acre - - along the corridors, utilizing 20 acres or larger as a developed
project size.
A regional center is seen as feasible at the Sunset Highway (26) and the
217 interchange (north of Beaverton). The intersection is now mostly
undeveloped except for nearby St. Vincent's Hospital, but apparently one
developer holds acreage of sufficient size for such a shopping center.
Standard Insurance is also promoting a shopping center at the Sunset
Highway and 185th Avenue intersection near Somerset West. The map
of the Recommended 1990 Bus Rapid Transit System for PVMATS shows
two bus lines approaching but bypassing this intersection. If the center
is ever built, the bus service would surely be routed through it. The
county recently stopped a proposed shopping center north of Hillsboro
but is still negotiating with the developer about possible design changes.
Washington County experienced sewer problems during the last two years
but is now putting in two new sewage treatment plants. The Unified
Sewerage Agency in Washington County tends to support a controlled
growth approach to planning, as does the Board of County Commissioners.
(The Unified Sewerage Agency covers approximately 200 square miles
out of the county's 714 square miles.) The county recently revised its
zoning code. In previous years, the county zoning was considered much
less restrictive than the cities within the county, but now may actually
be tighter.
Another important consideration in Washington County (and other counties)
will be Senate Bill 101, which became effective October, 1973. This law
allows a new agricultural deferral tax, which apparently is similar to the
Williamson Act in California. There has been some opposition in the
county from groups such as the Rural Land Owners Association, which
feels that Senate Bill 101 and some planning and design concepts are
intruding on their land ownership rights. (Another similar organization,
the Land Use Council of Washington County, was organized after the
sewer ban during the summer of 1972.)

:

7o

Clackamas County
Information on the future of Clackamas County is sparse. The county's
Comprehensive Plan (August 1971) is a policy-oriented document with
sketchy locational criteria. An "urban area land use" map shows three
major "planned commercial" areas. One is west of Lake Oswego near
1-5, Meadows Road and 217. Another is south of Lake Oswego and
Wankers Corner, where 1-205 and Stafford Road intersect. A third is
shown near the intersection of the Milwaukie Expressway (224) and
1-205 north of Clackamas. Major highway commercial is strung along
McLoughlin Boulevard (99E) and 82nd Street (213).
A strong concern expressed in the plan is the residential suburban
sprawl and intrusion into recreational areas, particularly the Sandy
River and Mt. Hood Corridors. The Mt. Hood Highway (2 6) from
Powell Valley-Gresham to Sandy permits relatively easy commuting
from the recreation area to the Portland-Central Multnomah Area. No
major policies of control have yet been set forth for areas under severe
development pressure in Clackamas County; but conversations with
officials indicate that certain related policies are under active consideration.
Clark County, Washington
Clark County, Washington, is presently reviewing its land use, economic
base, employment and housing elements for the general plan. It will be
a "sketch" general plan and will probably not be finalized for about two
years. The county has no specific growth policy with respect to amount
or capacities or urban services and is more concerned with the spatial
allocation of new development. Sewers have not yet been a problem in
Clark County. The major problem is accessibility. The limiting growth
factor appears to be internal congestion and lack of access to Portland.
Other than the 1-5 crossing, there is no bridge for 40 miles up the river
and 60 miles down the river. (It is estimated that daily commuters now
total some 12, 000 going south from Vancouver to Portland, and about
5, 000 going north from Portland to Vancouver.)
Local planners are optimistic about the prospects for 1-205 Freeway
and the Columbia River Bridge, and improved access to Portland
especially. This is also one of the routes proposed by the Oregon Public
Utility Commission for a light rail transit line. In addition, the 1-5
Bridge and approaches will soon be undergoing alighnment and lane
changes to achieve full freeway status in Clark County. (At present,
1-5 in Clark County is in effect a limited highway with many exits and
entrances.)

The Washington State Highway Department is undertaking an origindestination study on the 1-5 Bridge and approaches. Clark County hopes
to utilize funds that would have gone into the Mt. Hood Freeway and
transfer that to the 1-5 work, and the proposed 1-205 extensions, or the
construction of light rail links to the Portland CBD. (The Mt. Hood
Freeway money is some $100 million. It would cost about $80 million
to put in the five proposed light rail transit lines according to preliminary estimates.)
New development is taking place north and east of Vancouver. A large
California development firm owns some six square miles in the eastern
area of Clark County near the proposed 1-205 alignment. (According
to rumor, the developer was instrumental in moving the 1-205 alignment further east from its original position closer to 1-5.) This firm
has 10 year options on most of the property and it will pay taxes until
development occurs.
Downtown Vancouver has suffered a gradual decline in retail business for
the usual reasons. Its ability to bounce back, however, is strongly
affected by factors beyond its control. One factor is the 12 percent
installment purchase interest limit in the State of Washington (compared,
to 18 percent in Oregon), which discourages installment buying in
Washington. The other is the 5-1/2 percent sales tax in Washington
compared to no sales tax in Oregon. Jantzen Beach Center on Hayden
Island (Thunderbird Company) will probably continue to siphon much
retail potential from the Vancouver CBD. Negotiations are presently
going on for space in the Vancouver Downtown Mall - but downtown
Vancouver does not appear to be a promising area for office or retail
development in the foreseeable future.
Clark County has developed an urban services boundary, within which
it will encourage development and outside of which will be rural. The
county has tightened rural zoning to restrict development outside the
urban services area to one-acre lots with septic tanks. Politics in
Clark County have obviously changed in the last 5 years. "Business as
usual" no longer appears to prevail but growth will perhaps not be
discouraged as much as in the other major counties. At the moment,
there is a traditional growth dispute between the affluent and small
cities (such as Camas which is generally higher income, and Washougal
with lower income families).

Regional Transportation Planning

The very physiographic features of the Portland SMSA make the nature
and effectiveness of the transportation of paramount importance to the
distribution of regional activities. Moreover, the backbone of the
Downtown Portland Plan is reinforcement of existing office-based and
retail activities - making-accessibility to the Central Area critical
indeed. It is therefore necessary to examine public policies in this
area rather carefully.
*
The Portland SMSA (or Columbia Region) is, at present, tied to surface
vehicular transport for movement of people and goods within the region.
Basically, this is a system of federal, state and local highways and
streets. In addition, a tri-county metropolitan transit authority (Tri-Met)
is moving toward a comprehensive public transit system - presently, a
bus service network. Portland is firmly tied into the regional highway
and transit network as the historical center of commerce. The city's
major external surface linkage (north to Seattle, south to California) is
via Interstate 5.
Within the region, however, intra-county linkage is not really complete.
For instance, previous transportation plans have long called for
additional loop freeways east and west of Portland proper. These and
other proposals have been often modified, and at present are represented
in a synthesis of proposals termed the Portland-Vancouver Metropolitan
Transportation Study (PVMATS). Since the PVMATS proposals appear
to represent multi-jurisdictional compromises, they are of considerable
interest at this junture.
PVMATS 1990 Transportation Plan - Highways
A cursory analysis of the March, 1971 Interim Report of the PortlandVancouver Metropolitan Transportation Study documents reveals a
strenuous effort to improve circulation outside and around the Portland
Central Area. If many of the recommended freeway, expressway and
highway improvements are implemented, the potential effect would appear
to be a siphoning off of downtown development opportunities due to the
creation of numerous highway intersection nodes closer to the suburban
population.
Some of the recommended improvements could bring suburban workers
more easily to Downtown Portland office buildings. But without adequate
public transit and improved downtown circulation and parking, there
would be an upper limit to the benefits to the Central Area derived from
the recommended highway improvements.

Of course, many of the highway recommendations cannot or will not be
implemented even by 1990. The interim report draws on statistics and
opinions formulated before 1970 which more than likely cannot be sustained in this present atmosphere.
In our preliminary discussions with officials in the region, only the
1-205 segments of the highway plan were expected to be implemented.
Transportation planners in the region note three "hot" transportation
issues. The first is the Interstate 505 connection near the Fremont
Bridge, which will probably be made. Second is the Marquam Bridge
connection to 1-80 north, which the spokesman did not feel would be
constructed even to accommodate transit and exclusive bus facilities.
The third issue is 1-205 on the east, which was believed would be
implemented. Some portions of 1-205 to the south are under construction
or completed. If 1-205 is constructed across the Columbia River, Clark
County would certainly benefit through the opening of development
opportunities on its east side. (The implication is usually made that
political figures in the State of Washington favor the connection and
will put pressure on the Federal Government and others to see that it
is built.)
In the region, there is considerable expressed support for 1-205. While
there is some Oregon opposition for "purely political" reasons (including
anticipated competition from Clark County), it was felt that congressional
representatives and others were very strongly in support of a new bridge
over the Columbia River for the continuation of 1-205. Portland officials
did not feel that the Mt. Hood Corridor would receive support for new
or improved highway construction, but would most likely be developed
for transit such as light rail.
Mass Transit
The light rail concept under discussion by the Oregon Public Utilities
Commission and others, holds considerable opportunities for the region.
Four corridors are presently being studied. The first corridor uses
the Union Pacific right-of-way and parallels the Banfield Freeway as
far as Troutdale. The second corridor is along Jefferson Street, the
west bank of the Willamette to Lake Oswego. The third corridor Oaks Park - travels on the east bank of the Willamette and diverges to
the cities of Milwaukie and Gresham along Johnson Creek. The fourth
corridor is the Mt. Hood Corridor. All corridors would use existing
rights-of-way and would entail an expenditure of about $83 million,
considerably less than some planned highway construction or more
"advanced mass transit forms. "

It is felt that the light rail concept would take only three to four years
to implement. Grade separation is not a problem since the system
would be similar to San Francisco trolley-buses subject to traffic
lights, and not an exclusive guideway concept. The light rail concept
appeared to have the enthusiastic support of many persons for reasons
of relatively low cost and relationship to the energy crisis. If implemented, it should tend to encourage a stronger Downtown Portland. A
great deal will depend, however, on the level of service contemplated,
including efforts to accommodate patronage other than commuter access.
But, in the immediate future, mass transit in the Portland-Vancouver
Metropolitan Area will be organized on the basis of an extensive bus
(express and feeder) network, similar to that envisioned in the Recommended 1990 Bus Rapid Transit System developed as a result of the
PVMATS work. The Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District (Tri-Met)
is moving directly toward a radial express bus service network at this
time. Tri-Met has located some five "suburban transit stations"
(Gateway, Sunset, Lake Oswego, Milwaukie, and Vancouver) sites and
is preparing a detail design effort and applications for capital grants
to implement the suburban-to-Portland/Vancouver linkage.
•
The importance of a reasonable merger of environmental guidelines
and an improved transportation system (especially mass transit)
cannot be overstated. Presently, Tri-Met is initiating a large
technical study of system improvements throughout its service
area. No clear direction will be available from this work for at
least another year.

Other Tentative Regional Policy Directions

The various jurisdictions controlling the scale, pace and location of
urbanization are considering, but not yet actually implementing, coordinated land use and service policies. The major regional agencies involved
in the Columbia Region (land use, service and transportation) are making
many recommendations for (1) control of suburban development, (2) environmentally-oriented transportation improvements, and (3) changes in
regional relationships in these areas.
On the whole, however, most policies are either in the discussion stage
or slowly moving towards adoption. There are, of course, certain
strong policies now in effect related to control of pollution and trans-

portation service. It is in the general area of land use, zoning and
development regulations that considerable confusion still exists.
This too, should be clarified in the near future. Legislation is being
proposed on all sides to strengthen planning bodies and their roles in
shaping suburban and r u r a l land use patterns. For example:
The recent passage of at least two state bills has apparently strengthened
the role of CRAG; the bills are SB 769 and SB 100. SB 769 was passed
by the Oregon legislature and signed by the Governor. It establishes a
new regional planning agency covering the three counties of Clackamas,
Multnomah and Washington. The new agency would now be more legally
responsible for implementation of a regional plan. Membership is mandatory for the counties and cities therein. The CRAG Executive Board
has consisted to date of local elected officials on a voluntary b a s i s . The
new board of directors will be appointed as follows:
(a)

One member appointed by the governing body of
each member county

(b)

One member appointed by the governing body of
each member city having more than 300, 000
population on the effective date of the legislation

(c)

One member representing the cities having a
population of less than 300, 000 on the effective
date of the law and situated within each member
county in the district, selected by joint action of
a majority of the mayors of such cities

The initial board has seven members - one representing Portland, one
for each county and one for all the cities in each of the three counties.
There are also provisions for appointing associate m e m b e r s from
special districts, political subdivisions of the state, agencies of the
state or the Federal Government and any other interested and affected
public bodies. Presumably, Clark and Columbia Counties as well as
agencies like Tri-Met and the Port of Portland will join or have already
joined as associate m e m b e r s .
Section 9 of SB 769 says (in part) that the district shall:
(1)

Adopt by rule regional land use planning goals and
objectives

(2)

P r e p a r e , maintain and modify... a plan. . .

(3)

Designate areas and activities having significant
impact.. .and establish rules and regulations f o r . . .
such areas and activities

(4)

Review the comprehensive land use plans in effect. . .
and recommend or r e q u i r e . . . changes

(5)

Coordinate the land use planning activities

(6)

. . . (R)eview the zoning, subdivision and other
similar ordinances and regulations of its members
and associate m e m b e r s . . .

(7)

Coordinate its activities.. . with Federal government. . .
(and other local and state bodies)

Senate Bill 100, the Oregon State Land Use Bill gives the above formed
body yet more power in reviewing county and city plans. The new d i s trict must adopt planning goals and guidelines in compliance with those
of the State Land Conservation and Development Commission, and
assure the compliance of all the member governments with those goals
and guidelines.
These and similar "teeth" placed into regional affairs will clearly impact
upon urbanization trends in the region, as they are utilized to the fullest.
The net result may well be a series of deterrants to continued suburban
expansion, although this is speculation at this point.
Recognizing, however, that a movement is underway to carefully examine
the implications of various regional growth patterns, we conclude that:
o

In the short run, some limits will be placed on
formerly uncontrolled suburban development,
but the trend will continue indefinitely

o

Central Portland office employment will probably
be supported, in the long run, by emerging land
use controls and transportation policies; but other
uses, particularly retail, a r e somewhat undermined by possible expansion of regional commercial
centers

o

The long-run concept of "balanced growth" in the
counties could, ultimately, work to the detriment

of Central Portland if sufficient employmentgenerating use is permitted elsewhere
o

All policies combined are not yet acting, in a
coordinated sense, to either direct growth to
Portland or definitely shift it away from Portland.
The ad hoc nature of fragmented jurisdictional
actions is really responding to market forces
identified in our earlier report on projected
growth. We believe that this regional setting
will not materially change in the near future,
although significant adjustments are coming

Thus, from a regional point of view, we believe current and anticipated
public policies are (1) favoring Central Portland in terms of employment
concentration at relatively high densities (services employment);
(2) shifting Central Portland's retail base to suburban centers, and
(3) strongly supporting increased mobility of suburban workers with
reference to overall regional access (which, at least in the short run,
may have a neutral impact on Portland - but a strong impact on certain
regional residential patterns). Portland's voice in new forms of regional
government will be critical to it's position as these various public relationships and responsibilities come into increased focus.

Internal Policies - Portland's
Own Directions
Though responding and linked to regional policies and impacts, the City
of Portland itself does, to a large degree, also initiate policies that have
a strong bearing on Downtown's future. There are a number of policy
areas where decisions (affecting the scale and distribution of uses within
Portland) will tend to support or undermine implementation of the Downtown Plan. Some of the most significant, we believe, are:
o

The permitted balance of retail, hotel and
office development between the Downtown
(the entire area within the loop circulation
system) and other areas under significant
development pressure; i. e.
Lloyd Center across the river

John's Landing and other similar waterfront zones south of Downtown
o

The permitted location, type and scale of
development within the Downtown Plan
study area, such as high density projects
immediately on the Willamette Riverfront,
but outside the Plan's designated corridors
of high-density use (OIC and PGE are excellent examples)

o

Parking facility capacity and location affecting
possible intensity of development

o

Transit vs. vehicular circulation into and
through the Downtown

The scale of uses called for in the Downtown Plan is such that a considerable share of all regional office, retail, entertainment and residential
use will have to be captured within the designated zones of the plan. We
have previously pointed out the apparent outlook for Portland itself to
capture at least the bulk of office development for some time; but it
should be clear that the Downtown share itself will be dependent on the
shares captured in competing areas, such as Lloyd Center and OIC.
To put it plainly, there will only be a finite share of new development in
total.
If competing zones in Central Portland are permitted to develop apace
with the Downtown, the following is likely to occur: (1) obsolete office
and retail space in the Downtown will not be replaced at a pace implied
in the plan; (2) policies related to mass transit service to the existing
Downtown concetrations will be considerably more difficult to carry out;
(3) the current and anticipated problem of underutilization of Downtown
land area will be worsened; and (4) suggested residential development
programs in the Downtown will be unlikely.
Recent controversial planning decisions at the Portland City level have
pointed up this classic dilemma involved in executing the current Downtown Plan. These distributional problems coupled to the regional outlook
for continued conflicts in achieving "balanced growth" illustrate that:
o

Although regional policies may ultimately
fragment the pattern of non-residential uses
• now generally concentrating in Portland, there
is still time for Portland itself to voice strong

support of centralization directed to Portland's
business zones
o

Even with this achieved, however, Portland must
settle upon a strategy that actually reinforces the
Downtown Plan's key elements. Without such a
stance, the city policies may well achieve some
centralization of desirable uses in Portland, but
at the expense of the Downtown Plan

Recommended Positions for Portland
Related to Downtown Plan Implementation

The determinants of regional location for all proposed Downtown uses
will be, as we have pointed out, essentially these:
o

The effective demand for new space

o

The overall health and vitality of Downtown (in
the widest sense)

o

Availability of buiidable sites that permit
financially feasible investment

o

Access to Downtown (regional and citywide)

o

Perceived obstacles to or support for new
development (regulations, attitudes, and
effective costs)

o

Competitive locations

Our analysis of the outlook for continued development of Downtown
Portland assumes that the pressures for continued location of officebased employment there will in all probability continue through 1990.
Less certain is the outlook for retailing, at least of the scale implied
within the Downtown Plan. The same condition exists with respect to
entertainment (theaters and the like) and hotel/motel use; - that is,
certain pressures for additional space in Downtown Portland can be
assumed, but strong contervailing forces (primarily interest in suburban
sites) do exist that could diminish Downtown's share of these regional
development categories over time. With respect to housing, any major
increase in Downtown's residential inventory will occur only with
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concentrated public support of its development; and even with that, we
fully expect housing advances to come slowly.
Taking these findings forward and relating them to the Downtown Plan
(and policies to support the plan's elements) thus generates these
questions:
o

What changes in public policies will lend the
greatest measure of support to the Downtown
Plan?

o

What specific action programs will tend to
enhance the outlook for achieving the "difficult"
plan elements?

o

Of these programs, which appear "controllable"
(i.e. within Portland's sphere of influence and
capability) and therefore reasonable recommendations?

In order to even attempt answers to the above, it is necessary to
segregate, to the extent possible, questions related to the regional
setting (that is, Downtown's position vis-a-vis other competing locations)
and questions related to distribution (or the location of suitable uses
within the Downtown Plan Area). For instance, the plan calls for
continued attraction and development of office and retail space, at a
varying scale, throughout the study area. It also calls for various
specific types of space use, on a planning district or zonal basis,
within Downtown. Clearly, the first element is one of a regional
nature, and the second an internal or distributional concern.
From our work on regional growth and public policies, we have determined that certain changes in overall policies may support or undermine
the Downtown Plan over the next decade or so (although it is impossible
to determine precisely the degree to which this might occur). Again,
within the range of uses making up a healthy Downtown Portland, we
have found the outlook for office space to be strongest. Retail and
entertainment are less so, and the housing outlook the least encouraging.
Turning to regional policies then, we find that the largest measure of
support for implementation of the Downtown Portland Plan will occur if
these policy changes are considered:
o

That regional planning agencies take note of the
Downtown Plan and recognize its dependence upon
a continuing focus on Downtown Portland (this
would conflict to a degree with present discussions
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of "balanced growth" in other regional centers).
o

That major new commercial centers in outlying
locations be less readily accepted, or at least
examined carefully for impact considerations prior
to approval by local bodies.

o

That regional .transportation planning not be carried
out unilaterally (this includes highways and mass
transit planning). That is, magor elements of the
system must be clearly related more to supporting
Downtown and less to opening up additional suburban
development opportunities.

For instance, there is presently a major regional transit planning
effort underway. One aspect of the plan is exploration of additional
transit service to Downtown for suburban-to-central city commuters.
Another, however, is the concept of intensified residential and commercial use around certain suburban transit stations. Thus on the
one hand Downtown employment growth is supported; while on the other
new competitive locations (with retailing and office space the logical
uses) are being considered. This example (and there are always others)
simply points out the conflicts inherent in special-purpose public activity,
where it is difficult (and sometimes impossible) for agencies charged
with service delivery to work within very broad horizons. Transportation
planning in the highways area is also important, since improvements to
freeways and land service roads routinely open up adjacent lands to
urbanization. Thus, while surface transportation plas may be geared to
safety and travel time-saving, one effect for central cities (Portland is
no exception) is to spread population and new employment centers further
from the traditional regional center.
From an action viewpoint, there is but a limited amount of influence even
a major city can exert upon a large regional body. In Portland's case,
we believe that a position of concern for the Downtown Plan must,
however, be continuously demonstrated; at least to the extent that
the area's preeminence as a commercial center is actively guarded in
a regional context.
It might easily be argued, however, that adjusting regional planning
solely to Downtown Portland's interests is, at this point, inequitable.
The basis for such reasoning would be that Portland already has a
powerful central city employment base, a reasonably strong retail
core, and other growth housing opportunities. Thus, to place regional
planning as a whole in a subservient position to planning for Downtown

Portland only adds to Portland's "comparative advantage" (in the eyes
of competing locations).
These conflicts arise in every region, and are exacerbated by the heavy
dependence of public bodies upon real property valuation for revenues,
among other things. Without a massive (and unlikely) shift from this
revenue base to another, the struggle for real estate investment (taxable
property) will continue between central cities and suburbs. In Oregon, .
this situation is made more difficult by the absence of a sales tax,
further increasing the dependence upon real property taxes for the bulk
of local public expenditures.
It is therefore likely that from a regional land use standpoint Downtown
Portland will be supported by regional policies that tend to limit commercial proliferation, (especially large shopping/office centers) and
undermined by a reverse set of policies. Similarly, maintenance of
first-rate access for workers and visitors to Downtown is of paramount
importance. Clearly, a mass transit emphasis could provide the greatest support for Downtown with a minimum level of suburban impact (as
opposed to street and highway improvements). Portland's role in
regional affairs should thus reflect Downtown Plan goals and objectives,
concentrating upon the two major considerations noted here.
Moving from a regional setting to the local scene (Portland City), we
now find somewhat similar issues to consider. Again in terms of
public policy, it may be simply stated that implementation of the major
Downtown Plan elements will be supported by (1) minimizing competition;
(2) diverting public resources to the Downtown to a reasonable degree;
(3) avoiding investment processing and approval obstacles that drive
prospective investors elsewhere; (4) bringing buildable sites to the
marketplace; and (5) balance planning objectives against the reality
of market dynamics.
If one assumes that market forces will in fact continue, or be slightly
adjusted in Portland's favor, the citywide distributional or allocation
question becomes of some importance. Most importantly, this means
attempting to align specific Downtown Planning guidelines with overall
development potentials. We mention again that of the various uses
slated for Downtown overall, the "difficult" cases will be retailing and
housing. For the most part, these and related policies administered
by Portland City will affect the "internal" distribution and scale of
new development within the Downtown Planning Area (and thus affect
apparent investment performance and private interest in Downtown):
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o

Height and density regulations will strongly affect
office space development, and to a limited
extent housing

o

Parking regulations will primarily affect retail
and services development, and to a lesser
extent office space

Another consideration, of course, is the character of Portland City
attitudes towards intensification of commercial and residential zones
elsewhere in the city. Clearly, any serious obstacles to development
(arising from land use regulations or transportation problems) could
to a degree shift city-oriented potentials to the east bank of the
Willamette (Lloyd Center primarily) or the airport vicinity, or to
other locations where developing sites for office space, retail or
housing is not as difficult.
Thus, also at the local level, recognition of the Downtown Plan is
imperative, if the guidelines are to be carried forward. The roles
of Portland agencies related to Downtown (particularly with respect
to parking and land use regulations) should be adjusted to fit the implied
objectives of the plan, and not allowed to develop independently.

Changes in public policies that affect implementation of the Downtown
Plan are likely, as we have stressed, to bring about additional support
for the "problem areas" (housing, retailing and entertainment), but not
materially affect the direction of office-based activity in Downtown zones.
What the magnitude of change might be if such policy adjustments are
achieved is the subject here.
The foregoing discussion of public policies illustrates that regional
policies stressing "balance growth" in other SMSA settlements are
likely to impact upon commercial space inventory growth in the
Columbia Region, but far less so upon major office development, except
for regional centers emphasizing shopping centers with a small office
increment (the classic "shopping center" upgraded to muti-purpose use).
Our analysis of regional development trends indicates that Downtown
Portland, under existing policy sets, should capture some 7 percent
of regional retailing potential, to the degree it can be accommodated
Downtown, and to the degree that proliferation of such outlying regional
centers is controlled through cooperative action at the regional level.
Our estimates of Downtown capture potential in retailing and support
services reflect the current inventory of outlying competition (and
information on a handful of possible entrants into the market); however,
the period of 15 years hence will produce enormous pressure for additional outlying commercial development, as investors become aware of
the purchasing power being generated in suburban communities, and the
possibilities for profitable use of relatively experienced land (over and
above residential potentials as development pressures increase).
Exactly what shifts in locational pressure might occur if strong anticommercialization sentiments were to emerge in the region is impossible
to calculate. It is quite safe to assume, however, that the next fifteen
years will see some pressures for at least another half-dozen regional
commercial centers in the suburbs, as high income generation continues,
and existing centers become "too profitable". The implications of shifts
in regional planning policies (coupled to localized land use regulation
and control) for Downtown Portland are probably on this order:
No changes in regional attitudes towards additional
commercial centers is likely to prevent Downtown
from gaining an additional 1. 0 million SF of space
use in retailing discussed in Chapter II of this
report.
A modest change in public policies, perhaps suppressing one-half of the potential for outlying
centers, could give Downtown Portland additional
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support, primarily in the comparison goods area
(department store interest) simply due to its
already strong concentration and convenient access
to the regional trade area.
A major shift to suppressing commercialization
of available suburban locations could raise this
share substantially; but the actual percentage share
under these conditions is impossible to calculate.
There are legitimate reasons for assigning a larger share of such
"overspill" potential to the Downtown, including redevelopment opportunities there and the current drift of major retailer interest in CBD
locations (where high office employment activity is present or anticipated).
The actual numbers that result from this activity in each policy alternative
are not easy to generate; hypothetically, however, it is not unreasonable
to assume that Downtown Portland might enjoy an increase to some 10
percent in its share of regional retail potentials under the second alternative (modest control of outlying development), and perhaps as much
as a 15-20 percent share should dramatic efforts emerge in the region
to limit commercial development.
What this would mean to Downtown Portland is basically this: the Downtown share of household-oriented retailing would certainly increase over
time, even with existing competition and some additions to the suburban
shopping center inventory. This ability to redevelop portions of Downtown for major retail uses and link this new growth to the existing
concentration would be critical to the overall image and diversity of
Downtown; it would further raise the Downtown employment base, thus
perhaps increasing the outlook for housing in the study area, and it
would begin to again raise Downtown to its rightful position of prominence
vis-a-vis the suburban shopping center. It is not reasonable to assume
a Downtown capture of regional retail development above that discussed
here, due to the structural nature of the region's trade and various
transportation issues. The magnitude of even these changes, however,
would be substantial: for instance, an increase to some 20 percent of
Downtown's share of all regional retailing could possibly increase
overall retail
potential by some 1, 000, 000 square feet or more; this
translates into potentials for
other major department stores and
related shops, or perhaps additional square feet of eating and drinking
space
a decent increase in potential for these categories.
Once past the consideration of possible changes in regional development
patterns discussed above, it is appropriate to consider the local context;
or the distribution of uses within Portland itself and then within the
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Downtown. Our view towards ti . real potentials for Downtown under
all of regional growth alternatives is, however, predicated upon a
strong belief that in Portland only the Downtown, with implementation
of the plan, will be a suitable location for most of the additional retailing
potential here under review. Therefore, although some leakage of this
potential out of Downtown could be experienced, and some spillover in
Portland itself experienced - - for instance, to Lloyd Center, or other
non-Downtown locations - - no major local policy changes are likely to
have much effect upon the capture of potentials in Downtown, assuming
regional policies support additional growth potential. This is not to say
that additional capture in other Multnomah County locations close to
Portland might not occur; or that some growth in Clark County, Washington
might not be realized; but overall, with respect of retail use, local policies
should not have a major impact upon Downtown potentials, given any
possibility for additional shares of regional retail and services development.
Housing is affected less by regional policies than by a series of other
variables, such as the types of employment added to Downtown Portland,
the costs of commuting from outlying residential areas, fuel availability
for personal vehicles, and the effective costs of suburban versus intown .
housing. It is conceivable that regional policies suppressing further
residential growth in the fringe areas could, under certain circumstances,
divert some residential demand back to the Downtown Area, but it is
unlikely that this condition will exist in an effective sense in the next few
years. The future of housing in Downtown Portland will thus not be
affected to a meaningful degree by any set of regional policies, with
the exception of transportation: it is possible that the failure of the
region to implement a reasonable transit system for commuting, plus
increasing problems with automobile ownership and useage, could increase
the outlook for Downtown housing. To recommend that this policy be
considered is, however, unreasonable, since the greater public good
will be increased by transit, even if it ultimately means less housing
in Downtown Portland. No other regional policy appears to be changeable to the degree necessary to dramatically improve Downtown Portland's share of the regional housing inventory. The housing picture, as
we have pointed out in this report, will continue to be more of a function
of programs that bring reasonably priced housing to an existing market, than of regional policies, even with changes in the residential land
use component of the regional plan.
Housing will be affected much more by citywide or localized public policies, including the provision of direct or indirect subsidies for producers
of housing in Downtown Portland. But one certain effect upon Downtown
housing would be the creation of other publicly supported projects, in
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other locations. The clamor for public support of neighborhood rebuilding
that continues to be strong in every city is also present in Portland, although still concentrated in areas of serious racial and economic problems,
for the most part. Nonetheless, we must point out here that any movement by Portland City to create publicly-supported residential enclaves
outside Downtown will most certainly act in a negative sense to prolong
the outlook for housing in Downtown, since there is not an unlimited
pool of demand available at any given time for in-town units, even of
a moderate income character.
Localized housing potential will therefore be affected more by support
by Portland City in the area of subsidy for the units, whether direct or
indirect; and by the direction of codes and ordinances that support,
rather than deter, the creation of new units in Downtown by private
investors. With respect to the conservation of existing Downtown units,
it is necessary to place that goal above what might be normally-accepted
administration of building codes and ordinances - - for example, the
rehabilitation of existing units built prior to WWII will most certainly
require a sensitive approach to the application of code requirements,
since the methods of construction were different from that demanded
today, and the imposition of more recent code requirements in many
cases could make housing rehabilitation not a feasible proposition for
the would-be remodeler.
Other regional plans that have a bearing on the implementation of Downtown Plan guidelines include the actual configuration and service levels
of a regional transportation system. It is conceivable that the adoption
by Tri-Met (Tri-County Metropolitan Transit District) of a transit system primarily geared to servicing employment in Downtown Portland
could raise the effective share of office development in Downtown, if the
directions of regional growth did not already stress Downtown Portland
as the major concentration of institutional and professional office employment. Thus, although we strongly recommend that Portland City
representatives watch closely the planning of Tri-Met system improvements, we do not feel that transit service improvement will necessarily
change the share of office development that will accrue to Downtown in
the next ten or fifteen years.
Nor will transit per se have a great bearing on the future of retail potential
in Downtown; at least until that point when automobile travel in the off-work
hours and on weekends is more seriously curtailed than at present (another
fuel "crisis" of serious duration might well have a much larger impact,
with or without transit to fill the gap, since it could well divert some
retailing to Downtown, as employees buy there before leaving for home;
but it could move the other way, too, by inducing consumers to buy very
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near home at convenient times, thus supporting additional outlying retail
center growth). More direct relationships will exist between transportation policy and the outlook for housing Downtown, but as we have noted,
only to the degree that travel costs begin to exceed Downtown housing
cost increments.
It is impossible to second-guess the reactions of all groups to the adoption
of a parking policy that specifically limits the amount of new parking that
can be developed to service new construction in Downtown Portland. One
certain reaction we can foresee is on the part of the retailing community,
however; since parking is quite important to them, negative views towards
the absolute limitation of parking in the CBD particularly are to be expected.
Our own recommendation is that any parking policy adopted try to maintain the level of spaces necessary to support new retailing and some
office space use, and drop parking associated with new residential development, as a starter; then fall back to various set levels of parking by
phasing out existing lots and permitting new construction to include some
parking (perhaps at greatly reduced levels). Other consultants and city
staff working on parking and transportation questions have additional views
on this subject that involve avoidance of congestion in Downtown, access
to key points, and the like. Our main contribution here, we believe, is
to urge moderation in the application of a ceiling on total parking development, and carefully balance the requirements of new construction with
the elimination of surface lots that now prevent much optimal utilization
of Downtown land. One must remember that of the groups that may be
impacted adversely by a parking limitation, retailing will be the category
hardest hit; office use will be the next most affected, and residential use
the least affected (since many in-town residents will not require or desire
what might be a "normal" parking space allocation).

Preservation of Historic Buildings;
Street Improvement Outlays
Extensive preservation of historical buildings in a central city is a most
challenging and difficult Subject at best. The Downtown Plan recommendations related to preservation have been amplified by the work of various
groups concerned with restoration of many areas within the Downtown Plan
study area, . especially near the Waterfront, around the Skidmore Fountain area, and the like.
We have these thoughts related to implementation of the preservation
guidelines Suggested by the plan:
Limit serious preservation efforts to those
structures or features clearly of an "historic"
nature, since resources to accomplish a sweeping
program on scattered structures will be difficult
to acquire
Recognize that private parties interested in
preservation will not always be acting in concert with civic-minded or esthetically concerned
leaders of a restoration movement - - the
necessity to recover investment will often exist,
and views of owners towards extensive repairs
or restoration will be coupled with their attitudes
towards return on investment. Therefore, standards applicable to the restoration of these
structures should be carefully drawn up to
prevent unnecessary costs from impacting
upon the owner (by unnecessary we mean the
common search by city planners and designers
for a "perfect" restoration - - and this after the
building and safety departments have demanded
seismic strengthening, new code-level electrical
systems, fire systems, and so forth).
Although there is apparently a reasonably strong level of demand for
restored buildings to house professional and institutional firms interested
in the charm of such space, this is not an unlimited market: and there
will be a point where required rentals to meet historic preservation
levels will not be in line with market demand.

The Downtown Plan presently calls for a number of street and related
improvements, in addition to parking facility and park development
recommendations. The recommendation we have to offer on this subject
is simply this: many of the contemplated street closings, creation of
pedestrian walkways, skyways and related improvements are of merit
to the public at large, but perhaps less so to property owners and
prospective developers, if the improvements will be paid for through
direct charges or assessments against real property in the Downtown
alone. Already Downtown land values have risen to the point where some
sites are of interest only to a developer capable of financing relatively
intense space use, at rather high FAR levels; and the housing picture,
as we have pointed out, gets considerably more dim as these site costs
continue to increase in zones where new housing might be viewed a
desirable use.
We recognize that Portland, like other cities, has limited flexibility in
its use of general fund or general obligation revenues to finance specific
area improvements; we must caution those responsible for plan implemen
tation, however, to view many of the plan improvement elements as
possibly excessive, especially when attempting to introduce "problem"
uses into the various Planning Districts - - and to act accordingly when
calling for some of these improvements in conjunction with private
property development. An overall criterion we offer for consideration
is this: no major improvement project, with the exception of parking,
should be seriously considered in the near term if it involves significant
assessments against existing space use or potential development, unless
property owners and developers are generally in favor of and willing to
support the costs of the program.

Financial Support and Related Incentive Programs
Supporting Downtown Development

Nationally, there have been a number of financial and related programs
developed on a city-by-city basis related to development or redevelopment
of central cities and older neighborhoods. The number and utility of these
programs has increased by necessity as federal support for community
development has decreased steadily since 1968. Some of these program
types could have applicability to implementation of the Downtown Plan;
others might be too ambitious, or not sufficiently flexible for Oregon's
major metropolis. A review of a few of these program types is useful,
however, and is presented here.
Program Types and Normal Useagc
Housing support programs and the status of housing finance has already
been covered in this report. This category of program is straightforward, common, and varies little from state to state, city to city, except
in legal or procedural details. Housing is, however-, often treated along
with other uses in the development of programs to 0) induce private
investment directly, or (2) prevent "disinvestment" or the shifting of
investment from older urban areas to new emerging zones of interest.
Often treated as one category, we sec the use of public action programs
falling into these separate categories - - although the specific public actions
may blur into what appears a "comprehensive" support for an area's
growth and economic vitality.
Redevelopment, federally or locally financed, has had the most visible
direct impact of all programs employed. It is in itself action-oriented,
and although costly, often changes rather dramatically the shape, size
and function of a planning area. The nature and impacts of redevelopment are commonly understood today, and no extensive referencing will
be provided here.
Typically in conjunction with some sort of redevelopment scheme or
related area wide improvement, there are associated program types
that bear specific mention here:
o

Public improvements without major reuse activity
designed to stabilize or improve an area's activity
base (such as a street, traffic, landscaping effort).
Often funded on a benefit assessment basis covering
public debt (bonds and other long-term debt).
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o

"Tax abatement" and related incentives designed
to improve the investment climate for areas where
private interest is low. Normally used in place of
federal coverage of redevelopment costs, or where
state statutes do not provide for tax increment or
similar locally financed programs.

o

Joint development involving the coordination of
public and private investment in a mixed use
configuration. Usually associated with the
employment of air or other development rights
and parking facilities, transportation terminals,
or rights-of-way.

Oregon law and Portland practices provide numerous examples of the
use of local Improvement District (assessment) procedures, and the sale
and repayment of general obligation, revenue Bancroft Bonds and others.
Our assumptions are that the further employment of such programs will
be considered for Downtown implementation, and that some improvements
called for in the plan will so be financed.
Tax abatement and related financial incentives are not commonly considered in Oregon (or on the west coast as a whole), and at some point
might be applicable to a few difficult development objectives, such as
the production of new housing Downtown. Such an approach would, however, involve legislative action at the statehouse. Two excellent
examples of the use of tax incentives are illustrative, from New York
and Missouri (there are others).
New York State (State Tax Code Section 485,2210) will permit firms
developing in low-income areas (in cities of a size above 125,000) to
claim state income tax credit and certain exemptions from real property
tax for up to ten years following development of a new project. Various
requirements related to minority employment and operating characteristics are placed on the private enterprise. The City of New York
(Admin. Code J51-2. 5) permits up to twelve years tax exemption for
owners improving rent-controlled buildings, or a partial abatement
for twenty years covering 90 percent of new value created by remodeling.
Other exemptions (Real Property Tax Law Section 421) are granted
developers of new apartment buildings agreeing to a 15 percent discount
on rents or sales prices to tenants. Provisions for exemption vary.
New York's well-known Mitchell-Lama Housing Program (Housing
Finance Law, Articles II, III, IX and X) also exempts developers of
moderately-priced housing from taxes - up to 100 percent for 30 years.
Other types of development (industrial or job-generating) receive more
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in the way of direct subsidy (low interest loans or grants) in New York,
and the bulk of tax abatement goes to housing, a very difficult problem
there.
Missouri's incentive program (Chapter 353, State Statutes) was designed
to support the redevelopment of St. Louis and Kansas City, primarily,
and consists of two significant enabling considerations: (1) transfer of
a city's right of "eminent domain" to a selected private redeveloper,
and (2) real property tax abatement. Basically, the law provides that
a redeveloper may condemn sites if required (with proper public
approvals) to develop suitable projects in "blighted" areas. Taxes are
paid on land only for ten years following reconstruction, then at a 50
percent rate of assessed value for another 15 years. However, "in-line
payments" to the city involved are required (at a level corresponding to
that set by the area before redevelopment).
These programs and others similar are all designed to force-feed investment into difficult areas. They are variations on the theme of land cost
write-downs and tax increment financing employed in various states, and
should be considered as carefully as these programs are prior to
adoption.
In states and cities where redevelopment authorities are well-funded
and effective, transfer of eminent domain power seems an unnecessary
move. Tax abatement, however, does positively affect housing prices,
as it reduces a major component of operating cost, and is another method
whereby housing can be supported. If in fact housing cannot be developed
within the normal ranges of public powers in Downtown Portland, this
technique might well be considered. It does bring with it, however,
the same questions of equity (siphoning off revenues from school districts and counties) that accompany the "freezing" of valuation for tax
increment finance, and should be approached cautiously.
Joint development holds some promise where significant public investment is already installed or programmed. If Portland proceeds with a
concept of peripheral parking facilities, for instance, joint development
for other uses is a real possibility, and investors might well be
interested. The sheer amount of underutilized land now available
(parking lots, other "opportunities" noted in the plan) makes a major
look at joint use seem rather premature.

Redevelopment Procedures
Forecasts of 1990 development potential that might be captured Downtown
must be viewed as investment that could occur if conditions Downtown
favor such investment. These necessary conditions, as we have previously noted, include the availability of sites (at reasonable prices), the
ability for developers to receive adequate transit service and develop
some parking, and related considerations.
The present approach to redevelopment in Downtown consists of
(1) completing existing clearance projects, (2) proceeding with the
Waterfront Renewal Area, but on a scale of limited reuse, with minimum
clearance and maximum retention of existing buildings, many of which
are historical, and (3) limiting the scope of public acquisition and
redevelopment in the future. This may seem desirable at face value,
but in the long run may well act in a detrimental fashion upon plan
implementation.
Our analysis of potentials that might be captured in Downtown through
the next fifteen years indicates that assembly of larger blocks of land
would be the key to meeting plan guidelines with respect to housing and
retail use. Office development is much less dependent on redevelopment authority, intervention, since the scale of site assembly is considerably smaller than for multiple use projects, but there is a
relationship here also. Without public intervention, holdouts within
key areas are likely to prevent private interests from accomplishing
much in the way of extensive rebuilding. This situation may not be
particularly crucial in the short-run (five years or so), but over a
longer term, it may well suppress the type of development desired.
We strongly recommend that conventional redevelopment procedure
be considered as a desirable tool for plan implementation and not
something to be avoided. The likelihood of Downtown Portland
attracting a major multi-use retail/office/housing project near the
existing CBD is low without the ability to offer a larger (say four
block) site to private developers. There are safeguards that can be
utilized to prevent large-scale clearance from becoming either a
financial or political problem. For example, a project can be
designated but not executed until careful discussion of a potential
redeveloper's plans and level of interest indicates whether or not to
commit public monies. This approach (a back to back escrow arrangement) prevents the potential project from entering the public workload
prematurely and siphoning off funds critically needed for other projects.
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We estimate that, if sites are available, the
Waterfront Area could, by 1990 capture up
to 2 million square feet of office space and
500,000 square feet of retail use. Housing
redevelopment will occur if integrated into
multi-use projects; this will probably be
necessary to offset low financial returns from
housing developed alone.
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This raises an important question related to the use of scarce public
resources for redevelopment as Downtown Plan implementation is
carried forward. At least one major private project (The Oregon
International Center on the Waterfront) may be granted use of public
financial tools, such as tax increment financing. Without rating OIC
one way or the other as to its apparent viability with or without public
financial participation, we must point out that this and other projects
likely to emerge within or near the Downtown in the next few years
should be ranked rather carefully with respect to other apparent needs
for public intervention or financial assistance, prior to the granting of
such commitments from the public sector. It is quite possible that the
dropoff in federal funds available for redevelopment coupled to certain
emerging legal difficulties in the use of tax-secured debt instruments
will severely restrict any city's ability to move ahead with large
commitments to development projects, no matter how appealing the
probable social or economic impacts. Also there are definit limits to
the availability of such resources given the city's tax laws. Thus, it
makes considerable sense to begin thinking now of the probably requirements for public assistance within the overall Downtown Plan context
just in the problem areas (Areas 2 and 3) before committing public
participation to other projects that might well proceed independently
as soon as market conditions are right.
Overall, there will be only so many dollars available to support Downtown Plan improvements and development projects. What the requirements might be, financially, to bring Downtown up to a higher level of
regional importance over the years are now unknown. Until further
investigation is made into these costs, the premature commitment of
various public incentives, financial and legal, should be avoided. At
this point, only the Waterfront Renewal Area (Areas 2 and 3) has
official sanction as a possible "target area" for public participation
in a rebuilding program; and even this area is just now being evaluated
by various parties to determine its probable future character and the
requirements for public assistance.
Precise design and related planning for the Waterfront Areas is to be
carried on during the next two months. Our preliminary review of the
study area has, however, enabled us to develop these tenative conclusions
regarding a redevelopment approach there:
If maximum rehabilitation of historic and other
structures is assumed, limited large sites can
be offered for reuse (there are probably no more
than three or four multi-use project possibilities,
excluding the Union Station properties).
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IV
RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES
& IMPLICATIONS ON DOWNTOWN LAND USE

In the provision section a broad range of implementation questions and
procedures were discussed. The discussion included both the technical
ramifications and relevant public policy considerations connected with
various Plan proposals. In this section the specific measures that we
feel the City should employ to implement its proposed Plan are outlined.
The Height & Density Issue
Before accepting in final form the proposed FAR's for all areas,
review these to determine if landowners would be treated unfairly
as a consequence of imposition of height and density regulations.
Our own review suggested that they probably would not be, since
the Plan's specific height and density proposals conformed relatively
closely to prevailing land use and value patterns. However, this is
not altogether clear in the waterfront area between Morrison and
Madison, as the P.G.E. project, developed since completion of the
Plan, complicates the picture considerably. One method to assure
a reasonably fair allocation of land values would be to have independent appraisals made in areas where there are questions of the
appropriateness of an assigned FAR. If existing values are considerably
higher than other areas with identical FAR, the City might consider
the possibility of increasing the FAR by a reasonable amount, keeping
in mind its overall objectives with respect to downtown and the fact
that many sales take place at excessive levels because of reasons
noted earlier.
Review the proposals for height controls along the entire waterfront. .
A 40- to 50-foot height limit along the entire length of this area may
not be realistic in light of (1) reuse pressures in the southern half
of this area, (2) the preferences and predilections of many office
building developers and tenants, and (3) limited opportunities for
non-assisted housing along the waterfront. Retention of a low FAR
but with variable heights allowed would permit use of a bonus system
for medium income housing, which would appear to be the only way
that housing can be feasibly developed in the waterfront area. In
addition, height controls over a smaller area would probably be

politically more readily accepted, and the size of the area would be
more in line with the specialized market for such space. Finally,
reducing the size of the area would tend to more effectively set it off,
giving it a special uniqueness and attraction, than in the case where
height limits were extended over a very extensive area. A large
portion of the area between Oak and Glisan could appear to have
excellent potential as an area oriented largely to rehabilitation and
preservation of existing building heights, along the lines of the
New Orleans French Quarter or San Francisco's Jackson Square.
Retail Development Recommendations
. Limit the dispersal of retailing throughout the downtown. The
present plan calls for retail in numerous Planning Districts, but
retail development (especially for comparison goods) should be
encouraged as close to the existing CBD concentration as possible.
. Consider setting aside a potential site for at least one retail complex
(up to 500,000 square feet of floor area, plus additional office and
residential use if that is suitable) within downtown. One general
area might be a site just west of the existing CBD, including the
Rhodes store now vacant. A second would be somewhere directly
north of the CBD, just across Burnside within the existing urban
renewal boundaries (Areas 2 and 3).
. Align retail store parking requirements (in direct consultation with
existing store operators and prospective developers) within the
overall parking policy being considered for downtown. Do not
arbitrarily cut retailer requirements for parking without careful
consideration of the impacts upon the overall Downtown Plan guidelines (presently, outlying shopping centers use a standard of some
5 spaces per 1,000 square feet of selling area; CBD retailers can
do with less, but there will be a floor required to maintain a viable
retail district.
. Ensure that transit and related transportation system improvements
include consideration of retailing in downtown as well as the movement of commuters into downtown for employment. Examine the
transit system proposals for service to include consideration of
adequate headways at night and on weekends to encourage movement
within Greater Portland to and from CBD shopping facilities.
. Encourage the replacement of obsolete retail space with new retail
space, not office or other uses, particularly in those blocks near
the existing department store concentration. Space for specialty

shops can be worked in almost at will, since the demand for such
goods from rapidly increasing office employment will continue to
be significant.
. In general, maximize the physical assets within the existing CBD
retail core, through a program of public improvements and services
wherever required. Minimize the impact of special assessments
and related charges to the extent fiscally and legally possible, to
reduce the possible flight of retailers in that district due to rising
costs of occupancy.
Housing Recommendations
. Emphasize moderate-to-middle rental and sales targets, and
forego lower-income production as an unrealistic objective.
. Attempt to stimulate new housing integrated into mixed-use
projects, granting concessions to master developers for including
housing in approved plans. Develop a procedure whereby developers
of joint use projects, using a series of bonus and concession formulas (such as increasing FAR per unit of housing developed)
would be induced to provide a number of medium rent housing units
within a project at a suitable location.
. Develop a planning approval procedure whereby applicants for
joint-use projects can receive rapid, equitable review of proposals
where housing appears to be a desirable ingredient.
. Examine the relationship of such a joint-use approach to development
regulations in general, particularly in the waterfront area.
. Work carefully and conserve existing housing in suitable locations,
and return underutilized sites in appropriate housing locations to
the residential market. Complete a survey of downtown to more
precisely identify suitable locations for housing (working from the
rather broad area identifications contained in the downtown planning
districts).
, Investigate a city-sponsored revolving fund for housing development
(rehabilitation and new construction) which could be linked to statewide financing programs for new moderate income housing development.
Concentrate upon a city program whereby developers interested in
the provision of moderate income housing would receive assistance
similar to that found in other metropolitan areas (with the public

defraying some of the planning costs, and perhaps providing outright
grants for the remodeling of valuable segments of the inventory).
Consider creation of a Division of Housing Production or Coordination
that would operate in conjunction with, but not under the authority
of, City of Portland departments or the Portland Development
Commission. This agency would have the clear-cut responsibility
for working with state and private agencies in the moderate and
middle income housing area. Place the responsibilities for development of lower income housing squarely in that agency where access
to federal and other sources of public housing finance exists. Remove
the responsibilities associated with lower-income housing from
agencies responsible for dealing with private developers of marketrate housing. Far too much attention is paid to the rather impossible
task of developing below-market-rate housing through the private
market producers. It is not a viable approach.
Set a 1990 target of 1,000 market-rate housing units for the downtown.
Reassess progress on a regular basis, and readjust the target up
or down as progress is achieved on the bonus-concession approach
or from non-assisted sources.
Examine the legal, political and financial implications of instituting
tax abatement or related incentives with respect to the development
of downtown housing, but with full recognition of the problems
inherent in redirection or curtailment of multiple agency revenues
from real property taxes.
Work to eliminate or substantially modify the restrictive requirement
of the Building Code which prevents more than 50 percent of a building's value being added without bringing the entire building up to
code. This requirement clearly works to remove buildings which
could be rehabilitated in a series of stages. Fire safety in the form
of one-hour firewalls and doors, additional corridor exits and
sprinkler systems may certainly be necessary; but when viewed in
terms of the number of downtown tenants who are living under far
worse conditions of sanitation, inadequate heat and plumbing and the
like, it makes little sense to penalize an owner who cares enough to
want to put in any improvements. It is questionable, also, whether
any masonry structure can be brought up to earthquake standards
without incurring costs beyond new construction cost levels.

Public Policy Questions
. There is relatively little that central cities can do of a direct
natureto influence regional development trends. In Portland's
case, it would use the threat of water rate increases or other such
devices for leverage.
. A better method is to engage in a variety of indirect measures to
preserve Portland's status vis-a-vis the metropolitan area. One
of these is to encourage outlying areas to divert multi-housing into
concentrations easily serviceable by public transit, thereby
strengthening the central area. In general, open up direct lines of
communication with outlying governments, aimed at discussing
mutual goals and objectives. There is a necessity to identify policies
that are favorable, negative or neutral with respect to both. The
City can identify where its best interests can be served by the counties, and the counties can ask for favors in return. None of the
cities is raising questions as to what it should become in a hierarchy
of regional communities. The indirect route through supraregional
governments (i. e. , CRAG) helps, but the most effective vehicle is
through direct conversation.
. Encourage cooperation with respect to new outlying shopping centers.
Encourage their construction more in line with the incremental
growth in SMSA retail space demand, rather than follow beggar-thyneighbor policies.
. With respect to local policies, realize that what happens in areas
peripheral to the downtown can have even more profound effects on
downtown than what happens in suburban areas. In particular,
minimize the competitive advantages of peripheral areas by imposing
on them zoning, parking and other controls that are advantageous to
the downtown.
. Use urban renewal tax increment monies judiciously. Use TA
revenue in areas where the consequences are limited to one or two
private developments alone only with the greatest of reluctance.
The function of renewal is partly to bring about an upgrading of
areas that have undergone decline, but principally it is to stem further
downgrading and to force an upgrading of properties peripheral to the
renewal boundaries. It is particularly designed to upgrade areas
which could not undergo renewal in the absence of intervention,
because of multiple ownerships, the necessity to develop on a massive
scale, and so forth.
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. Reconsider attitudes and positions with respect to conventional urban
renewal tools and procedures (condemnation and clearance). These
tools can be used on a spot, rather than widespread, basis with
excellent results, without the negative consequences of massive
renewal. Merely by being able to threaten use of condemnation
would enable the city to move desired projects ahead with greater
effectiveness. Moreover, development of large multi-use projects,
the most dynamic central city investment device at work today, is
robbed of its effectiveness without city-assisted intervention in the
land market.
. Develop effective ordinances regarding elimination of surface parking. Do it judiciously, phasing controls over time so as not to
disrupt existing parking, tax revenue and land use requirements in
downtown. Such a program may have to begin by being limited to a
specific area at the outset, but one objective of the city should be to
convert underutilized land into offices, housing, hotel and other urban
uses to generate a more dynamic quality into downtown.
As was seen in Section II, the outlook for downtown land uses, aside from
housing and perhaps retail, appears very favorable. Hence, the principal
implications of the City's moving ahead with implementation recommendations relate to the effect on housing and retailing. They would also
indirectly affect the other principal land uses, however, in the sense that
they would tend to enhance and augment downtown locations vis-a-vis
projects located in outlying areas.
It would be impossible to calculate precisely the extent of the effect of
Plan implementation on housing and retailing, as their magnitudes would
depend upon how many of the above recommendations were actually put
into effect, the vigor with which they were pursued, the extent to which
ordinances or policies were carried, etc. Nonetheless, it is possible to
say in a general way that at least an additional 1, 000 market-rate dwelling
units could be added to the downtown and an equivalent number of moderate
income, assisted housing units could also be feasible. With respect to
retailing, an additional 1 million square feet of such space would be
possible, providing the City was willing to take some rather dramatic
steps, such as encouraging development of an in-town shopping center
or a variety of multi-use centers, assisted through conventional urban
renewal processes. In any event, one major improvement that would be
forthcoming would be elimination of much of the blight and otherwise
negative environmental conditions associated with surface parking. With
this measure, the City would bring down the scale of office, hotel and
other buildings, increase the numbers of such structures, and, in general,

bring about an upgrading in the appearance and vitality of the downtown
over a much broader area than is likely to be the case if the present
pattern of tall buildings and ground-level parking lots is continued.
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